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v0.1.1.0 feat: optional remote URL in .secrets-store (EGB-282) (#2)

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* chore: ignore .gstack/ (per-project local state)

* feat: optional remote URL in .secrets-store (EGB-282)

A second whitespace-separated token after the store name in .secrets-store
is treated as the store's git remote URL. When a teammate clones a project
bound to a store they don't have locally yet, the directed missing-store
error now fills in `git clone <url> <path>` so they can copy-paste instead
of asking the original setter for the URL.

Backward compatible: single-token .secrets-store files (the v0.1.0.x
format) continue to work and produce the existing `<their-store-remote>`
placeholder.

Security hardening (caught by adversarial review during /ship):
- The rendered git clone line is meant to be copy-pasted by a teammate.
  Without sanitization, `work evil.git;rm -rf ~` would render verbatim
  and execute `rm -rf ~` on paste. The parser now rejects URLs containing
  shell metacharacters (;&|<>$`(){}*?!"'\\), control characters (incl.
  ANSI escape sequences that could spoof terminal output), and embedded
  whitespace. Rejected URLs are dropped with a stderr warning; the error
  falls back to the safe placeholder.
- Switched from `set -- $line` to `read -r spec rest` so the URL field
  isn't glob-expanded or word-split — important so `work *` from a
  populated directory doesn't leak filenames into the URL field.

Tests 72 → 80. New: backward compat, SSH+HTTPS+~/-prefix URL forms,
comment-and-URL form, four named injection vectors (shell metachar,
backtick, $(), ANSI escape), multi-token URL, glob char, and a positive
test asserting standard git URL chars round-trip unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.1.1.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Brian Majewski 2026-05-09 14:54:45 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
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20
CHANGELOG.md
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@ -5,6 +5,25 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to a four-digit MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.MICRO version scheme.
## [0.1.1.0] - 2026-05-09
### Added
- **Optional git remote URL in `.secrets-store`.** Add a second whitespace-separated token after the store name to give teammates a copy-paste-ready clone command:
```
work git@github.com:acme/work-secrets.git
```
When a teammate clones a project bound to a store they don't have on their machine yet, the directed error now fills in the actual `git clone <url> <path>` line — they no longer have to ask the original setter for the URL. The URL is optional; existing single-token `.secrets-store` files continue to work and show the `<their-store-remote>` placeholder as before. (EGB-282)
### Security
- **Hardened `.secrets-store` URL parser against copy-paste shell injection.** The URL is rendered into a `git clone` line that a teammate is likely to copy-paste from the directed error. Without sanitization, a malicious `.secrets-store` containing `work evil.git;rm -rf ~` would render verbatim and execute `rm -rf ~` on paste. The parser now rejects URLs containing shell metacharacters (`;&|<>$\`(){}*?!"'\\`), control characters (including ANSI escape sequences that could spoof terminal output), and embedded whitespace. Rejected URLs are dropped with a stderr warning; the directed error falls back to the safe placeholder. Found by adversarial review during /ship; verified with regression tests for every named attack vector.
- **Switched URL parsing from `set -- $line` to `read -r spec rest`.** The previous form word-split *and* glob-expanded — `work *` from a populated directory would have leaked filenames into the URL field. The new form preserves the rest of the line verbatim into a single variable, so glob characters and internal whitespace are noticed by the sanitizer instead of silently expanded.
### Tests
- 72 → 80 (+8). New coverage: backward-compat single-token form, two-token URL form (SSH, HTTPS, `~/`-prefixed), comment-and-URL form, copy-paste injection (rm -rf payload), backtick injection, `$()` injection, ANSI escape injection, multi-token URL, glob-character URL, and a positive test asserting standard git URL chars (`-`, `+`, `_`, `:`, `/`, `@`, `.`) round-trip unchanged.
## [0.1.0.1] - 2026-05-09
### Fixed
@ -42,5 +61,6 @@ and this project adheres to a four-digit MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.MICRO version scheme.
- 37 → 66 tests. New coverage: store resolution rules and precedence, walk-up boundaries, command-injection prevention, key-file re-derivation across stores, teammate-onboarding error path, monorepo workspace binding, F1–F5 adversarial regressions.
[0.1.1.0]: https://github.com/bmajewski/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.1.0
[0.1.0.1]: https://github.com/bmajewski/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.0.1
[0.1.0.0]: https://github.com/bmajewski/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.0.0