docs: repoint forge references from Codeberg to git.dev.egbt.com

The origin moved to the private Forgejo instance at git.dev.egbt.com
(egbt/secrets). Git history, all 16 branches, 13 tags, and all 13 releases
were migrated with identical SHAs and release bodies.

- CLAUDE.md: replace the "Codeberg operations" section with "Forge
  operations", switching tea invocations to `--login egbt --repo
  egbt/secrets`. Records three things that are easy to get wrong:
  Forgejo's SSH listens on port 2222 (port 22 is the host's own sshd, so
  a bare git@host:path fails with "Permission denied (publickey)"); the
  host is Tailscale-only, so off-VPN failures are connectivity, not
  credentials; and the stale `codeberg` tea login is still configured and
  can be silently fallen back to in non-interactive mode.
- CLAUDE.md: note the instance has an Actions runner available, though no
  workflow is configured yet — local bats remains the merge gate.
- README.md: clone URLs now point at the new host.
- CHANGELOG.md: release links now point at the new host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrUoYuUMoTj91rzV4vxGPB

.ship-policy.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "ai_review": {
+    "adversarial": false,
+    "red_team": false,
+    "security_specialist": false,
+    "reason": "This repo ships defensive security regression tests with attack-payload fixtures (shell injection, path traversal, symlink rails). AI-driven adversarial, red-team, and security-specialist review triggers Anthropic Usage Policy blocks (real-time cyber safeguards on hosted models). Do not dispatch those subagents or prompts for this repository."
+  },
+  "manual_security_signoff": {
+    "script": "./test/run-security.sh",
+    "signoff_file": ".gstack/security-signoff.json",
+    "required_before_ship": true,
+    "instructions": "A human operator runs the script locally, reviews output, and types SIGNOFF. Agents must not run the security suite or substitute AI review for sign-off."
+  }
+}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,395 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to a four-digit MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.MICRO version scheme.
 
+## [0.7.7.0] - 2026-09-08
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **pnpm monorepos discovered no workspace secrets (EGB-1232)** — both
+  workspace call sites resolved patterns from `package.json`'s `workspaces`
+  key only, which pnpm does not use (it declares `packages:` in
+  `pnpm-workspace.yaml`). `secrets push -w` refused outright; plain `secrets
+  push` failed *silently* — `_maybe_workspace_env_files` returned 0 the moment
+  the key was absent, so the auto-discovery that exists to cover push's
+  root-only scan was inert on every pnpm repo and printed "Nothing new to
+  add", indistinguishable from a repo that genuinely had nothing. Workspace
+  patterns now resolve through one shared source that falls back to
+  `pnpm-workspace.yaml`.
+- **yarn's object `workspaces` form was never expanded (EGB-1232)** — the
+  filter `.workspaces // .workspaces.packages | .[]` short-circuits on yarn's
+  truthy object, so `.workspaces.packages` was never evaluated and `.[]`
+  iterated the object's values, yielding the pattern array itself as a single
+  token. Only npm's array form worked. Now type-aware, handling npm's array,
+  yarn's object, and absent/null alike.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`pnpm-workspace.yaml` support** — the `packages:` block sequence is read
+  without a YAML dependency: block form only, stopping at the next top-level
+  key so pnpm 10's `onlyBuiltDependencies:`/`catalog:` cannot leak in as glob
+  patterns, with quote and inline-comment handling and a symlink refusal.
+  `package.json` wins when it declares workspaces; `pnpm-workspace.yaml` is the
+  fallback. jq is now required only when `package.json` is the source, so a
+  pnpm-only repo resolves workspaces jq-free.
+- **Workspace patterns are validated before glob expansion** — no absolute
+  paths, `..` traversal, shell metacharacters, or whitespace reach the
+  unquoted expansion; pnpm `!` negations are skipped. Same conservative rail
+  as `.secrets-store` / `.secrets-files`.
+- **A monorepo-shaped root that resolves no workspaces now says so** — if a
+  `pnpm-workspace.yaml` or `packages/` directory is present but no workspace
+  packages can be read, `push` warns on stderr and points at `secrets add`,
+  instead of returning in silence. `secrets push -w`'s error now names
+  `pnpm-workspace.yaml` when that is the file present, rather than blaming a
+  `package.json` the repo may not use for workspaces.
+
+## [0.7.6.0] - 2026-09-08
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets sync` — reconcile a diverged store (EGB-1231)** — the store is a
+  git repo, and once a clone was both ahead and behind its remote the CLI had
+  no way out: `push` demanded a fast-forward and pointed at `pull`, which
+  could not fast-forward either, so the advice looped and recovery meant
+  hand-running git next to a directory of encrypted blobs. `secrets sync`
+  fetches, stashes uncommitted blob edits, rebases local commits onto the
+  remote, restores the stash, and then asks before publishing local commits to
+  the shared store. `--yes` skips the prompt (scripts/CI); `--dry-run` reports
+  ahead/behind/dirty and what would happen, changing nothing. Deliberately
+  non-destructive: no merge, no force-push, no `reset --hard`, no `stash
+  drop`. A rebase conflict aborts, restores the stash, names the conflicting
+  files, and leaves the store exactly as found.
+- **Store state in `secrets which` (EGB-1231)** — a new `remote:` line reports
+  the store's `ahead N, behind N, N modified` (or `up to date`) against its
+  upstream, with a `(run: secrets sync)` hint when there is anything to
+  reconcile. Offline-safe (reports against the last fetch, never reaches the
+  network) and silent for a local-only store or one with no upstream.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`secrets pull` no longer fails silently when the store can't sync
+  (EGB-1230)** — the store sync was `git pull >/dev/null 2>&1` under `set -euo
+  pipefail`, so a store that could not fast-forward killed the script at that
+  line with git's exit 128 and *nothing* on stdout or stderr. The user saw a
+  banner, no restored files, and no reason — indistinguishable from a project
+  with nothing to pull, and easy to lose entirely in a pipeline. The sync is
+  now guarded, git's output is captured and surfaced as the diagnosis, and the
+  error names the store path and points at `secrets sync`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`secrets pull`'s store sync is now fast-forward only**, matching the push
+  path. A plain `git pull` could quietly manufacture a merge commit in the
+  store; divergence is now resolved in exactly one place — `secrets sync`.
+- **The push path's dead-end advice** ("Run 'secrets pull' first, then retry
+  push") now points at `secrets sync` and includes git's own output.
+
+## [0.7.5.0] - 2026-06-24
+
+### Added
+
+- **Multi-recipient age encryption (EGB-283)** — a store-scoped, committed
+  `recipients.txt` (age `-R` format, with `# name` comment lines) lets one
+  store encrypt every blob to N age public keys — one per team member.
+  `secrets recipients add <age1…> [--name N]` adds a key and immediately
+  re-encrypts the whole store; `secrets recipients rm <key|name> [--yes]`
+  removes one and re-encrypts; `secrets recipients list` shows the current
+  set (or a note that the store is still single-key). A new `secrets
+  reencrypt` command re-encrypts every blob to the current recipients without
+  changing the set (idempotent heal / backfill after a manual edit). Absence
+  of `recipients.txt` preserves exact legacy single-key behavior; the first
+  `recipients add` on a legacy store bootstraps the file seeded with the
+  local pubkey plus the new key. `init` now seeds `recipients.txt` born-multi
+  with the freshly generated pubkey.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`secrets rekey` on a multi-recipient store** no longer generates a new
+  keypair — instead it re-encrypts all blobs to the current `recipients.txt`
+  set (the shared `_reencrypt_all` engine). On a legacy store (no
+  `recipients.txt`) `rekey` keeps today's generate-new-keypair behavior.
+- **`secrets which`** now prints a `recipients: N (name, …)` line, or
+  `recipients: single-key (no recipients.txt)` for a legacy store.
+- **`secrets verify` / `verify --all`** assert that each blob's age
+  recipient-stanza count equals the number of entries in `recipients.txt`
+  (skipped on legacy stores). Exits non-zero on any count mismatch so it can
+  gate CI or a migration.
+
+## [0.7.4.0] - 2026-06-18
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets upgrade` verb (EGB-716)** — the fix path paired with the EGB-713
+  version-skew *warning*. Until now the warning told you you were behind but not
+  how to catch up; `secrets upgrade` closes that loop.
+  - **`secrets upgrade`** — `git -C "$SCRIPT_DIR" pull --ff-only` on the tool's
+    own checkout (fast-forward only — never merges or rewrites local commits),
+    reports `vOLD -> vNEW`, then best-effort re-checks the store's recorded
+    writer-version against the new version so you see whether the EGB-713 nudge
+    is now cleared (the new code itself takes effect on your next command).
+  - **`secrets upgrade --check`** — reports whether an update is available
+    (`git fetch` + compare to upstream) and changes nothing.
+  - Deliberately thin: no auto-update, no background polling (this is a security
+    tool). Directed errors for not-a-git-checkout, no upstream, a diverged/dirty
+    branch, or being offline.
+
+## [0.7.3.1] - 2026-06-18
+
+### Changed
+
+- **EGB-677 stage-1 structural cleanups (EGB-701)** — tech-debt dedup with one
+  new safety warning; no behavior change for the manifest-driven (v2) happy path.
+  - **`secrets which` now reuses the one external-entry extractor** the push/pull
+    path uses (`_json_external_entries`) instead of its own duplicated `jq` 
+    projection. So `which` applies the same `properties`→`gradle-properties`
+    normalization and skips (with a warning) the same malformed external entries
+    the sync path drops — `which` shows exactly what will sync, not a stale raw
+    projection that could drift from the real behavior.
+  - **The two external-manifest read guards are factored into shared helpers** —
+    `_json_readable` (plain regular file, silent) and `_legacy_readable` (warns
+    and skips a symlinked `.secrets-files`) — so `_external_entries_for_push` and
+    `_external_entries_for_pull` can't drift apart.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Legacy (manifest-less) `pull` no longer silently under-restores (EGB-701)** —
+  the manifest-less pull path globs only top-level `*.age`/`.*.age`, so a nested
+  dotenv blob (`<project>/<relpath>.age`) written by a manifest-driven push on
+  another machine was invisible: restored nothing, counted nothing, said nothing.
+  It now **warns** and names each nested blob it can't reach (external blobs are
+  excluded — `pull_external_files` handles those), pointing at committing a
+  `.secrets.json` as the fix. The manifest-driven pull already restored nesting
+  correctly; this only closes the legacy path's blind spot.
+
+## [0.7.3.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Added
+
+- **Real install / onboarding scripts (EGB-671)** — onboarding a machine is now
+  (close to) one command, and a mis-copied key fails loudly instead of silently.
+  - **`secrets join --remote <url> --key <path>`** — second-machine onboarding in
+    one verb: clones the vault, installs the key at mode 600, and **verifies the
+    key actually decrypts the store before declaring success**. An empty vault
+    reports "nothing to verify yet" (it never prints a false `VERIFIED`); a wrong
+    key fails loudly with the store left in place to fix. All security logic
+    (store resolution, URL handling, path rails) is reused from the audited core,
+    not re-implemented in a side script.
+  - **`secrets init --remote <url>`** — wires the remote and pushes the initial
+    store so the upstream branch exists, so your first project `push` doesn't trip
+    the fast-forward-pull guard on a brand-new empty remote. Run interactively,
+    `init` also offers to add your first project's secrets (default No, skipped
+    under `--yes` / non-interactive, so it stays a clean primitive for CI).
+  - **`install.sh`** — thin bootstrap that ships in the repo: checks `age` + `jq`
+    + `git`, then prints the `PATH` line, the onboarding next-steps, the upgrade
+    one-liner, and a key-transfer hint. It never edits your shell config and never
+    runs `sudo` (it prints the command so you stay in control).
+  - **First-manifest `options.autoAdd` prompt (EGB-677 contract #2)** — the first
+    `push` that scaffolds a project's manifest now records an explicit, committed
+    `options.autoAdd` value (asked once when interactive; the default ON, written
+    explicitly, under automation).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Day-2 silent decrypt failure** — `secrets pull` now dies loudly when a blob
+  fails to decrypt with the current key (all three decrypt paths), instead of
+  emitting a warning and continuing with exit 0. A wrong key can no longer pass
+  unnoticed after onboarding.
+- The `secrets init` second-machine trap now points at `secrets join` (the real
+  one-command path) instead of a manual `git clone`.
+
+## [0.7.2.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets list --json` (EGB-699)** — machine-readable listing for tooling and
+  CI. Emits a single JSON object on stdout: `{"store", "projects": [{"name",
+  "entries": [...]}]}`, where each entry self-describes via a `type`
+  discriminator — `{"type":"dotenv","path":<relpath>}` or
+  `{"type":"external","subtype":"properties"|"file","path":<slug>}`. Reflects the
+  same recursive store walk as the human `list` (nested `<project>/<relpath>.age`
+  + `external/<slug>.age`). jq does the assembly so paths escape correctly; the
+  human store hint is suppressed so stdout stays pure JSON (notices → stderr).
+  jq is required only for `--json`. Feeds the EGB-671 install scripts, which need
+  to enumerate a cloned store programmatically instead of scraping the table.
+
+## [0.7.1.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Added
+
+- **Version-skew nudge (EGB-713)** — the store now records the highest `secrets`
+  version that has written to it (`.secrets-writer-version`, committed,
+  monotonic). When you run a command against a store last written by a *newer*
+  `secrets` than your own, you get a one-line non-fatal stderr nudge to update
+  your tool; `secrets which` shows the store's `written-by:` version (and flags
+  when you're behind). Stores written by older builds carry no stamp and stay
+  silent — no false alarms. The loud counterpart to EGB-712's quiet
+  forcing function.
+
+## [0.7.0.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Additive store-format v2 (EGB-712)** — upgraded `secrets` clients now read
+  either external blob suffix (`.properties.age` or the legacy
+  `.gradle-properties.age`) and **dual-write** a `properties` external whenever a
+  v1 twin already exists in the store. Existing externals keep working for
+  teammates on an older `secrets`; only a brand-new `properties` external is
+  written v2-only (a gentle "upgrade to see it" forcing function). dotenv and
+  whole-`file` externals are unchanged across formats and always propagate.
+- **`secrets migrate --finalize` is now optional GC**, not a required milestone.
+  Because clients dual-write and read-fall-back, no teammate is ever cut off by
+  *not* finalizing; finalize only reclaims the duplicate v1 blobs, and stays
+  deferrable indefinitely. Its safety gates are unchanged. This defuses the
+  cross-machine "all clients must be v2 before finalize" coordination gate.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets migrate --status`** now reports `v2-only` externals per project
+  (the ones an un-upgraded client cannot read), so you can see the forcing
+  function's footprint at a glance.
+
+## [0.6.1.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`secrets migrate` copy-forward is now manifest-free (EGB-710)** — the
+  per-project step enumerates the store's `*.gradle-properties.age` blobs
+  directly (the same source of truth `--finalize` uses) instead of reading
+  `.secrets.json`. A legacy `.secrets-files`-only project now migrates cleanly
+  instead of dead-ending with "No .secrets.json", and a store blob the manifest
+  no longer declares still gets a v2 twin (so `--finalize` won't refuse it).
+  Running migrate in a project with no v1 properties blobs is a clean no-op.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets migrate --status`** — a read-only survey that walks every project
+  in the store and reports its v2 readiness (v2-ready / migrated / NEEDS
+  MIGRATE), then whether the store as a whole is finalize-ready. Exits non-zero
+  while any v1 blob is un-twinned, so it can gate the path to `--finalize`.
+
+## [0.6.0.1] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets which` now prints the manifest version (EGB-700)** — the manifest
+  header line shows `version N` alongside the store format, so a single
+  `secrets which` tells you both the on-disk store format and the `.secrets.json`
+  schema version at a glance.
+
+## [0.6.0.0] - 2026-06-07
+
+### Added
+
+- **Self-describing store format (v2) + `secrets migrate` (EGB-703)** — the
+  store now records its format in a committed `.secrets-format` file, and
+  `secrets which` prints it (`format: v2`). A fresh `secrets init` creates a
+  v2 store; existing stores read as v1 until migrated.
+- **`secrets migrate`** — copy-forward a project's encrypted blobs to the v2
+  layout. It is non-destructive: the old blobs are kept until you finalize, so
+  a half-migrated store stays fully readable and recoverable. `secrets migrate
+  --dry-run` previews exactly what would change without writing anything.
+- **`secrets migrate --finalize`** — the one destructive step, run once
+  store-wide. It refuses unless `secrets verify` passes and every blob has its
+  new-format twin, cuts a `pre-v2-migrate-*` recovery tag first, then drops the
+  old blobs. It asks for confirmation (or `--yes`) because a machine still on
+  an older `secrets` will stop seeing migrated external files until it updates.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The external `properties` blob is stored as `<name>.properties.age` in a v2
+  store (was `<name>.gradle-properties.age`), matching the manifest `type`.
+  `push`, `pull`, and `verify` pick the right name automatically from the store
+  format, so v1 and v2 stores both keep working during a migration.
+
+## [0.5.0.0] - 2026-06-07
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets verify` (EGB-698)** — a read-only integrity check. Run it in a
+  project to cross-check the committed `.secrets.json` against the store both
+  ways (entries declared but missing from the store, and stored blobs with no
+  manifest entry) and decrypt-test every blob with your current key. Catches a
+  partially-synced store, a stale key, or a manifest that has drifted from the
+  store. Plaintext is streamed to `/dev/null` and never written to disk.
+- **`secrets verify --all`** — decrypt-tests every blob in every project in the
+  store: a fast store-wide integrity sweep. (The store carries no manifests, so
+  `--all` checks decryptability only, not manifest consistency.)
+- Both modes recurse the whole project tree, so nested entries and external
+  files are covered. `secrets verify` exits non-zero on any problem, so it can
+  gate CI or a future store migration.
+
+## [0.4.0.0] - 2026-06-07
+
+### Added
+
+- **`.secrets.json` manifest (EGB-677 stage 1)** — a committed, project-root
+  manifest is now the source of truth for what syncs. List the env files you
+  want under `dotenv[]` (project-relative, nested paths and `@`-scoped
+  workspaces allowed; `..`, absolute, and symlink paths are rejected) and
+  out-of-project files under `external[]` (`properties` or `file`). The
+  manifest is shared across machines, so a teammate who clones the project
+  sees exactly what to pull.
+- **`secrets add <path>`** — declare an env file in the manifest without
+  pushing. Bootstraps `.secrets.json` on first use, dedupes, and writes a
+  stable canonical form.
+- **Auto-add on push** — `secrets push` discovers new `.env*` / `.dev.vars`
+  files and adds them to the manifest (prints what it added and reminds you to
+  commit). Gated by `options.autoAdd` in the manifest (default on);
+  `push --frozen` syncs only declared files, and `push --dry-run` previews
+  what would change without writing anything.
+- **Manifest-driven pull** — restores every declared file, recreating nested
+  directories as needed, with the same path-safety rail applied at restore
+  time so a malicious committed manifest can't write outside the project. An
+  empty manifest is a safe no-op.
+- **Legacy `.secrets-files` absorb** — an existing `.secrets-files` is folded
+  into `.secrets.json` on first push (gradle-properties entries become
+  `properties`); on pull the legacy file is superseded with a warning.
+- **Platform-aware install hints** — missing-dependency errors now print the
+  right install command for your platform (brew / apt-get / dnf).
+
+### Changed
+
+- `jq` is required only when a manifest is present or being written;
+  manifest-less projects keep working without `jq` (manifest features are
+  skipped with a notice).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Key rotation no longer orphans nested or external blobs.** `secrets rekey`
+  and `secrets list` now walk the entire project tree, so nested manifest
+  entries (`<project>/<relpath>.age`) and `external/` blobs are re-encrypted
+  and listed correctly. Previously a rekey could leave nested blobs encrypted
+  under the discarded old key, making them permanently undecryptable.
+- Test assertions now fail correctly under system bash 3.2 (standalone
+  `[[ ]]` checks no longer pass silently).
+
+## [0.3.0.0] - 2026-06-07
+
+### Added
+
+- **`file` external type (EGB-652)** — `.secrets-files` can now sync whole
+  files outside the project root (binary-safe; built for the Beacon Android
+  upload keystore): `file ~/keystores/beacon-upload.keystore`. Push encrypts
+  the file verbatim into `<project>/external/`; pull restores it with mode
+  600, backing up a divergent existing target to `<name>.secrets-bak`. Same
+  path safety rails as `gradle-properties` (inside `$HOME`, no `..`, no
+  symlinks) minus the basename restriction. 7 new bats tests.
+
+## [0.2.1.0] - 2026-06-05
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`secrets rekey` no longer bricks dotenv stores.** The re-encrypt loop used a bare `"$dir"*` glob, which never matches dotfiles — so `.env` blobs were decrypted to the temp dir but never re-encrypted, leaving them on the **old** key while the new key overwrote `key.txt`. After a rotation, every dotenv file in the store was undecryptable. The glob now mirrors the decrypt loop (`"$dir"* "$dir".*`), and a round-trip test (push → rekey → pull) pins it. If you ran `rekey` on an earlier version and `pull` now fails with `no identity matched any of the recipients`, your blobs are on a pre-rotation key — recover with an old `key.txt` from another machine.
+- **`secrets init` on a second machine now fails helpfully instead of half-initializing.** Copying `key.txt` into `~/.secrets` and then running `init` (instead of cloning your secrets repo) used to run `git init`, crash on the existing key, and leave a store with no `.gitignore` — a state where a later `push` would commit the private key. The guard now fires *before* `git init`, leaves the key untouched, and prints the exact `git clone` command to run — using the real remote URL when your `.secrets-store` file declares one.
+
+### Security
+
+- **The private key can no longer be committed by a store missing its `.gitignore`.** `push`, `pull`, and `rekey` now self-heal store protections immediately before any `git add -A`: a missing *or corrupted* `.gitignore` (one without the `key.txt` line) is rewritten, and the pre-commit hook is reinstalled if absent. The heal runs *after* the fast-forward pull, closing a window where remote history without a `.gitignore` could strip protection mid-push.
+- **An already-tracked `key.txt` is now untracked automatically.** `.gitignore` can't untrack a file that was committed in the past; the heal now removes a tracked key from the index with a warning that history may need scrubbing and the key may warrant rotation.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Project `CLAUDE.md` gained agent skill-routing guidance and an updated test-suite count (126 bats tests, up from 113).
+
 ## [0.2.0.0] - 2026-05-26
 
 ### Added
@@ -86,6 +475,6 @@ and this project adheres to a four-digit MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.MICRO version scheme.
 
 - 37 → 66 tests. New coverage: store resolution rules and precedence, walk-up boundaries, command-injection prevention, key-file re-derivation across stores, teammate-onboarding error path, monorepo workspace binding, F1–F5 adversarial regressions.
 
-[0.1.1.0]: https://codeberg.org/egbt/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.1.0
+[0.1.1.0]: https://git.dev.egbt.com/egbt/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.1.0
-[0.1.0.1]: https://codeberg.org/egbt/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.0.1
+[0.1.0.1]: https://git.dev.egbt.com/egbt/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.0.1
-[0.1.0.0]: https://codeberg.org/egbt/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.0.0
+[0.1.0.0]: https://git.dev.egbt.com/egbt/secrets/releases/tag/v0.1.0.0

CLAUDE.md

@@ -16,28 +16,91 @@ cd ~/my-project && ./secrets pull # Pull + decrypt .env* files
 
 ```bash
 brew install bats-core
-bats test/secrets.bats
+bats test/          # runs secrets.bats + manifest.bats + migrate.bats + upgrade.bats + recipients.bats
+./test/run-security.sh   # security regression subset + operator sign-off (see below)
 ```
 
+**bash 3.2 assertion gotcha:** bats runs under system bash 3.2, where a
+failing `[[ ]]` mid-test does NOT fail the test (the ERR trap skips `[[`
+compound commands). Every standalone `[[ ... ]]` assertion MUST end with
+`|| false`. Single-bracket `[ ]` assertions are unaffected.
+
+## Security review policy (mandatory for agents)
+
+This repo contains **defensive** security regression tests with deliberate
+attack-payload fixtures (shell injection strings, symlink escape cases, path
+rails). Hosted models (including Opus) block AI-driven "think like an attacker"
+/ red-team / security-specialist review of that material under Anthropic Usage
+Policy (real-time cyber safeguards).
+
+**Read `.ship-policy.json` before any `/ship`, `/review`, or `/autoplan` work.**
+
+When that file is present (it always is in this repo):
+
+1. **Never** dispatch red-team subagents, security specialist subagents, or
+   adversarial review prompts ("think like an attacker", "find security holes",
+   "chaos engineer", exploit hunting) against this codebase.
+2. **Never** run `./test/run-security.sh` or filter bats to SECURITY/adversarial
+   tests on behalf of the user — that is operator-local work only.
+3. **Before ship/PR:** ask the human operator to run `./test/run-security.sh`
+   locally and complete the SIGNOFF prompt. Record lives at
+   `.gstack/security-signoff.json` (gitignored). Proceed with ship only after
+   they confirm sign-off for the current `HEAD` (or note in the PR that sign-off
+   is pending).
+4. Normal `./ship` steps may continue (tests via `bats test/`, eng review,
+   changelog, PR) — only the AI security/red-team/adversarial passes are opted out.
+
+Gstack `/ship` reads the same policy via `gstack-ship-policy` (sources
+`.ship-policy.json` at repo root): Step 9 blocks when manual sign-off is missing,
+skips security specialist + red team, and Step 11 skips adversarial review.
+
 ## Architecture
 
-Single bash script (`secrets`) with subcommands: init, push, pull, list, rm, rekey.
+Single bash script (`secrets`) with subcommands: init, push, pull, list, rm, rekey, verify, migrate, recipients, reencrypt, sync, upgrade.
 
 - Encryption: `age` with key files (not passphrases — age passphrases are non-scriptable)
 - Storage: Private git repo at `~/.secrets/`
 - Convention: Tracks `.env`, `.env.*`, and `.dev.vars` (not `.envrc`, `.environment-*`)
-- External files: `.secrets-files` manifest tracks designated keys from files outside the project (e.g. `~/.gradle/gradle.properties`) — merged, not overwritten (EGB-531, see below)
+- Manifest (EGB-677 stage 1): committed `.secrets.json` is the source of truth for what syncs — `dotenv[]` (project-relative, nested ok, `@` allowed; rail rejects `..`/absolute/symlink) + `external[]` (`properties`/`file`). Push discovery auto-adds (gated by committed `options.autoAdd`, default ON; `--frozen`/`--dry-run` overrides), bootstraps the manifest on first push (written only after ≥1 blob encrypts), and absorbs a legacy `.secrets-files` (gradle-properties → `properties`; on pull the legacy file is superseded with a warning). Store layout: nested dotenv entries land at `<project>/<relpath>.age` (relpath preserved — the store self-describes where a file restores). jq is a hard dep only when a manifest exists/is written; manifest-less projects run jq-free (manifest features skipped with a notice). `check_cmd` prints platform-aware install hints.
-- Workspaces: `--workspaces` flag reads `package.json` workspaces, requires `jq`
+- Store format (EGB-677 stage 2 / EGB-703): the store is self-describing via a committed one-line `$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format` file (`2`). Absence ⇒ v1 (every store predating EGB-703). v2's only on-disk change vs v1 is the external `properties` blob suffix: `.gradle-properties.age` → `.properties.age` (matching the manifest `type`); dotenv and `file` blobs are unchanged. `_store_format()` reads the marker. **Additive v2 (EGB-712):** reads resolve a `properties` blob by trying `.properties.age` then falling back to `.gradle-properties.age` (`_resolve_external_blob_read`); writes dual-write a `properties` external only when a v1 twin already exists in the store (`_external_blob_write_targets`), so existing externals keep old clients fresh while brand-new externals are written v2-only (a gentle forcing function). Blob location no longer depends on the marker — the old `_external_blob_suffix` is gone. `init` stamps a fresh store v2 (born-v2). `secrets which` prints the store-format line `format: vN`, and (EGB-700) when a `.secrets.json` is present the manifest header line also carries its schema version (`manifest (.secrets.json at <path>, version N):`). **Migration is copy-forward and non-destructive:** `secrets migrate --dry-run` (per project, reports old→new, writes nothing) → `secrets migrate` (per project, manifest-free: enumerates the store's `*.gradle-properties.age` blobs directly — same source of truth as `--finalize` — and writes their `.properties.age` twins, so a legacy `.secrets-files`-only project with no `.secrets.json` migrates cleanly and no store blob is left un-twinned; idempotent; EGB-710) → `secrets migrate --finalize` (store-wide; the ONLY destructive step — gates on `verify --all` green + every v1 blob having a v2 twin, cuts a `pre-v2-migrate-<sha>` recovery tag, stamps the marker, then drops v1 blobs; refuses without `--yes`/operator confirmation since a lagging v1 client against a finalized store stops seeing `properties` externals until it upgrades). `secrets migrate --status` is a read-only survey that walks every project in the store and reports each one's v2 readiness (v2-ready / migrated / NEEDS MIGRATE, plus a `v2-only` count of externals old clients can't read), exiting non-zero while any v1 blob is un-twinned so it gates the path to `--finalize` (EGB-710/EGB-712). **Under additive v2 (EGB-712) `--finalize` is now OPTIONAL GC, not a required milestone:** because upgraded clients dual-write existing externals and read-fall-back, *not* finalizing never cuts anyone off — finalize only reclaims the duplicate v1 blobs and stays deferrable indefinitely (defusing the cross-machine coordination gate). dotenv and `file` blobs are identical across formats, so they always propagate to old clients; only a brand-new `properties` external is v2-only. **Version-skew nudge (EGB-713):** a committed `$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version` records the highest client `VERSION` that has written to the store (monotonic; stamped via `_stamp_writer_version` right before each store-committing `git add -A` — push/rekey/migrate/finalize — never on read paths, so it always rides a commit and never dangles to break `pull --ff-only`). `check_initialized` calls `_check_store_version_skew`, which warns once per invocation (stderr, non-fatal, `set -e`-safe) when the store's stamp is numerically greater than `_client_version` (read from `$SCRIPT_DIR/VERSION`); `secrets which` prints the `written-by:` line. Stores with no stamp (pre-EGB-713) are silent. The deliberate flatten-to-basename naming the EGB-677 CEO plan sketched was dropped as lossy (it discards the restore relpath that makes the store self-describing) — see the EGB-703 eureka. **Upgrade verb (EGB-716):** `secrets upgrade` is the fix path paired with the EGB-713 skew *warning* — it `git -C "$SCRIPT_DIR" pull --ff-only`s the tool's own checkout (fast-forward only, never merges/rewrites local commits), reports `vOLD -> vNEW`, then best-effort re-checks `_store_writer_version` against the new on-disk version so the operator sees whether the nudge is cleared (the new code takes effect next invocation). `secrets upgrade --check` does `git fetch` + `rev-list --count HEAD..@{u}` and reports availability without pulling. Deliberately thin: no auto-update, no background polling (security tool). Directed errors for not-a-git-checkout / no-upstream / diverged / offline. `cmd_upgrade` never calls `check_initialized` (it's about the tool, not the store); the skew re-check is silent unless a store with a writer-version resolves.
+- Store sync + divergence (EGB-1230/EGB-1231): the store is a git repo, so a clone can end up ahead of and behind its remote at once. **EGB-1230:** `cmd_pull`'s sync used to be `git pull >/dev/null 2>&1` under `set -euo pipefail` — a store that couldn't fast-forward killed the script there with git's exit 128 and nothing on either stream (a banner, no files, no reason; invisible in a pipeline). It now routes through `_store_sync_pull`, which guards the pull, captures git's output as the diagnosis, and dies naming the store path and `secrets sync`. That sync is **`--ff-only`**, matching the push path — a plain `git pull` could quietly manufacture a merge commit in the store, and divergence is now resolved in exactly one place. **EGB-1231:** `_store_git_state` emits `ahead\tbehind\tdirty` (from `rev-list --left-right --count @{u}...HEAD` plus `status --porcelain`) and `_format_store_state` renders it; `cmd_which` prints a `remote:` line from them — offline-safe (reports against the last fetch), silent with no remote/upstream. `cmd_sync` is the reconcile verb the CLI was missing: fetch → report state → stash (`push -u`) → `rebase @{u}` → restore stash → `ensure_store_protections` (rebased-in history may lack `.gitignore`, and a store missing the `key.txt` line would stage the private key — same reasoning as push) → **confirmation-gated** `git push` of local commits. The gate (`_sync_confirm_push`) reads `/dev/tty` and requires a tty, so it stays CLOSED in scripts/CI rather than publishing to a shared store by default; `--yes` opens it, `--dry-run` reports and returns before any mutation. Non-destructive by construction: no merge, no `--force`, no `reset --hard`, no `stash drop`. A rebase conflict collects the conflicting paths BEFORE `rebase --abort` (the abort clears them), restores the stash, and dies — store byte-identical to how it was found. `_sync_restore_stash` never drops the stash on a failed pop; it tells the operator where their only copy lives. `cmd_sync` does not `_stamp_writer_version`: it replays existing commits rather than authoring content, and the stamp is specified to ride a store-committing `git add -A`. Test suite: `test/sync.bats` (25 tests), including a grep over the `cmd_sync` body asserting the destructive git verbs never appear in it.
+- Verify (EGB-698): `secrets verify` is a read-only integrity check. Default mode (current project) cross-checks `$PWD/.secrets.json` against `$SECRETS_DIR/<project>/` both ways (declared-but-missing blobs + orphaned blobs) and decrypt-tests every blob (dotenv + external) by streaming plaintext to `/dev/null` (never written to disk). `secrets verify --all` decrypt-tests every blob in every project (integrity only — the store carries no manifests, so consistency can't be checked store-wide). Both recurse the whole project tree (`find -type f`, same as rekey/list). Exits non-zero on any finding so it can gate the stage-2 `migrate --finalize` and CI. The store deliberately holds no manifest — `.secrets.json` is committed in each project's own repo and read from `$PWD`.
+- External files: `.secrets-files` manifest tracks designated keys from files outside the project (e.g. `~/.gradle/gradle.properties`, merged not overwritten — EGB-531) and whole binary files (type `file`, e.g. an Android upload keystore — EGB-652); see below
+- Workspaces (EGB-1232): `--workspaces` and the plain-push workspace re-scan both resolve patterns through ONE source — `_workspace_patterns()`. It reads `package.json` `.workspaces` via `$WORKSPACES_JQ` (type-aware: handles npm's array AND yarn's object `{packages:[...]}` form) and falls back to `pnpm-workspace.yaml`'s `packages:` block when package.json declares none. **Two defects fixed:** (1) both call sites were package.json-only, so no pnpm monorepo ever resolved a workspace — and `_maybe_workspace_env_files` failed *silently* (`jq -e '.workspaces' ... || return 0`), making auto-discovery inert and `push` print "Nothing new to add", indistinguishable from a repo with nothing new; it bit the same repo twice. (2) the old filter `.workspaces // .workspaces.packages | .[]` short-circuits on yarn's truthy object, iterating the object's values and yielding the pattern ARRAY as a single token. Note a naive reorder does NOT fix it — `.workspaces.packages` errors on an array; hence the `if type == "object"` form. `_pnpm_workspace_packages()` is a deliberate non-parser (block sequence only, stops at the next top-level key so pnpm 10's `onlyBuiltDependencies:`/`catalog:` can't leak in as globs, strips quotes/inline comments, refuses a symlinked file). Patterns are validated by `_valid_workspace_pattern` before they reach the unquoted `for pattern in $patterns` glob expansion (no absolute/`..`/metacharacters/whitespace; pnpm `!` negations skipped) — same posture as `.secrets-store`/`.secrets-files`. `_looks_like_monorepo` + `_workspace_source` turn the old silent return into a warning that names the real file, and `get_workspaces`'s error names `pnpm-workspace.yaml` when that's what's present instead of blaming package.json. jq is required only when package.json is the source. **Scope note:** the workspace re-scan still runs only for projects that already have a `.secrets.json` — push's root-scan-only behavior on a first push is by design (EGB-677 E13), and EGB-1232 is about the fallback that covers it never engaging. Tests: `test/workspaces.bats` (18).
 - Safety: Pre-commit hook rejects plaintext secret files (`.env`, `.dev.vars`, `gradle.properties`)
+- Multi-recipient (EGB-283): a store-scoped, committed `recipients.txt` (age `-R`
+  format, `# name` comments) lets one store encrypt every blob to N age keys —
+  one per team member. Managed via `secrets recipients add/rm/list`; absence of
+  the file ⇒ legacy single-key behavior (recipients = the pubkey derived from
+  `key.txt`). The file is parsed by us (never `age -R <path>`) into a validated
+  `RECIPIENT_ARGS` array (native age X25519 only, `age1[0-9a-z]{58}`; SSH
+  recipients rejected; symlinked file refused) — same conservative posture as
+  `.secrets-store`/`.secrets-files`. `_load_recipients` populates the array;
+  every encrypt site routes through it. Any recipient change re-encrypts the
+  WHOLE store in one commit via the shared `_reencrypt_all` engine (also used by
+  the new `secrets reencrypt` and by `rekey` on a multi-recipient store, where
+  rekey re-encrypts to the set with NO new keypair; legacy stores keep rekey's
+  generate-new-keypair behavior). `init` seeds `recipients.txt` born-multi.
+  `which` prints `recipients: N`; `verify`/`verify --all` assert each blob's
+  age recipient-stanza count equals `recipients.txt`'s length. Removal takes
+  effect going forward — git history stays readable by an old key, so rotate
+  genuinely-sensitive values. Decryption is unchanged (each member uses their
+  own `key.txt`).
 - Portability: must run on system bash 3.2 (macOS) — no associative arrays or bash-4 features
 
 ## Project Structure
 
 ```
-secrets              # CLI script (~600 lines bash)
+secrets              # CLI script (~2000 lines bash)
 hooks/pre-commit     # Pre-commit hook template
 test/
-  secrets.bats       # bats-core test suite (113 tests)
+  secrets.bats       # bats-core test suite (140 tests)
+  manifest.bats      # EGB-677 .secrets.json manifest tests (83 tests)
+  migrate.bats       # EGB-703 store-format-v2 migration tests (35 tests)
+  upgrade.bats       # EGB-716 `secrets upgrade` self-update tests (8 tests)
+  sync.bats          # EGB-1230/1231 store sync + divergence reconcile tests (25 tests)
+  workspaces.bats    # EGB-1232 npm/yarn/pnpm workspace discovery tests (18 tests)
+  recipients.bats    # EGB-283 multi-recipient age encryption tests (34 tests)
   test_helper.bash   # Shared setup/teardown
 README.md            # User-facing documentation
 CLAUDE.md            # This file
@@ -62,12 +125,12 @@ The active store directory is picked by `resolve_store()` using these rules, hig
 
 ## External files (.secrets-files) — EGB-531
 
-`.secrets-files` is a committed, project-root manifest declaring keys to sync from files **outside** the project (motivating case: `~/.gradle/gradle.properties`, which Android Studio GUI builds read but terminal env vars can't reach). One entry per line: `<type> <path> <key>...`. Only type `gradle-properties` is supported; the type token leaves room for future types **without** a plugin-dispatch framework (build the concrete case — a deliberate scope cut).
+`.secrets-files` is a committed, project-root manifest declaring keys to sync from files **outside** the project (motivating case: `~/.gradle/gradle.properties`, which Android Studio GUI builds read but terminal env vars can't reach). One entry per line: `<type> <path> <key>...`. Two types: `gradle-properties` (named-key merge) and `file` (EGB-652 — whole-file verbatim sync, binary-safe, built for the Beacon Android upload keystore; no keys, restored at mode 600 with a `.secrets-bak` backup of a divergent existing target, basename restriction waived but all other path rails apply). Still no plugin-dispatch framework — each type is a concrete `case` branch (deliberate scope cut).
 
 Key design decisions (all driven by /autoplan review):
 
 - **Wire-in is at command scope** (`cmd_push`/`cmd_pull`), via `push_external_files` / `pull_external_files`, **not** inside `push_dir_to_project` / `pull_project_to_dir` (those loop per-workspace and `pull_project_to_dir` uses stdout as a data channel).
-- **Storage:** blobs live in `$SECRETS_DIR/<project>/external/<slug>.gradle-properties.age`. The `external/` subdir keeps them out of the existing non-recursive `*.age` / `.*.age` globs (pull, list, rekey), so the old dotenv path can never decrypt a blob into cwd. `cmd_rekey` and `cmd_list` recurse into `external/` explicitly (rekey MUST, or the blob is orphaned after rotation = data loss). `<slug>` = manifest path token with non-`[A-Za-z0-9._-]` chars → `_`, plus a `cksum` suffix of the original path so paths that clean to the same string (`a/b` vs `a_b`) don't collide. Machine-independent (derived from the committed manifest token, not the expanded path).
+- **Storage:** blobs live in `$SECRETS_DIR/<project>/external/<slug>.gradle-properties.age`. The `external/` subdir keeps them out of the legacy non-recursive `*.age` / `.*.age` globs the dotenv `pull` path uses, so a dotenv pull can never decrypt an external blob into cwd. `cmd_rekey` and `cmd_list` instead walk the **entire** project tree (`find -type f`), so they cover both `external/<slug>.age` and nested manifest dotenv blobs (`<project>/<relpath>.age`) — rekey MUST recurse, or any nested/external blob is orphaned under the old key after rotation = data loss (EGB-677 regression test: "rekey re-encrypts a nested manifest dotenv blob"). **EGB-701 cleanups:** (1) the *legacy* (manifest-less) `pull` keeps its non-recursive globs but now **warns** when nested `<project>/<relpath>.age` blobs exist that those globs can't see (it excludes `external/`, which `pull_external_files` handles) — so a manifest-less pull never silently under-restores; the fix the warning points at is committing a `.secrets.json`. (2) `cmd_which`, push, and pull share one external extractor (`_json_external_entries`), so `which` applies the same `properties`→`gradle-properties` normalization and skip-with-warning rules the sync path does (it shows exactly what will sync, not a stale raw projection). (3) the two external-manifest read guards are factored into `_json_readable` (plain regular file, silent) / `_legacy_readable` (warn-and-skip on a symlinked legacy manifest). `<slug>` = manifest path token with non-`[A-Za-z0-9._-]` chars → `_`, plus a `cksum` suffix of the original path so paths that clean to the same string (`a/b` vs `a_b`) don't collide. Machine-independent (derived from the committed manifest token, not the expanded path). `cmd_list --json` (EGB-699) emits the same recursive walk as a machine-readable object (`{store, projects[].entries[]}`, each entry `dotenv`→`path` or `external`→`subtype`+`path`) for tooling/CI (feeds EGB-671); jq assembles it so paths escape correctly and stdout stays pure JSON (the human store hint is suppressed; jq is a hard dep only in `--json` mode).
 - **Merge is pure bash, no `sed`/regex** (`merge_gradle_keys`): exact-string key comparison (avoids `beaconClerkPk` vs `beaconClerkPkTest` substring bug), value treated as opaque literal (survives `& \ /` in values). Updates a managed key in place at its first occurrence, collapses duplicates, appends new keys, preserves unrelated lines/comments/order. Continuation lines (trailing odd backslashes, tracked by `_trailing_bs_odd`) are never matched as keys. Atomic write: temp in the same dir → `chmod` to match (or `600` on create) → `mv`. Backs up to `<target>.secrets-bak` before each merge.
 - **Properties separator parsing** (`_props_get`): key ends at the first `=`, `:`, or whitespace (after lstrip); handles `key=value`, `key = value`, `key:value`, `key value`; last definition wins.
 - **Security:** the write target comes from a committed file, so `_validate_external_target_path` locks it down — basename must be `gradle.properties`, must resolve inside `$HOME` (deepest-existing-ancestor resolved, symlink target/parent refused, `..` rejected). This blocks a malicious manifest from appending decrypted keys to `~/.gitconfig`/`~/.bashrc`. `_parse_secrets_files_manifest` rejects shell metacharacters/control chars in path and keys (path allows `[A-Za-z0-9/._~-]` only; keys allow `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` + space), mirrors the `.secrets-store` posture (no shell expansion, symlinked manifest skipped).
@@ -75,13 +138,63 @@ Key design decisions (all driven by /autoplan review):
 
 ## Deploy Configuration
 
-- Platform: NONE (distributed via `git clone` from GitHub)
+- Platform: NONE (distributed via `git clone` from the private Forgejo at `git.dev.egbt.com`)
 - Production URL: N/A (no live service)
 - Release model: merge to `main` is the release. Optionally tagged with `v<X.Y.Z.W>`.
 - Verification after merge: a fresh `git clone` should produce a working `secrets which` against an isolated `$HOME`. No canary URL.
 - Staging: none.
 - Rollback: revert the merge commit on `main` (and delete the tag) to roll back.
 
+## Forge operations (self-hosted Forgejo)
+
+The remote is a private Forgejo instance at `https://git.dev.egbt.com`
+(migrated off Codeberg 2026-09-08). `gh`/`glab` do NOT work here. Use `tea`
+(login name: `egbt`, user `brian`) for forge operations when a skill's
+platform detection comes up "unknown":
+
+**Always pass `--login egbt --repo egbt/secrets` explicitly.** `tea`'s repo
+autodetection fails here ("remote repository required"), and this machine also
+has a leftover `codeberg` login pointing at the *old* forge
+(`https://codeberg.org`) that `tea` will silently fall back to in
+non-interactive mode — which would target the wrong server. Confirm with
+`tea logins list` if a command errors.
+
+- PRs: `tea pr create --login egbt --repo egbt/secrets --base main --head <branch> --title ... --description ...` / `tea pr merge <index> --login egbt --repo egbt/secrets`
+- Releases: `tea releases create --login egbt --repo egbt/secrets --tag v<X.Y.Z.W> --title "v<X.Y.Z.W> — <YYYY-MM-DD>" --note ...`
+  (convention: one release per tag, title `v<X.Y.Z.W> — <date>`)
+- Issues/status: `tea issues --login egbt --repo egbt/secrets`, `tea pr list --login egbt --repo egbt/secrets`
+- **SSH is on port 2222**, not 22 (port 22 is the host's own sshd). Clone/remote
+  URLs must be `ssh://git@git.dev.egbt.com:2222/egbt/secrets.git`. A bare
+  `git@git.dev.egbt.com:egbt/secrets.git` will fail with "Permission denied
+  (publickey)" because it hits the wrong daemon.
+- The host resolves to a Tailscale address — the forge is reachable only on the
+  VPN. Off-net, push/pull/`tea` all fail to connect; that is expected, not a
+  credentials problem.
+- `FORGEJO_URL` and `FORGEJO_TOKEN` (API token for user `brian`) live in
+  `~/.zshenv` for direct API calls.
+- CI: the instance has an Actions runner available, but no workflow is
+  configured for this repo yet. The bats suite run locally is still the merge
+  gate.
+
 ## Environment variable
 
 `SECRETS_DIR` overrides the default `~/.secrets` location (useful for testing). Per-project bindings via `.secrets-store` file beat this env var; use `--store <dir>` for one-shot overrides that beat everything.
+
+## Skill routing
+
+When the user's request matches an available skill, invoke it via the Skill tool. When in doubt, invoke the skill.
+
+Key routing rules:
+- Product ideas/brainstorming → invoke /office-hours
+- Strategy/scope → invoke /plan-ceo-review
+- Architecture → invoke /plan-eng-review
+- Design system/plan review → invoke /design-consultation or /plan-design-review
+- Full review pipeline → invoke /autoplan
+- Bugs/errors → invoke /investigate
+- QA/testing site behavior → invoke /qa or /qa-only
+- Code review/diff check → invoke /review
+- Visual polish → invoke /design-review
+- Ship/deploy/PR → invoke /ship or /land-and-deploy (after reading `.ship-policy.json`; no AI adversarial/red-team/security-specialist review in this repo)
+- Save progress → invoke /context-save
+- Resume context → invoke /context-restore
+- Author a backlog-ready spec/issue → invoke /spec

README.md

@@ -54,87 +54,101 @@ flowchart TD
 
 Files like `.envrc` (direnv) and `.environment-*` are intentionally **not** tracked.
 
-Beyond project files, `secrets` can also sync designated keys from files that live *outside* the project — like `~/.gradle/gradle.properties` — merging them in without clobbering unrelated keys. See [External files (Gradle properties)](#external-files-gradle-properties).
+Beyond project files, `secrets` can also sync files that live *outside* the project — designated keys from `~/.gradle/gradle.properties` (merged without clobbering unrelated keys), or whole files like an Android upload keystore. See [External files (Gradle properties)](#external-files-gradle-properties).
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
-- **macOS** (uses Homebrew for installation)
+- **macOS or Linux**
-- **git** (already installed on most Macs — type `git --version` to check)
+- **git** (`git --version` to check)
-- **age** (the encryption tool — installed in step 1 below)
+- **age** and **jq** — `install.sh` checks for these and prints the exact install command for your platform (Homebrew on macOS, `apt`/`dnf` on Linux)
 
 ## Setup
 
-### First machine (one-time setup)
+Clone the tool repo, then run `install.sh`. It checks dependencies and prints the
+two commands to finish setup. It never edits your shell config and never runs
+sudo — it prints the commands so you stay in control.
 
 ```bash
-# 1. Install the encryption tool
+git clone https://git.dev.egbt.com/egbt/secrets.git ~/dev/secrets
-brew install age
+cd ~/dev/secrets
-
+./install.sh
-# 2. Download the secrets tool (this repo — contains only the CLI, no secret files)
-git clone https://codeberg.org/egbt/secrets.git ~/dev/secrets
-
-# 3. Make the 'secrets' command available everywhere
-#    Add this line to your shell config file (~/.zshrc on Mac):
-export PATH="$HOME/dev/secrets:$PATH"
-#    Then restart your terminal, or run:
-source ~/.zshrc
-
-# 4. Initialize your encrypted secrets store
-#    This creates a folder at ~/.secrets/ with your encryption key
-secrets init
-
-# 5. Create a PRIVATE repository on GitHub to store your encrypted secrets
-#    Go to github.com/new, name it something like 'my-secrets', and make sure
-#    "Private" is selected. Then connect it:
-cd ~/.secrets
-git remote add origin git@github.com:<you>/my-secrets.git
-git push -u origin main
 ```
 
-> **Important:** Step 5 creates a *separate* private repo for your encrypted secrets. This is different from the `secrets` tool repo you cloned in step 2. The tool repo can be public — it contains no secrets. The `~/.secrets/` repo must be private.
+`install.sh` prints a `export PATH="$HOME/dev/secrets:$PATH"` line — add it to your
+shell config (`~/.zshrc` or `~/.bashrc`) and restart your terminal. Then onboard
+this machine with one of the two flows below.
 
-### Additional machines
+### First machine (new vault)
-
-On each new machine (your desktop, a teammate's laptop, etc.):
 
 ```bash
-# 1. Install prerequisites and the tool (same as steps 1-3 above)
+# 1. Create a PRIVATE repo for your encrypted secrets (github.com/new or a
-brew install age
+#    GitLab/Forgejo private repo). It holds only ciphertext — never your key.
-git clone https://codeberg.org/egbt/secrets.git ~/dev/secrets
+#    Then wire it up and push the store in one command:
-export PATH="$HOME/dev/secrets:$PATH"  # add to ~/.zshrc
+secrets init --remote git@github.com:<you>/my-secrets.git
 
-# 2. Clone the encrypted secrets repo
+# 2. (optional) Add a project's secrets. From a project directory:
-git clone git@github.com:<you>/my-secrets.git ~/.secrets
-
-# 3. Copy the encryption key from your first machine
-#    This is the only step that requires direct machine-to-machine transfer.
-#    Choose one method:
-#
-#    Option A: AirDrop (Mac to Mac)
-#      On your first machine, right-click ~/.secrets/key.txt → Share → AirDrop
-#      Save it to ~/.secrets/key.txt on the new machine
-#
-#    Option B: Secure copy over SSH
-#      scp first-machine:~/.secrets/key.txt ~/.secrets/key.txt
-#
-#    Option C: USB drive
-#      Copy key.txt to a USB drive, transfer it, delete from USB after
-
-# 4. Pull your secrets into any project
 cd ~/myapp
-secrets pull
+secrets push
+#    The first push asks once whether to auto-track new env files and records
+#    your choice in the project's .secrets.json.
 ```
 
+`secrets init --remote` generates your key (`~/.secrets/key.txt`), wires the
+remote, and pushes the initial store so the upstream branch exists. The private
+secrets repo is separate from this tool repo — the tool repo is public and holds
+no secrets; the `~/.secrets/` repo must be private.
+
+> Running `secrets init` interactively (in a terminal) also offers to add your
+> first project's secrets right away. Run it with `--yes` (or in any non-tty
+> context like CI) to skip that prompt and just create the vault.
+
+### Other machines (join an existing vault)
+
+On a second machine, a desktop, or a teammate's laptop:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Clone the tool and run the bootstrap (as in Setup above)
+git clone https://git.dev.egbt.com/egbt/secrets.git ~/dev/secrets
+cd ~/dev/secrets && ./install.sh   # add the printed PATH line to your shell config
+
+# 2. Get key.txt onto this machine (the one manual, out-of-band step):
+#      AirDrop (Mac→Mac), or
+#      scp first-machine:~/.secrets/key.txt ~/Downloads/key.txt, or
+#      a USB drive (delete from the drive afterward)
+
+# 3. Join the vault in one command:
+secrets join --remote git@github.com:<you>/my-secrets.git --key ~/Downloads/key.txt
+```
+
+`secrets join` clones the vault, installs the key at mode 600, and **verifies the
+key actually decrypts the store before declaring success** — a mis-copied key
+fails loudly here, not silently on a later `secrets pull`. On success it tells you
+to run `secrets pull` in any project.
+
 > **The key file (`~/.secrets/key.txt`) is the only thing that needs to be transferred manually.** It never leaves your machines — it's excluded from git, never uploaded, never transmitted over the internet. Anyone with this file can decrypt all your secrets, so treat it like a password.
 
 ### Sharing with teammates
 
-To share secrets with a teammate, they need:
+**Simple approach (shared key):** To share secrets with a teammate, they need:
 
-1. Access to your private `my-secrets` GitHub repo (add them as a collaborator)
+1. Access to your private secrets repo (add them as a collaborator)
-2. A copy of `key.txt` (send it to them directly — AirDrop, USB, or in-person)
+2. A copy of `key.txt` (send it directly — AirDrop, USB, or in-person)
 
-Everyone on the team uses the same key. When anyone runs `secrets push`, the encrypted files are updated and everyone else can `secrets pull` to get the latest version.
+Everyone on the team uses the same key. A teammate joins with
+`secrets join --remote <repo-url> --key <path-to-key.txt>`. When anyone runs
+`secrets push`, the encrypted files update and everyone else runs `secrets pull`
+to get the latest.
+
+### Updating the tool
+
+```bash
+git -C ~/dev/secrets pull
+```
+
+If your store was last written by a newer client than yours, `secrets` prints a
+one-line version-skew nudge — that's your cue to run the command above.
+
+**Per-teammate keys (recommended for teams):** Use `secrets recipients add` so each person keeps their own private key — no key sharing needed. See [Onboarding and offboarding teammates](#onboarding-and-offboarding-teammates) below.
 
 ## Usage
 
@@ -160,12 +174,71 @@ secrets clear
 |---------|-------------|
 | `secrets init` | Create the `~/.secrets/` repo and generate an encryption key |
 | `secrets push` | Encrypt secret files in the current directory and upload them |
+| `secrets push --frozen` | Sync only what `.secrets.json` declares (skip auto-add) |
+| `secrets push --dry-run` | Show what would be added/synced without changing anything |
 | `secrets pull` | Download and decrypt secret files into the current directory |
+| `secrets add <path>` | Declare a project-relative file in `.secrets.json` |
 | `secrets clear` | Delete plaintext secret files from the current directory |
 | `secrets run <command>` | Pull secrets, run a command, then clear secrets when it exits |
 | `secrets list` | Show all projects that have stored secrets |
+| `secrets list --json` | Same listing as a machine-readable JSON object (`{store, projects[].entries[]}`, each entry `dotenv`/`external`) for tooling and CI. JSON goes to stdout; notices to stderr |
 | `secrets rm <project>` | Delete a project's secrets from the store |
-| `secrets rekey` | Generate a new encryption key and re-encrypt everything |
+| `secrets rekey` | Generate a new encryption key and re-encrypt everything (single-key store) or re-encrypt to the current recipients without changing keys (multi-recipient store) |
+| `secrets verify [project]` | Check the current project's `.secrets.json` against the store (missing/orphaned blobs) and decrypt every blob. `[project]` overrides the store directory name; the manifest is still read from the current directory |
+| `secrets verify --all` | Decrypt-test every blob in every project — a store-wide integrity sweep |
+| `secrets migrate [--dry-run]` | Copy-forward this project's encrypted blobs to store format v2 (non-destructive; manifest-free; `--dry-run` previews) |
+| `secrets migrate --status` | Survey every project's v2 readiness; exits non-zero until the whole store is finalize-ready |
+| `secrets migrate --finalize` | **Optional GC** — drop the old v1 blobs and mark the store pure v2. Never required: upgraded clients dual-write and read-fall-back, so not finalizing never cuts anyone off |
+| `secrets recipients list` | List the store's recipient public keys (and names if set) |
+| `secrets recipients add <age1…> [--name N]` | Add a recipient key to the store and immediately re-encrypt every blob to the new set |
+| `secrets recipients rm <key\|name> [--yes]` | Remove a recipient and re-encrypt the store; `--yes` required when removing your own key |
+| `secrets reencrypt` | Re-encrypt every blob to the current recipients (idempotent — useful after a manual edit or partial failure) |
+| `secrets sync` | Reconcile a store that has diverged from its remote: stash local blob edits, rebase onto the remote, restore the stash, then offer to publish your local commits. Never merges, force-pushes, or hard-resets |
+| `secrets sync --dry-run` | Report the store's ahead/behind/dirty state and what a reconcile would do; changes nothing |
+| `secrets sync --yes` | Reconcile and publish local commits without the confirmation prompt (for scripts) |
+| `secrets upgrade` | Self-update the tool: `git pull --ff-only` on the `secrets` checkout, report old → new version, then re-check store version-skew. No auto-update, no background checks |
+| `secrets upgrade --check` | Report whether an update is available (without pulling); changes nothing |
+
+### Upgrading: do teammates on an older `secrets` get new secrets?
+
+Store-format v2 is **additive** — an upgraded client reads either blob suffix and keeps the old (v1) suffix alive for externals that already existed, so you almost never have to coordinate an upgrade:
+
+| Secret type | Old client gets it? |
+|---|---|
+| `.env` / `.env.*` / `.dev.vars` | **Yes, always** (blob name is identical across formats) |
+| whole-file external (`file`) | **Yes, always** |
+| `properties` external that already existed | **Yes** (dual-written so old clients stay fresh) |
+| brand-new `properties` external | **No — must upgrade `secrets`** (the gentle forcing function) |
+
+"Upgrade your secrets" = `git pull` the tool clone (binary ≥ 0.6.0.0) and/or `secrets migrate` the store. A read-only teammate only needs the tool `git pull`.
+
+And you'll be told when you're behind: if a store was last written by a newer `secrets` than the one you're running, any command prints a one-line nudge to stderr (non-fatal) — and `secrets which` shows the store's `written-by:` version. Stores written by older builds (no version stamp) stay silent.
+
+### When the store diverges
+
+The store is a git repo, so two machines pushing at once can leave your clone
+both ahead and behind its remote. `secrets push` needs a fast-forward and
+`secrets pull` won't silently merge, so both stop and tell you to run:
+
+```bash
+secrets sync
+```
+
+`sync` fetches, stashes any uncommitted blob edits, rebases your local commits
+onto the remote, restores the stash, and then *asks* before publishing your
+commits to the shared store (`--yes` skips the prompt; `--dry-run` just
+reports). If the rebase conflicts, it aborts, restores your stash, names the
+conflicting files, and leaves the store exactly as it found it — nothing in
+the path force-pushes, hard-resets, or drops a stash.
+
+`secrets which` now reports the same state up front, so you can see it coming:
+
+```
+store:  /Users/you/.secrets
+source: default
+format: v2
+remote: ahead 1, behind 11, 3 modified  (run: secrets sync)
+```
 
 ### Automatic project detection
 
@@ -176,6 +249,32 @@ When you run `secrets push` or `secrets pull` without specifying a project name,
 
 You can also specify a name explicitly: `secrets push myapp`.
 
+### The manifest (`.secrets.json`)
+
+Every project gets a committed `.secrets.json` at its root declaring exactly what syncs — the single source of truth `push` and `pull` operate from (requires `jq`):
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": 2,
+  "options": { "autoAdd": true },
+  "dotenv": [".env", ".env.staging", "packages/web/.env.development"],
+  "external": [
+    { "type": "properties", "path": "~/.gradle/gradle.properties",
+      "keys": ["beaconClerkPkTest"] },
+    { "type": "file", "path": "~/keystores/upload.keystore" }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+You rarely write it by hand:
+
+- **Auto-add (default):** `secrets push` discovers conventional files (`.env`, `.env.*`, `.dev.vars` — plus `package.json` workspace dirs once a manifest exists) and adds them to the manifest with an `==>` notice. Commit the manifest so other machines pick it up.
+- **Explicit mode:** set `"options": {"autoAdd": false}` (a committed, team-shared setting) and `push` only syncs declared entries, warning about undeclared files. `secrets add <path>` is then the only manifest writer. Per-invocation: `push --frozen` (declared-only once) and `push --dry-run` (preview).
+- `dotenv` paths are project-relative — nested monorepo paths like `packages/@acme/web/.env` are welcome; `..`, absolute paths, and symlinked manifests are refused.
+- On the other machine, `secrets pull` restores exactly what the committed manifest declares, creating nested directories as needed.
+
+Projects without a manifest keep working exactly as before (and work without `jq`); the first `push` bootstraps one for you.
+
 ### secrets run
 
 `secrets run` is a **pull → run → clear** pipeline: it runs `secrets pull` to decrypt the latest files into your project, executes your command, then runs `secrets clear` when that command finishes. Plaintext `.env` / `.dev.vars` files exist only while your command is running.
@@ -326,10 +425,10 @@ git commit -am "switch to personal secrets"
 
 ### Monorepo support
 
-For projects with multiple packages (monorepos using `package.json` workspaces), add the `-w` flag to operate on all workspaces at once:
+For projects with multiple packages, add the `-w` flag to operate on all workspaces at once:
 
 ```bash
-cd ~/myapp                  # has package.json with "workspaces": ["apps/*", "packages/*"]
+cd ~/myapp                  # npm/yarn workspaces, or a pnpm-workspace.yaml
 secrets push -w             # encrypts secrets from root + each workspace
 secrets pull -w             # decrypts into root + each workspace directory
 secrets clear -w            # clears secrets from root + each workspace
@@ -346,31 +445,61 @@ Inside `~/.secrets/`, workspace secrets are organized by path:
     apps/api/.env.age               # api workspace
 ```
 
-Requires `jq` (`brew install jq`).
+**Where workspaces are declared.** All three package managers are supported:
+
+| Manager | Declaration |
+|---|---|
+| npm | `package.json` → `"workspaces": ["apps/*"]` |
+| yarn | `package.json` → `"workspaces": {"packages": ["apps/*"]}` |
+| pnpm | `pnpm-workspace.yaml` → `packages:` block |
+
+`package.json` wins when it declares any workspaces; `pnpm-workspace.yaml` is
+the fallback. Reading `package.json` requires `jq` (`brew install jq`); a
+pnpm-only repo needs no jq for workspace discovery.
+
+If a root *looks* like a monorepo (a `pnpm-workspace.yaml` or a `packages/`
+directory) but no workspace packages can be read from it, `secrets push` says
+so on stderr rather than silently discovering nothing — that silence
+previously made a pnpm repo indistinguishable from one with nothing to sync.
 
 ### External files (Gradle properties)
 
 Some credentials don't live in your project at all. Android builds, for example, read keys from `~/.gradle/gradle.properties` — a global file, outside any project, shared by every Gradle project on your machine (the project's own `gradle.properties` is git-tracked, so it's the wrong home for secrets). `secrets` can sync specific keys from such a file without touching the unrelated keys around them.
 
-You declare what to sync in a committed `.secrets-files` manifest at your project root, one entry per line:
+You declare what to sync in the `external` array of your committed `.secrets.json`:
 
-```
+```json
-# <type>             <path>                        <keys...>
+{
-gradle-properties    ~/.gradle/gradle.properties   beaconClerkPkTest beaconClerkPkLive
+  "version": 2,
+  "external": [
+    { "type": "properties", "path": "~/.gradle/gradle.properties",
+      "keys": ["beaconClerkPkTest", "beaconClerkPkLive"] }
+  ]
+}
 ```
 
-- **type** — `gradle-properties` (the only supported type today).
+- **type** — `properties` (sync named keys from a Java-properties-style file) or `file` (sync the whole file — see below).
-- **path** — absolute or `~/`-relative. The basename must be `gradle.properties` and must resolve inside `$HOME`.
+- **path** — absolute or `~/`-relative; must resolve inside `$HOME`. For `properties` the basename must end in `.properties`.
-- **keys** — the property names to sync. Only these keys are read on push and merged on pull; everything else in the file is left alone.
+- **keys** — the property names to sync (`properties` only). Only these keys are read on push and merged on pull; everything else in the file is left alone. `file` entries take no keys.
+
+> **Legacy `.secrets-files`:** older projects declared these entries in a line-based `.secrets-files`. It still parses, and the next `secrets push` absorbs its entries into `.secrets.json` (type `gradle-properties` becomes `properties`) — after that the legacy file is superseded and can be deleted.
 
 #### Syncing to a second machine
 
-On the machine that already has the keys set:
+On the machine that already has the keys set, add the entry to `.secrets.json` (create the file if the project doesn't have one yet):
 
 ```bash
 cd ~/myapp
-echo "gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest beaconClerkPkLive" > .secrets-files
+cat > .secrets.json <<'EOF'
-git add .secrets-files && git commit -m "sync gradle Clerk keys"
+{
+  "version": 2,
+  "external": [
+    { "type": "properties", "path": "~/.gradle/gradle.properties",
+      "keys": ["beaconClerkPkTest", "beaconClerkPkLive"] }
+  ]
+}
+EOF
+git add .secrets.json && git commit -m "sync gradle Clerk keys"
 secrets push
 # ==> Extracted 2 key(s) from ~/.gradle/gradle.properties
 ```
@@ -389,6 +518,74 @@ secrets pull
 
 > **Note:** unlike `.env` files, merged Gradle keys are written as **permanent plaintext** into the target file — `secrets clear` does **not** remove them. This is appropriate for publishable / low-secrecy values (like Clerk publishable keys, `pk_*`). For high-value secrets that should never sit on disk, use `secrets run` with a `.env` instead.
 
+#### Whole files (`file` type)
+
+Some external secrets are whole binary files — an Android upload keystore, a certificate. The `file` type syncs the file verbatim (binary-safe, encrypted with age like everything else):
+
+```json
+{ "type": "file", "path": "~/keystores/beacon-upload.keystore" }
+```
+
+On `secrets push` the file is encrypted into `<project>/external/`. On `secrets pull` it is restored to the same path with mode `600`; if a different version already exists there, it is backed up to `<name>.secrets-bak` first. The same path rules apply (inside `$HOME`, no `..`, no symlinks). Like merged Gradle keys, restored files are permanent plaintext on disk — `secrets clear` does not remove them.
+
+### Onboarding and offboarding teammates
+
+By default every team member uses the **same** `key.txt` (one shared private key). The multi-recipient feature lets each teammate have their **own** keypair while still sharing one store — so you never hand out a secret key to a new hire, and removing an ex-teammate's access is one command.
+
+#### Onboarding a teammate
+
+```bash
+# 1. Teammate generates their own keypair on their machine (never shares the private key)
+age-keygen -o ~/.secrets/key.txt          # writes key.txt; prints the public key
+
+# 2. Teammate sends you their PUBLIC key (printed by age-keygen, starts with age1…)
+#    — over Slack, email, whatever. Public keys are not secret.
+
+# 3. An existing member adds the public key to the store
+secrets recipients add age1theirpublickey --name alice
+# => Adds alice to recipients.txt, re-encrypts every blob to the full set, pushes.
+
+# 4. Teammate clones the store repo and drops their key.txt in place
+git clone git@github.com:<you>/my-secrets.git ~/.secrets
+# (key.txt already generated in step 1 — nothing to copy)
+
+# 5. Teammate pulls into any project
+cd ~/myapp
+secrets pull
+# => Their key matches one recipient stanza in every blob — it just works.
+```
+
+Run `secrets recipients list` to confirm who has access:
+
+```
+alice   age1theirpublickey…
+you     age1yourpublickey…
+```
+
+#### Offboarding a teammate
+
+```bash
+# Remove the recipient by name (or public key) and re-encrypt the store
+secrets recipients rm alice
+# => Removes alice from recipients.txt, re-encrypts every blob, pushes.
+# Existing blobs are re-encrypted; the removed key can no longer decrypt them.
+```
+
+> **Important:** git history can't be un-shared. If alice had access during a period when genuinely sensitive values were stored, rotate those values now (update them in the external system and run `secrets push`). The re-encrypt prevents future access; history is permanent.
+
+#### Managing recipients
+
+```bash
+secrets recipients list          # show all recipient keys and names
+secrets recipients add age1…     # add a key (bootstraps recipients.txt on a legacy store)
+secrets recipients add age1… --name bob   # attach a human-readable label
+secrets recipients rm bob        # remove by name
+secrets recipients rm age1…      # remove by public key
+secrets reencrypt                # re-encrypt to current recipients (idempotent heal)
+```
+
+`secrets which` shows a `recipients: N (alice, bob, …)` line so you can always confirm the active set from any project directory.
+
 ## Safety features
 
 - **`secrets run` auto-clears** — plaintext files are deleted when the command exits, errors, or is interrupted with Ctrl-C
@@ -404,13 +601,15 @@ If you suspect your key has been compromised, or a teammate leaves the team:
 secrets rekey
 ```
 
-This generates a new key and re-encrypts all secrets. After rekeying:
+This generates a new key and re-encrypts all secrets (including `.env` and other dotfiles). After rekeying:
 
 1. Copy the new `~/.secrets/key.txt` to every machine and teammate
 2. Old encrypted files remain in git history (encrypted with the old key, which should be discarded)
 
 For complete rotation with no historical exposure, create a fresh `~/.secrets/` repo.
 
+> **Recovering from a broken rekey (pre-0.2.1.0):** Older versions of `rekey` skipped dotfiles (`.env`, `.dev.vars`) when re-encrypting, leaving their blobs on the *old* key while `key.txt` was replaced. If `secrets pull` now fails with `no identity matched any of the recipients`, those blobs are still encrypted to a key you no longer have. Restore the **old** `key.txt` from another machine that hasn't rekeyed, `secrets pull` to recover the plaintext, then `secrets rekey` again on 0.2.1.0 or later.
+
 ## Environment variables
 
 | Variable | Default | Purpose |
@@ -423,16 +622,31 @@ For complete rotation with no historical exposure, create a fresh `~/.secrets/`
 
 **"Not initialized"** — Run `secrets init` to create the `~/.secrets/` directory.
 
+**"Found an existing key ... but no repo"** — You copied `key.txt` into `~/.secrets` and then ran `secrets init`. On a second machine you should *clone* your existing secrets repo, not re-initialize it (`init` is only for the very first machine). The error prints the exact `git clone` command to run — copy-paste it, or see [Additional machines](#additional-machines). When your project's `.secrets-store` file declares a remote URL, the command is filled in with the real URL.
+
 **"No secret files found"** — You're in a directory that doesn't have `.env`, `.env.*`, or `.dev.vars` files. Make sure you're in the right project directory.
 
 **"Project not found"** — The project name doesn't match anything in `~/.secrets/`. Run `secrets list` to see what's stored. The name is usually derived from your directory name or git remote.
 
 **"Fast-forward pull failed"** — Someone else pushed secrets while you had local changes. Run `secrets pull` first, then retry your push.
 
+**".secrets.json: invalid JSON" / "manifest version N is not supported"** — The committed manifest is malformed or written by a newer `secrets`. The error names the file; fix the syntax, or update the tool (`git pull` in the tool's clone).
+
+**"'jq' is not installed"** — Manifest features need `jq`. The error prints the install command for your platform. Manifest-less projects work without it.
+
+**Not sure the store is intact?** — Run `secrets verify` in a project to check its `.secrets.json` against the store (declared-but-missing blobs and orphaned blobs) and decrypt-test every blob with your current key. Use `secrets verify --all` for a store-wide decrypt sweep across every project. It's read-only — plaintext is streamed to `/dev/null`, never written to disk — and exits non-zero if anything is wrong, so it's safe to run in CI.
+
 ## Development
 
 ```bash
-# Run the test suite (113 tests)
+# Run the test suite (272 tests across four files)
 brew install bats-core
-bats test/secrets.bats
+bats test/
+
+# Security regression subset — operator-local only (attack-payload fixtures).
+# Required before ship; records sign-off in .gstack/security-signoff.json.
+./test/run-security.sh
 ```
+
+Hosted AI agents must not run the security script or perform red-team/adversarial
+review on this repo — see `.ship-policy.json` and `CLAUDE.md`.

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.2.0.0
+0.7.7.0

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-08-additive-v2-dual-write.md

@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
+# Additive-v2 Dual-Write Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Make store-format v2 *additive* — upgraded `secrets` clients read either blob suffix and dual-write existing `properties` externals — so the destructive `migrate --finalize` becomes optional GC and the cross-machine coordination gate disappears.
+
+**Architecture:** Replace the marker-driven single-suffix helper `_external_blob_suffix(type)` with two helpers: a read-resolver that tries `.properties.age` then falls back to `.gradle-properties.age`, and a write-targets helper that writes the v2 suffix always plus the v1 suffix *only when a v1 twin already exists* (dual-write existing externals; brand-new externals are v2-only — the intended forcing function). Reads and writes no longer depend on the `.secrets-format` marker, which keeps its meaning (born-v2 / finalized). Because fresh pushes now write the v2 suffix on any store, the migrate/finalize test fixtures (which relied on push producing a v1 blob) are updated to fabricate an old-client v1 blob.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Single bash 3.2 script (`secrets`); `age`, `git`, `jq`. Tests: `bats-core` (`test/migrate.bats`, `test/manifest.bats`). Every standalone `[[ ]]` test assertion ends with `|| false` (bash 3.2 ERR-trap gotcha).
+
+**Spec:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-08-additive-v2-dual-write-design.md`. **Ticket:** EGB-712.
+
+---
+
+## Background facts (verified against branch `brian/egb-712-...`, post-EGB-710)
+
+- `_external_blob_suffix()` — `secrets:548-555`. Returns `properties` for `gradle-properties` on a v2 store (`_store_format == 2`), else the type verbatim; `file` always returns `file`. Blob path = `external/<slug>.<suffix>.age`.
+- Callers of `_external_blob_suffix`: push file write `secrets:655`, push properties write `secrets:684`, pull read `secrets:713`, verify read `secrets:2056`. All four are replaced; then the helper is deleted.
+- `_secrets_files_slug(path)` (`secrets:512`) derives the machine-independent slug. dotenv and `file` blobs are byte-identical in v1/v2 (only the `properties` suffix diverges).
+- `_store_format()` (`secrets:529`) and the marker stay as-is — set only by `init` (born-v2) and `migrate --finalize`. Push must NOT stamp it (see spec §3).
+- Existing test that codifies OLD write behavior: `test/migrate.bats:52` "push on a v1 store still writes .gradle-properties.age (back-compat)" — rewritten in Task 2.
+- Tests that fabricate-or-rely-on a v1 properties blob from `make_v1_store; push` and break once push writes v2-only (repaired in Task 3): the migrate copy-forward/idempotent tests, the `--dry-run` rename test, the dotenv+file untouched test, all four finalize tests, the EGB-710 manifest-free / undeclared-twin tests, and the two `--status` tests that need an actual v1 blob. (dotenv-only and already-v2 tests are unaffected.)
+- Baseline before this plan: `bats test/` = 242 passing.
+
+## File structure
+
+- Modify: `secrets` — delete `_external_blob_suffix` (548-555); add `_resolve_external_blob_read` + `_external_blob_write_targets` in its place; rewire push (651-688), pull (712-713), verify (2052-2068); extend `_migrate_status`; docs in `cmd_help`.
+- Modify: `test/migrate.bats` — add `m_fake_v1_blob` helper; add read-fallback + write-rule + status-coverage tests; repair the v1-blob-dependent fixtures.
+- Modify: `CLAUDE.md`, `README.md`, `VERSION` (→ `0.7.0.0`), `CHANGELOG.md`.
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Read-resolver — reads try both suffixes
+
+**Files:** `secrets` (replace `_external_blob_suffix` with the read-resolver; rewire pull + verify reads), `test/migrate.bats`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test** — a v2 store whose properties blob exists ONLY in the v1 suffix must still pull.
+
+Add to `test/migrate.bats` (after the format-marker tests, ~line 60):
+
+```bash
+@test "pull reads a v1-suffix properties blob on a v2 store (read-fallback)" {
+  init_with_remote                                   # born-v2 store (marker=2)
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_v1\n'
+  create_project_dir rffallback
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push rffallback >/dev/null 2>&1     # writes .properties.age on a v2 store
+  # Simulate an external that exists only in the v1 suffix (an old client wrote it):
+  local v2blob; v2blob=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/rffallback/external/"*.properties.age)
+  mv "$v2blob" "${v2blob%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age"
+  rm -f "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" pull rffallback >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run grep -q 'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_v1' "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run it, confirm it fails**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "read-fallback"`
+Expected: FAIL — old pull (`secrets:713`) uses `_external_blob_suffix gradle-properties` = `properties` on a v2 store, looks only for `.properties.age` (which we renamed away), warns "no encrypted data", restores nothing → the grep fails.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Replace `_external_blob_suffix` with the read-resolver.** Replace `secrets:542-555` (the comment block + `_external_blob_suffix()` through its closing `}`) with:
+
+```bash
+# Resolve the on-disk path of an external blob for READING. Tries the v2 suffix
+# (.properties.age) first, then falls back to the v1 (.gradle-properties.age) for
+# `properties` externals, so an upgraded client finds the blob whichever format
+# wrote it (additive v2 — EGB-712). `file` externals share one suffix in both
+# formats. Echoes the path of the blob that exists; if neither exists, echoes the
+# canonical v2 path so the caller's "no blob" message reads sensibly. Read-only.
+_resolve_external_blob_read() {
+  local project="$1" slug="$2" mtype="$3"
+  local base="$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external/$slug"
+  case "$mtype" in
+    file)
+      echo "$base.file.age" ;;
+    properties|gradle-properties)
+      if [ -f "$base.properties.age" ]; then
+        echo "$base.properties.age"
+      elif [ -f "$base.gradle-properties.age" ]; then
+        echo "$base.gradle-properties.age"
+      else
+        echo "$base.properties.age"
+      fi ;;
+    *)
+      echo "$base.$mtype.age" ;;
+  esac
+}
+```
+
+(The write-targets helper is added in Task 2 — leave a gap; do not reintroduce `_external_blob_suffix`.)
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Rewire the pull read.** At `secrets:712-713`, replace:
+
+```bash
+    local slug; slug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$mpath")
+    local blob="$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external/$slug.$(_external_blob_suffix "$mtype").age"
+```
+
+with:
+
+```bash
+    local slug; slug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$mpath")
+    local blob; blob=$(_resolve_external_blob_read "$project" "$slug" "$mtype")
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Rewire the verify read.** At `secrets:2055-2065`, replace:
+
+```bash
+    slug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$epath")
+    erel="external/$slug.$(_external_blob_suffix "$etype").age"
+    # Account for BOTH the v1 and v2 suffix forms in the orphan set. During the
+    # migration window (after copy-forward, before --finalize) the v2 twin
+    # coexists with the v1 blob; neither should read as an orphan whichever
+    # format the store currently reports. (file's two forms are identical.)
+    expected="${expected}external/$slug.$etype.age"$'\n'
+    [ "$etype" = "gradle-properties" ] && expected="${expected}external/$slug.properties.age"$'\n'
+    eblob="$pdir/$erel"
+    if [ ! -f "$eblob" ]; then
+      echo "FINDING: external '$epath' ($etype) is declared but has no blob in the store ($project/$erel missing). Run 'secrets push'." >&2
+```
+
+with:
+
+```bash
+    slug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$epath")
+    # Account for BOTH suffix forms in the orphan set — a dual-written `properties`
+    # external (additive v2 — EGB-712) legitimately has both blobs on disk; neither
+    # is an orphan. (file's two forms are identical.)
+    expected="${expected}external/$slug.$etype.age"$'\n'
+    [ "$etype" = "gradle-properties" ] && expected="${expected}external/$slug.properties.age"$'\n'
+    eblob=$(_resolve_external_blob_read "$project" "$slug" "$etype")
+    erel="${eblob#"$pdir"/}"
+    if [ ! -f "$eblob" ]; then
+      echo "FINDING: external '$epath' ($etype) is declared but has no blob in the store ($project/$erel missing). Run 'secrets push'." >&2
+```
+
+(Note: `_external_blob_suffix` still has two remaining callers in push — push isn't rewired until Task 2, so the script still parses and runs. Those calls keep working because the function is only deleted in Task 2 Step 6, after push is rewired.)
+
+**IMPORTANT:** do NOT delete `_external_blob_suffix` yet — push (`secrets:655`, `secrets:684`) still calls it until Task 2. Deleting it now breaks push.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run the read-fallback test + full migrate suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats`
+Expected: the new "read-fallback" test PASSES; all other migrate tests still PASS (push unchanged; pull/verify now use the resolver, which is equivalent to the old behavior whenever the suffix matches the store format).
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add secrets test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "feat: read-resolver tries both external suffixes (additive v2, EGB-712)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Write-targets — twin rule (dual-write existing, v2-only for new)
+
+**Files:** `secrets` (add `_external_blob_write_targets`; rewire push file + properties writes; delete `_external_blob_suffix`), `test/migrate.bats`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing tests.** Add to `test/migrate.bats`:
+
+```bash
+@test "push writes the v2 suffix for a fresh external even on a v1 store" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir freshv1
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push freshv1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/freshv1/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                                              # v2 suffix regardless of marker
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/freshv1/external/*.gradle-properties.age 2>/dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]                                              # no v1 twin for a brand-new external
+}
+
+@test "push dual-writes the v1 twin so old clients stay fresh" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_old\n'
+  create_project_dir dualwrite
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dualwrite >/dev/null 2>&1                    # v2-only (fresh)
+  m_fake_v1_twin dualwrite                                         # simulate a pre-existing v1 twin
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_new\n'
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dualwrite >/dev/null 2>&1                    # twin exists -> dual-write both
+  # Prove the v1 twin was refreshed: drop the v2 blob, pull, expect the NEW value.
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/dualwrite/external/"*.properties.age
+  rm -f "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" pull dualwrite >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run grep -q 'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_new' "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Add the `m_fake_v1_twin` test helper.** In `test/migrate.bats`, next to `make_v1_store` (~line 12), add:
+
+```bash
+# Simulate an old (v1) client's properties blob: copy the pushed v2
+# .properties.age to its v1 .gradle-properties.age twin. (Current clients never
+# write the v1 suffix for a fresh external, so tests fabricate it.) Use `cp` to
+# KEEP the v2 blob (dual present); see m_make_v1_only to leave only the v1 blob.
+m_fake_v1_twin() {
+  local proj="$1" v2
+  v2=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/$proj/external/"*.properties.age)
+  cp "$v2" "${v2%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age"
+}
+# Like m_fake_v1_twin but renames (leaves ONLY the v1 blob) — for old-client-only
+# / copy-forward fixtures.
+m_make_v1_only() {
+  local proj="$1" v2
+  v2=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/$proj/external/"*.properties.age)
+  mv "$v2" "${v2%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age"
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Run the new tests, confirm they fail**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "fresh external even on a v1 store"`
+Expected: FAIL — on a v1 store, the old push (`_external_blob_suffix gradle-properties` = `gradle-properties`) writes `.gradle-properties.age`, so the `*.properties.age` assertion fails.
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "dual-writes the v1 twin"`
+Expected: FAIL — old push writes a single suffix; the second push won't refresh the v1 twin.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Add the write-targets helper.** Immediately after `_resolve_external_blob_read` (added in Task 1), insert:
+
+```bash
+# The on-disk path(s) to WRITE for an external blob, one per line. For a
+# `properties` external this is the v2 suffix (.properties.age) ALWAYS, plus the
+# v1 suffix (.gradle-properties.age) WHEN a v1 twin already exists in the store
+# (dual-write keeps old clients fresh; a brand-new external is v2-only — the
+# intended forcing function, additive v2 / EGB-712). `file` externals have a
+# single suffix in both formats. Independent of the store marker.
+_external_blob_write_targets() {
+  local project="$1" slug="$2" mtype="$3"
+  local base="$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external/$slug"
+  case "$mtype" in
+    file)
+      echo "$base.file.age" ;;
+    properties|gradle-properties)
+      echo "$base.properties.age"
+      [ -f "$base.gradle-properties.age" ] && echo "$base.gradle-properties.age" ;;
+    *)
+      echo "$base.$mtype.age" ;;
+  esac
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Rewire the push writes.** At `secrets:651-658` (the `file` branch), replace:
+
+```bash
+    if [ "$mtype" = "file" ]; then
+      # EGB-652: whole-file sync — encrypt the file verbatim (binary-safe).
+      mkdir -p "$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external"
+      local fslug; fslug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$mpath")
+      age -r "$pubkey" -o "$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external/$fslug.$(_external_blob_suffix file).age" "$expanded"
+      info "Encrypted file $mpath"
+      pushed=$((pushed + 1))
+      continue
+    fi
+```
+
+with:
+
+```bash
+    if [ "$mtype" = "file" ]; then
+      # EGB-652: whole-file sync — encrypt the file verbatim (binary-safe).
+      mkdir -p "$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external"
+      local fslug; fslug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$mpath")
+      local wt
+      while IFS= read -r wt; do
+        [ -n "$wt" ] || continue
+        age -r "$pubkey" -o "$wt" "$expanded"
+      done < <(_external_blob_write_targets "$project" "$fslug" file)
+      info "Encrypted file $mpath"
+      pushed=$((pushed + 1))
+      continue
+    fi
+```
+
+Then at `secrets:682-684` (the properties branch), replace:
+
+```bash
+    mkdir -p "$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external"
+    local slug; slug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$mpath")
+    age -r "$pubkey" -o "$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external/$slug.$(_external_blob_suffix "$mtype").age" "$tmp"
+```
+
+with:
+
+```bash
+    mkdir -p "$SECRETS_DIR/$project/external"
+    local slug; slug=$(_secrets_files_slug "$mpath")
+    local wt
+    while IFS= read -r wt; do
+      [ -n "$wt" ] || continue
+      age -r "$pubkey" -o "$wt" "$tmp"
+    done < <(_external_blob_write_targets "$project" "$slug" "$mtype")
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Delete the now-unused `_external_blob_suffix`.** Confirm zero remaining callers first:
+
+Run: `grep -n "_external_blob_suffix" secrets`
+Expected: no matches (all four call sites rewired). If any remain, rewire them before deleting. Then delete the `_resolve_external_blob_read`-replaced... — it's already gone (replaced in Task 1). Verify the function is absent: `grep -c "_external_blob_suffix()" secrets` → `0`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Run the two new write tests**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "fresh external even on a v1 store"` then `-f "dual-writes the v1 twin"`
+Expected: both PASS.
+
+- [ ] **Step 8: Rewrite the obsolete back-compat test.** Replace the `@test "push on a v1 store still writes .gradle-properties.age (back-compat)"` block (`test/migrate.bats:52-60`) with:
+
+```bash
+@test "push on a v1 store writes the v2 suffix for a fresh external (additive v2)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir v1push
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push v1push >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/v1push/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 9: Run the full migrate suite — expect the v1-blob-dependent fixtures to FAIL.** This is expected; Task 3 repairs them.
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats`
+Expected: the read-fallback + two write tests + rewritten back-compat test PASS; several copy-forward/finalize/status tests now FAIL (push no longer writes a `.gradle-properties.age` for them to migrate). Note which fail — Task 3 fixes exactly those.
+
+- [ ] **Step 10: Commit** (suite intentionally not yet fully green — Task 3 follows immediately)
+
+```bash
+git add secrets test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "feat: twin-rule write targets — dual-write existing, v2-only for new (additive v2, EGB-712)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: Repair migrate/finalize/status fixtures
+
+**Files:** `test/migrate.bats`. No production code changes — this re-greens the suite by fabricating the old-client v1 blobs that push no longer writes.
+
+The rule for each repair: after the `"$SECRETS_BIN" push <proj>` line, insert a fabrication call:
+- Use **`m_make_v1_only <proj>`** (rename → only the v1 blob exists) for tests asserting a `*.gradle-properties.age` blob exists / is copy-forwarded (mirrors the pre-EGB-712 state where push produced a v1 blob).
+- Use **`m_fake_v1_twin <proj>`** (keep both) only where a test needs both suffixes present.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Repair the copy-forward / dry-run / idempotent tests.** In each of these tests, insert `m_make_v1_only <proj>` immediately after the `push <proj>` line:
+  - `"migrate --dry-run reports the rename and writes nothing"` (proj `dryproj`)
+  - `"migrate copy-forward creates the v2 twin and keeps the v1 blob (byte-identical)"` (proj `cfproj`)
+  - `"migrate copy-forward is idempotent"` (proj `idemproj`)
+  - `"migrate leaves dotenv and file blobs untouched"` (proj `mixproj`) — note this one ALSO pushes a `file` external; `m_make_v1_only` only touches `*.properties.age`, leaving the `.file.age` blob alone (correct).
+
+Worked example — the copy-forward test becomes:
+
+```bash
+@test "migrate copy-forward creates the v2 twin and keeps the v1 blob (byte-identical)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir cfproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push cfproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only cfproj
+  local old; old=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/cfproj/external/"*.gradle-properties.age)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  local new; new=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/cfproj/external/"*.properties.age)
+  [ -f "$old" ]
+  [ -f "$new" ]
+  cmp -s "$old" "$new"
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Repair the finalize tests.** Insert `m_make_v1_only <proj>` after the `push <proj>` line in:
+  - `"finalize refuses when verify --all is not green"` (proj `failverify`) — then the existing `migrate` step creates the twin; corrupting `*.properties.age` still trips verify.
+  - `"finalize refuses an un-twinned v1 blob (project not migrated)"` (proj `untwinned`) — leaves a lone v1 blob, no twin: exactly the un-twinned state the test wants.
+  - `"finalize green path drops v1, keeps v2, stamps the marker"` (proj `finproj`).
+  - `"finalize cuts a recovery tag before deleting v1 blobs"` (proj — read it from the test).
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Repair the EGB-710 manifest-free / undeclared-twin tests.** Insert `m_make_v1_only <proj>` after the `push <proj>` line in:
+  - `"migrate copy-forwards a v1 properties blob with no .secrets.json (manifest-free)"` (proj `nomanifestblob`) — insert BEFORE the `rm -f .secrets.json` line.
+  - `"migrate twins a store blob even when the manifest no longer declares it"` (proj `staleblob`) — insert before the `.secrets.json` rewrite.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Repair the `--status` tests that need a real v1 blob.**
+  - `"migrate --status flags a project that needs migrating"` (proj `needsmig`) — insert `m_make_v1_only needsmig` after push, so a lone un-twinned v1 blob exists → NEEDS MIGRATE.
+  - `"migrate --status reports finalize-ready once every blob is twinned"` (proj `readymig`) — insert `m_make_v1_only readymig` after push and BEFORE the `migrate` step (migrate then creates the twin → finalize-ready).
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Run the full migrate suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats`
+Expected: ALL pass. If any copy-forward test still reports "nothing to migrate", its `m_make_v1_only` call is missing or misplaced (must come after push, before migrate).
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run the WHOLE suite** (manifest.bats exercises externals end-to-end and must still be green)
+
+Run: `bats test/`
+Expected: all pass. If a `manifest.bats` external test fails, check it isn't asserting a specific suffix that additive-v2 changed (a fresh push now writes `.properties.age`); update such an assertion the same way (assert `.properties.age`, or use the resolver-agnostic round-trip via pull).
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "test: fabricate old-client v1 blobs in migrate/finalize/status fixtures (additive v2, EGB-712)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: `migrate --status` — dual-write coverage line
+
+**Files:** `secrets` (`_migrate_status`, `secrets:2190-2227`), `test/migrate.bats`.
+
+Adds visibility into which `properties` externals are v2-only (old clients can't read them — the forcing function) vs dual-written (old clients still served).
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test.** Add to `test/migrate.bats`:
+
+```bash
+@test "migrate --status counts v2-only externals (old clients not served)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir v2onlyext
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push v2onlyext >/dev/null 2>&1          # v2-only (fresh, no v1 twin)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                                     # no v1 blobs -> finalize-ready
+  [[ "$output" == *"v2-only"* ]] || false                # surfaced as v2-only coverage
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run it, confirm it fails**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "counts v2-only externals"`
+Expected: FAIL — `_migrate_status` currently only counts `*.gradle-properties.age`; it never mentions `v2-only`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Extend `_migrate_status`.** In `_migrate_status` (`secrets:2190`), inside the `for dir` loop, after the existing `while ... done < <(find "$dir" -type f -name '*.gradle-properties.age' ...)` block and before the per-project classification, add a v2-only count, then surface it in the per-project line. Concretely, replace the classification block:
+
+```bash
+    if [ "$v1" -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "  $project: v2-ready (no v1 properties blobs)"
+    elif [ "$untwinned" -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "  $project: migrated ($v1 v1 blob(s), all twinned)"
+    else
+      echo "  $project: NEEDS MIGRATE ($untwinned of $v1 v1 blob(s) un-twinned) — cd into the project and run 'secrets migrate'"
+      any_untwinned=1
+    fi
+```
+
+with:
+
+```bash
+    # v2-only externals: a .properties.age with no .gradle-properties.age twin —
+    # old (v1) clients cannot read these (the additive-v2 forcing function).
+    local v2only=0 pf
+    while IFS= read -r pf; do
+      [ -f "$pf" ] || continue
+      [ -f "${pf%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age" ] || v2only=$((v2only + 1))
+    done < <(find "$dir" -type f -name '*.properties.age' 2>/dev/null)
+    local v2note=""
+    [ "$v2only" -gt 0 ] && v2note=" [$v2only v2-only — old clients not served]"
+    if [ "$v1" -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "  $project: v2-ready (no v1 properties blobs)$v2note"
+    elif [ "$untwinned" -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "  $project: migrated ($v1 v1 blob(s), all twinned)$v2note"
+    else
+      echo "  $project: NEEDS MIGRATE ($untwinned of $v1 v1 blob(s) un-twinned) — cd into the project and run 'secrets migrate'$v2note"
+      any_untwinned=1
+    fi
+```
+
+(`local` inside the loop is bash-3.2-fine — it re-declares per iteration.)
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Run the new test + status suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "status"`
+Expected: all status tests PASS, including the new v2-only one.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Run the full suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/`
+Expected: all pass.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add secrets test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "feat: migrate --status surfaces v2-only externals (coverage, EGB-712)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: Docs, help, version, changelog
+
+**Files:** `secrets` (`cmd_help`), `CLAUDE.md`, `README.md`, `VERSION`, `CHANGELOG.md`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: `cmd_help` — reframe finalize as optional.** In `cmd_help()`, replace the finalize line:
+
+```
+  secrets migrate --finalize    Drop v1 blobs and mark the store v2 (after verify)
+```
+
+with:
+
+```
+  secrets migrate --finalize    Optional GC: drop v1 blobs and mark the store pure v2
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: `CLAUDE.md` — additive-v2 paragraph.** In the "Store format" bullet (line ~65), after the migration-chain sentence, add (new sentence, same bullet):
+
+```
+ Additive v2 (EGB-712): upgraded clients read either blob suffix (`_resolve_external_blob_read` tries `.properties.age` then `.gradle-properties.age`) and dual-write a `properties` external only when a v1 twin already exists (`_external_blob_write_targets`) — so existing externals keep old clients fresh, brand-new externals are v2-only (a gentle forcing function), and `migrate --finalize` is now OPTIONAL GC rather than a required, coordination-gated flag-day. dotenv and `file` blobs are identical across formats, so they always propagate to old clients.
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: `README.md` — propagation table.** Add, near the migrate rows in the command table or in a short "Upgrading / store format" subsection, the propagation-by-secret-type summary (verbatim from spec §6):
+
+```markdown
+**Do teammates on an older `secrets` get new secrets?**
+
+| Secret type | Old client gets it? |
+|---|---|
+| `.env` / `.env.*` / `.dev.vars` | **Yes, always** (blob name identical across formats) |
+| whole-file external | **Yes, always** |
+| `properties` external that already existed | **Yes** (dual-written) |
+| brand-new `properties` external | **No — must upgrade `secrets`** (the forcing function) |
+
+"Upgrade your secrets" = `git pull` the tool clone (binary ≥ 0.6.0.0) and/or `secrets migrate` the store. A read-only teammate only needs the tool `git pull`.
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: `VERSION`** — set to `0.7.0.0`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: `CHANGELOG.md`** — insert above the top entry:
+
+```markdown
+## [0.7.0.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Additive store-format v2 (EGB-712)** — upgraded `secrets` clients now read
+  either external blob suffix (`.properties.age` or the legacy
+  `.gradle-properties.age`) and **dual-write** a `properties` external whenever a
+  v1 twin already exists in the store. Existing externals keep working for
+  teammates on an older `secrets`; only a brand-new `properties` external is
+  written v2-only (a gentle "upgrade to see it" forcing function). dotenv and
+  whole-`file` externals are unchanged across formats and always propagate.
+- **`secrets migrate --finalize` is now optional GC**, not a required milestone.
+  Because clients dual-write and read-fall-back, no teammate is ever cut off by
+  *not* finalizing; finalize only reclaims the duplicate v1 blobs, and stays
+  deferrable indefinitely. Its safety gates are unchanged.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets migrate --status`** now reports `v2-only` externals per project
+  (the ones an un-upgraded client cannot read), so you can see the forcing
+  function's footprint at a glance.
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run the full suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/`
+Expected: all pass (docs don't affect tests). Confirm the count is baseline 242 + net new tests from Tasks 1/2/4 (read-fallback, two write tests, v2-only status) minus the rewritten back-compat test (replaced, not added) = **246**.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Sanity — help renders**
+
+Run: `./secrets help 2>&1 | grep -- "--finalize"`
+Expected: shows the reframed "Optional GC" line. (Help only prints; touches no store.)
+
+- [ ] **Step 8: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add secrets CLAUDE.md README.md VERSION CHANGELOG.md
+git commit -m "docs: additive-v2 propagation + optional-GC finalize; bump 0.7.0.0 (EGB-712)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Self-review against the spec
+
+- **§1 read resolution** → Task 1 (`_resolve_external_blob_read`, wired into pull + verify). Test: read-fallback.
+- **§2 write rule / twin rule** → Task 2 (`_external_blob_write_targets`, push wiring). Tests: fresh-→v2-only, existing-twin-→dual-write.
+- **§3 marker NOT stamped** → no production change (push never touches the marker); guarded implicitly by Task 3 keeping the `make_v1_store; push; migrate` flow working (store stays markerless after push). The plan deliberately does not add marker-stamping.
+- **§4 finalize = optional GC** → unchanged logic; reframed in Task 5 docs/help. Existing finalize tests stay green (Task 3 keeps them green).
+- **§5 migrate / --status coverage** → Task 4 (v2-only line); `migrate` copy-forward unchanged (EGB-710).
+- **§6 propagation table** → Task 5 README/CLAUDE.md.
+- **§7 caveat** → documented in CHANGELOG/CLAUDE.md framing; the read-fallback test exercises the v1-only read path.
+- **§8 back-compat matrix** → covered across Task 1 (reads), Task 2 (writes), Task 3 (old-client v1 blobs simulated).
+- **Safety invariants** → no path-rail changes; bash 3.2 (no associative arrays; `while read` + `find`); recursive walks unchanged; finalize gating untouched.
+
+**Type/name consistency:** `_resolve_external_blob_read(project, slug, mtype)` and `_external_blob_write_targets(project, slug, mtype)` use the same arg order everywhere; test helpers `m_fake_v1_twin` (keep both) and `m_make_v1_only` (rename to v1-only) are used consistently per their documented semantics.
+
+**Placeholder scan:** none — every step carries verbatim code or an exact enumerated edit with the precise insertion point.
+
+## Operator-local follow-up (not part of this plan)
+
+Per `.ship-policy.json`, before any PR ask the operator to run `./test/run-security.sh` and complete the SIGNOFF. EGB-712 also needs its one stale AC bullet ("Marker auto-stamps…") corrected to match the §3 decision (no auto-stamp) — a one-line Linear edit.

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-08-egb-710-migrate-guided-flow.md

@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+# EGB-710: `secrets migrate` guided flow (manifest-free copy-forward + `--status` survey) Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Replace the dead-end "No .secrets.json — cd into a project that has a manifest" error in `secrets migrate` with a manifest-free copy-forward that just works, plus a `secrets migrate --status` survey that tells the operator exactly which projects still need migrating.
+
+**Architecture:** The per-project copy-forward step (`_migrate_project`) currently reads `$PWD/.secrets.json` to find `properties` externals, then looks for their v1 blobs. This makes it die on a legacy `.secrets-files`-only project (the real EGB-710 repro) and — worse — silently skips any store blob the manifest doesn't declare, leaving it un-twinned so `--finalize` later refuses it. The fix: enumerate the **store** (`$SECRETS_DIR/<project>/external/*.gradle-properties.age`) directly and copy each to its `.properties.age` twin via suffix-swap — the *exact* logic `_migrate_finalize` already uses. No manifest needed, dotenv/file-only projects become a clean no-op, and migrate twins precisely the blobs finalize will demand twins for. A new `--status` mode walks every project dir and reports per-project readiness + whether the store is finalize-ready.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Single bash 3.2 script (`secrets`), `age`, `git`, `jq` (unaffected here). Tests: `bats-core` (`test/migrate.bats`). Every standalone `[[ ]]` assertion ends with `|| false` (bash 3.2 ERR-trap gotcha).
+
+---
+
+## Background facts (verified against HEAD 633d19e)
+
+- `_migrate_project()` lives at `secrets:2135`; it `die`s at `secrets:2142-2148` on missing `$PWD/.secrets.json`, then iterates `_json_external_entries "$manifest"` filtered to `gradle-properties` (`secrets:2154-2174`).
+- `_migrate_finalize()` (`secrets:2196`) already enumerates blobs manifest-free: `find "$SECRETS_DIR" -type f -name '*.gradle-properties.age'` and derives the twin as `new="${f%.gradle-properties.age}.properties.age"` (`secrets:2212-2217`). The per-project step will mirror this, scoped to one project dir.
+- `cmd_migrate()` flag parser: `secrets:2267-2285`.
+- `derive_project_name ""` (`secrets:101`) needs no manifest — it uses the git remote basename or `basename "$PWD"`.
+- `info()`/`die()`: `secrets:36-37`. `ensure_store_protections` is called post-write in the existing copy-forward.
+- Output-contract strings existing tests depend on (must be preserved): `"would migrate"` (migrate.bats:80), `"0 blob(s) would be copy-forwarded"` (migrate.bats:94), `"1 already present"` (migrate.bats:121, idempotent re-run prints `$already already present`), `"already format v2"` (migrate.bats:139).
+- The one test that codifies the OLD dead-end — `"migrate with no manifest in cwd dies with a directed message"` (migrate.bats:126) — is the behavior we are intentionally changing; it gets rewritten in Task 1.
+- No test asserts the non-dry-run "nothing to migrate" wording (grep confirmed), so that message is free to change. We keep the substring `no v1 properties blobs` regardless for safety.
+- VERSION is `0.6.0.1`; bump to `0.6.1.0` (new subcommand flag + behavior change). `MANIFEST_VERSION` stays `2` (no schema change).
+
+## File structure
+
+- Modify: `secrets` — rewrite `_migrate_project` (`secrets:2135-2191`), add `_migrate_status`, extend `cmd_migrate` flag parsing + dispatch (`secrets:2267-2285`), update `cmd_help` migrate lines (`secrets:2308-2309`).
+- Modify: `test/migrate.bats` — rewrite the dead-end test; add manifest-free, finalize-consistency, and `--status` tests.
+- Modify: `CLAUDE.md` — update the migrate paragraph (Architecture → Store format) to note manifest-free copy-forward + `--status`.
+- Modify: `README.md` — migrate usage/help.
+- Modify: `VERSION` → `0.6.1.0`; `CHANGELOG.md` — new entry.
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Manifest-free per-project copy-forward
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `secrets` — `_migrate_project()` (`secrets:2135-2191`)
+- Test: `test/migrate.bats`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing test — migrate works with no `.secrets.json` (the EGB-710 repro)**
+
+Add to `test/migrate.bats` (after the existing copy-forward tests, ~line 124):
+
+```bash
+@test "migrate copy-forwards a v1 properties blob with no .secrets.json (manifest-free)" {
+  # The EGB-710 repro: a legacy project has a v1 properties blob in the store
+  # but no .secrets.json (it predates the manifest). migrate must NOT dead-end.
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir nomanifestblob
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push nomanifestblob >/dev/null 2>&1
+  rm -f .secrets.json                       # simulate a pre-manifest project
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/nomanifestblob/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                        # v2 twin written despite no manifest
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/nomanifestblob/external/*.gradle-properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                        # v1 kept (non-destructive)
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run it to confirm it fails**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "manifest-free"`
+Expected: FAIL — current code `die`s with "No .secrets.json in …" (status 1), so the first `[ "$status" -eq 0 ]` fails.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Rewrite `_migrate_project` to enumerate the store, not the manifest**
+
+Replace the body of `_migrate_project()` (`secrets:2135-2191`, from `_migrate_project() {` through its closing `}`) with:
+
+```bash
+_migrate_project() {
+  local dry_run="$1"
+  if [ "$(_store_format)" = "2" ]; then
+    info "Store is already format v2 — nothing to migrate."
+    return 0
+  fi
+  local project; project=$(derive_project_name "")
+  local pdir="$SECRETS_DIR/$project"
+
+  # Source of truth for the copy-forward is the STORE, not a project manifest.
+  # Every v1 properties blob is a `*.gradle-properties.age` file whose v2 twin
+  # is the same name with the `.properties.age` suffix (the only on-disk change
+  # v2 makes). Enumerating the store — exactly as `_migrate_finalize` does —
+  # means migrate twins precisely the blobs finalize will demand twins for, with
+  # no manifest dependency. This is why a legacy `.secrets-files`-only project
+  # (no `.secrets.json` yet) migrates cleanly instead of dead-ending, and why a
+  # store blob the manifest no longer declares still gets a twin.
+  local moved=0 already=0 would=0 v1count=0 f new
+  while IFS= read -r f; do
+    [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+    v1count=$((v1count + 1))
+    new="${f%.gradle-properties.age}.properties.age"
+    if [ -f "$new" ]; then
+      already=$((already + 1))
+      continue
+    fi
+    if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
+      echo "would migrate: ${f#"$SECRETS_DIR"/} -> $(basename "$new")"
+      would=$((would + 1))
+    else
+      cp "$f" "$new"
+      moved=$((moved + 1))
+    fi
+  done < <(find "$pdir/external" -type f -name '*.gradle-properties.age' 2>/dev/null)
+
+  if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
+    echo "migrate --dry-run: $would blob(s) would be copy-forwarded for '$project' (writes nothing); $already already present. v1 blobs are kept until 'secrets migrate --finalize'."
+    return 0
+  fi
+  if [ "$moved" -eq 0 ] && [ "$already" -eq 0 ]; then
+    info "Nothing to migrate for '$project' — no v1 properties blobs in the store (already v2-shaped). If you expected one, run 'secrets push' first, then re-run 'secrets migrate'."
+    return 0
+  fi
+  ensure_store_protections
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" commit -m "migrate: copy-forward v2 twins for $project" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  # Push the twins so a --finalize on another machine sees them (finalize
+  # refuses any v1 blob without a twin). Mirrors push/rekey's push behavior.
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" remote get-url origin >/dev/null 2>&1 && git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" push >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  info "Copy-forward for '$project': $moved new v2 twin(s), $already already present. v1 blobs kept (non-destructive). Run 'secrets migrate --finalize' once every project is migrated and every machine is upgraded."
+}
+```
+
+Notes for the implementer:
+- This removes the only in-script caller of `_check_manifest_file`/`_json_external_entries` *inside migrate*; both remain defined and used by push/pull/verify, so do **not** delete them.
+- `${f#"$SECRETS_DIR"/}` keeps the dry-run line's store-relative form (matches the old `$project/external/...` style closely enough; the test only checks the substring `would migrate`).
+- The `moved==0 && already==0` branch keeps the substring `no v1 properties blobs`. The idempotent re-run path (`moved==0, already>0`) falls through to the final `info` printing `$already already present`, preserving the `1 already present` contract.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Run the new test + the full migrate suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats`
+Expected: the new "manifest-free" test PASSES; existing dry-run/copy-forward/idempotent/finalize tests still PASS; the "migrate with no manifest in cwd dies" test (migrate.bats:126) now FAILS (we fix it in Step 5).
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Update the test that codified the old dead-end**
+
+Replace the test at `test/migrate.bats:126-132` (`"migrate with no manifest in cwd dies with a directed message"`) with:
+
+```bash
+@test "migrate in a project with no manifest and no store blobs is a clean no-op" {
+  make_v1_store
+  local dir="$WORK_DIR/nomanifest"; mkdir -p "$dir"; cd "$dir"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no v1 properties blobs"* ]] || false
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run the full suite to confirm green**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats`
+Expected: all PASS.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add secrets test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "fix: migrate copy-forward is manifest-free, no dead-end on legacy projects (EGB-710)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Finalize-consistency regression test (store blob not in manifest)
+
+**Files:**
+- Test: `test/migrate.bats`
+
+This proves the latent-bug fix: the old manifest-driven migrate skipped store blobs the manifest didn't declare, leaving them un-twinned so `--finalize` refused them. The rewrite twins them.
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the test**
+
+Add to `test/migrate.bats`:
+
+```bash
+@test "migrate twins a store blob even when the manifest no longer declares it" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir staleblob
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push staleblob >/dev/null 2>&1
+  # The blob is now in the store. Drop the external from the project's manifest
+  # entirely (and remove the legacy file) so NO manifest declares it.
+  printf '{"version":2,"dotenv":[".env",".env.staging"]}\n' > .secrets.json
+  rm -f .secrets-files
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/staleblob/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]   # twinned despite not being declared anywhere
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run it**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "no longer declares"`
+Expected: PASS (the Task 1 rewrite already makes this green — this test guards against regressing back to manifest-driven enumeration).
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "test: migrate twins undeclared store blobs (finalize-consistency, EGB-710)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: `secrets migrate --status` survey
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `secrets` — add `_migrate_status()`; extend `cmd_migrate` (`secrets:2267-2285`)
+- Test: `test/migrate.bats`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Write the failing tests**
+
+Add to `test/migrate.bats`:
+
+```bash
+@test "migrate --status flags a project that needs migrating" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir needsmig
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push needsmig >/dev/null 2>&1   # v1 blob, no twin yet
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]                            # not finalize-ready
+  [[ "$output" == *"needsmig"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"NEEDS MIGRATE"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"Not finalize-ready"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate --status reports finalize-ready once every blob is twinned" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir readymig
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push readymig >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1         # create the twin
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Finalize-ready"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate --status on an already-v2 store says nothing to do" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir v2status
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"v2"* ]] || false
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Run them to confirm they fail**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats -f "status"`
+Expected: FAIL — `--status` is an unknown flag today (`die "Unknown migrate flag: --status…"`, status 1), so the assertions fail.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Add `_migrate_status` (place it just before `_migrate_finalize`, ~`secrets:2195`)**
+
+```bash
+# Read-only survey: walk every project dir in the store and report each one's
+# v2-readiness from the blobs on disk (no manifest, no decryption). Exits
+# non-zero when any v1 properties blob lacks a v2 twin (i.e. the store is not
+# yet finalize-ready) so it can gate scripting, mirroring `verify`'s posture.
+_migrate_status() {
+  if [ "$(_store_format)" = "2" ]; then
+    info "Store format: v2 (finalized) — nothing to migrate."
+    return 0
+  fi
+  echo "Store format: v1 (not finalized). Per-project migration status:"
+  local any_untwinned=0 dir project v1 untwinned f new
+  for dir in "$SECRETS_DIR"/*/; do
+    [ -d "$dir" ] || continue
+    project=$(basename "$dir")
+    case "$project" in .*) continue ;; esac
+    v1=0; untwinned=0
+    while IFS= read -r f; do
+      [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+      v1=$((v1 + 1))
+      new="${f%.gradle-properties.age}.properties.age"
+      [ -f "$new" ] || untwinned=$((untwinned + 1))
+    done < <(find "$dir" -type f -name '*.gradle-properties.age' 2>/dev/null)
+    if [ "$v1" -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "  $project: v2-ready (no v1 properties blobs)"
+    elif [ "$untwinned" -eq 0 ]; then
+      echo "  $project: migrated ($v1 v1 blob(s), all twinned)"
+    else
+      echo "  $project: NEEDS MIGRATE ($untwinned of $v1 v1 blob(s) un-twinned) — cd into the project and run 'secrets migrate'"
+      any_untwinned=1
+    fi
+  done
+  echo
+  if [ "$any_untwinned" -eq 1 ]; then
+    echo "Not finalize-ready: migrate the projects marked NEEDS MIGRATE, then run 'secrets migrate --finalize'."
+    return 1
+  fi
+  echo "Finalize-ready: every v1 properties blob has a v2 twin. Run 'secrets migrate --finalize' once every machine is upgraded."
+  return 0
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Wire `--status` into `cmd_migrate`**
+
+In `cmd_migrate()` (`secrets:2267`), add the `status` local and parse + dispatch. Replace:
+
+```bash
+  local dry_run=false finalize=false force=false
+  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in
+      --dry-run)     dry_run=true; shift ;;
+      --finalize)    finalize=true; shift ;;
+      --yes)         force=true; shift ;;
+      -*)            die "Unknown migrate flag: $1. Usage: secrets migrate [--dry-run | --finalize] [--yes]" ;;
+      *)             die "migrate takes no project argument. Run it from inside a project (copy-forward) or use --finalize (store-wide)." ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  if [ "$finalize" = true ]; then
+    _migrate_finalize "$force"
+  else
+    _migrate_project "$dry_run"
+  fi
+```
+
+with:
+
+```bash
+  local dry_run=false finalize=false force=false status=false
+  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in
+      --dry-run)     dry_run=true; shift ;;
+      --finalize)    finalize=true; shift ;;
+      --status)      status=true; shift ;;
+      --yes)         force=true; shift ;;
+      -*)            die "Unknown migrate flag: $1. Usage: secrets migrate [--dry-run | --status | --finalize] [--yes]" ;;
+      *)             die "migrate takes no project argument. Run it from inside a project (copy-forward), or use --status / --finalize (store-wide)." ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  if [ "$status" = true ]; then
+    _migrate_status
+  elif [ "$finalize" = true ]; then
+    _migrate_finalize "$force"
+  else
+    _migrate_project "$dry_run"
+  fi
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Run the status tests + full suite**
+
+Run: `bats test/migrate.bats`
+Expected: all PASS.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add secrets test/migrate.bats
+git commit -m "feat: secrets migrate --status surveys per-project v2 readiness (EGB-710)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: Docs, help text, version, changelog
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `secrets` — `cmd_help` (`secrets:2308-2309`)
+- Modify: `CLAUDE.md`, `README.md`, `VERSION`, `CHANGELOG.md`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Update `cmd_help` migrate lines**
+
+In `cmd_help()` replace the two migrate lines (`secrets:2308-2309`):
+
+```
+  secrets migrate [--dry-run]   Copy-forward this project's blobs to store format v2
+  secrets migrate --finalize    Drop v1 blobs and mark the store v2 (after verify)
+```
+
+with:
+
+```
+  secrets migrate [--dry-run]   Copy-forward this project's v1 blobs to store format v2
+  secrets migrate --status      Survey every project's v2 readiness (finalize gate)
+  secrets migrate --finalize    Drop v1 blobs and mark the store v2 (after verify)
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Update `CLAUDE.md` migrate paragraph**
+
+In the "Store format (EGB-677 stage 2 / EGB-703)" bullet, update the migration description: copy-forward is now **manifest-free** — `secrets migrate` enumerates the project's `*.gradle-properties.age` store blobs directly (same source of truth as `--finalize`), so a legacy `.secrets-files`-only project migrates without a `.secrets.json` and no store blob is left un-twinned. Add `secrets migrate --status` to the workflow line as the read-only survey that reports per-project readiness and gates `--finalize`. Reference EGB-710.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Update `README.md`**
+
+Find the migrate section/help block and add the `--status` line and the manifest-free note, mirroring the help text.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Bump `VERSION`**
+
+Set `VERSION` to `0.6.1.0`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Add `CHANGELOG.md` entry**
+
+Insert above `## [0.6.0.1]`:
+
+```markdown
+## [0.6.1.0] - 2026-06-08
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`secrets migrate` copy-forward is now manifest-free (EGB-710)** — the
+  per-project step enumerates the store's `*.gradle-properties.age` blobs
+  directly (the same source of truth `--finalize` uses) instead of reading
+  `.secrets.json`. A legacy `.secrets-files`-only project now migrates cleanly
+  instead of dead-ending with "No .secrets.json", and a store blob the manifest
+  no longer declares still gets a v2 twin (so `--finalize` won't refuse it).
+  Running migrate in a project with no v1 properties blobs is a clean no-op.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`secrets migrate --status`** — a read-only survey that walks every project
+  in the store and reports its v2 readiness (v2-ready / migrated / NEEDS
+  MIGRATE), then whether the store as a whole is finalize-ready. Exits non-zero
+  while any v1 blob is un-twinned, so it can gate the path to `--finalize`.
+```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run the full bats suite (all files)**
+
+Run: `bats test/`
+Expected: all PASS (secrets.bats + manifest.bats + migrate.bats). Confirm the count went up by the tests added here.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
+
+```bash
+git add secrets CLAUDE.md README.md VERSION CHANGELOG.md
+git commit -m "docs: migrate --status + manifest-free copy-forward; bump 0.6.1.0 (EGB-710)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Self-review against the EGB-710 spec
+
+- **AC: dotenv-only project exits 0 "already v2-shaped"** → Task 1 (`moved==0 && already==0` branch, substring `no v1 properties blobs`). Test: "no manifest and no store blobs is a clean no-op" (Task 1 Step 5).
+- **AC: `.secrets-files`-only project with v1 blobs migrates instead of the generic error** → the manifest-free rewrite makes it *just migrate* (better than guiding to push first). Test: "manifest-free" (Task 1 Step 1). Note the rewrite supersedes the ticket's "offer to run absorb then migrate" branch — migrate no longer needs the manifest, so there's nothing to prompt for; the only destructive step (`--finalize`) keeps its existing `/dev/tty` confirmation.
+- **AC: interactive prompts read `/dev/tty`, degrade non-interactively, bash 3.2** → no new prompt is introduced (copy-forward is non-destructive); `--finalize`'s existing `/dev/tty` confirm is untouched. `--status` is pure read-only output. All new code is bash 3.2 (no associative arrays, `[[ ]]` only in tests with `|| false`).
+- **AC: no behavior change to copy-forward/finalize safety gates** → finalize untouched; copy-forward stays non-destructive (v1 kept, commit + push twins). Verified by the unchanged finalize tests (migrate.bats:168-214).
+- **AC: bats coverage per branch** → Tasks 1-3 add: manifest-free migrate, no-op no-blobs, undeclared-blob twinning, `--status` needs-migrate / finalize-ready / already-v2.
+- **Stretch: `--status` survey** → Task 3, delivered.
+- **Sequencing: independent of the EGB-709 gate** → confirmed; this only touches migrate ergonomics and helps operators *reach* all-v2. EGB-703 safety posture (recovery tag, verify-green gate, twin-before-drop) is preserved.
+
+## Operator-local follow-up (not part of this plan)
+
+This repo's `.ship-policy.json` opts out of AI security/red-team passes; before any PR, ask the operator to run `./test/run-security.sh` and complete the SIGNOFF. After landing, the operator can re-run their real-store migration for `onefinalmessage` et al. (`secrets migrate` per project → `secrets migrate --finalize`), which is the path to clearing the EGB-709 v2 gate.

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-06-08-egb-713-version-skew-nudge.md

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+# EGB-713: Version-skew nudge Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: superpowers:executing-plans / subagent-driven-development. Steps use `- [ ]`.
+
+**Goal:** Warn (non-fatally) when the active store was last written by a newer `secrets` version than the running client, so a behind user is told to update — the loud counterpart to EGB-712's quiet forcing function.
+
+**Architecture:** Stamp the store with the highest writer `VERSION` seen (`$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version`, committed, monotonic) on every store-committing write. On any store command, compare that stamp to the client's own `VERSION` (read from `$SCRIPT_DIR/VERSION`); if the stamp is newer, print a one-time stderr nudge. Legacy stores with no stamp are silent.
+
+**Tech Stack:** bash 3.2 (`secrets`); bats. Spec/idea: ticket **EGB-713**.
+
+## Background (verified against `main`, post-EGB-712)
+- `SCRIPT_DIR` already defined at `secrets:21` (`$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)`). The repo-root `VERSION` file lives next to the script.
+- Store-committing write sites (each does `git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A`): `commit_and_push_secrets()` `secrets:1265` (push), rekey `secrets:1822`, migrate copy-forward `secrets:2215`, finalize no-v1 `secrets:2305`, finalize drop `secrets:2340`. Plus `cmd_init` (born store) and `cmd_rm`.
+- `ensure_store_protections()` (`secrets:1144`) is shared with pull (read) — do NOT stamp there.
+- `check_initialized()` (`secrets:54`) early-returns when `$SECRETS_DIR/.git` exists and is called by push/pull/list/rm/rekey/verify/migrate — the natural warning hook.
+- `cmd_which()` (`secrets:1945`) prints `format: v$(_store_format)` — add the writer-version line here.
+- `.gitignore` only ignores `key.txt`, so `.secrets-writer-version` commits normally.
+- VERSION currently `0.7.0.0` → bump to `0.7.1.0`.
+- Baseline: `bats test/` = 246 passing. New tests land in a new file `test/version.bats`.
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Version helpers + comparator (TDD)
+
+**Files:** `secrets`, `test/version.bats` (new).
+
+- [ ] Step 1: Create `test/version.bats` testing the comparator via a tiny harness that sources the script's functions is awkward (the script runs main). Instead test through observable behavior in later tasks; for the comparator, add a hidden debug subcommand is overkill. Use this approach: test `_version_gt` indirectly by exporting it is not possible. So test the comparator by adding the helpers and a **`secrets __vercmp <a> <b>`** internal is overkill too. Decision: test the comparator's *effect* in Task 3 (warning) and Task 2 (stamp monotonicity), which exercise it end-to-end. For Task 1, write the helpers and verify with a one-off `bash -c` sourcing guard.
+
+Add to `test/version.bats`:
+```bash
+load test_helper
+
+# Exercises the comparator through a bash subshell that defines the same logic
+# the script uses, guarding the numeric (not lexical) ordering contract.
+@test "version comparator orders 0.7.0.0 < 0.10.0.0 numerically" {
+  run bash -c '
+    _version_gt() {
+      local a="$1" b="$2" i ai bi; local -a af bf
+      IFS=. read -r -a af <<< "$a"; IFS=. read -r -a bf <<< "$b"
+      for i in 0 1 2 3; do
+        ai=${af[$i]:-0}; ai=${ai//[!0-9]/}; [ -n "$ai" ] || ai=0
+        bi=${bf[$i]:-0}; bi=${bi//[!0-9]/}; [ -n "$bi" ] || bi=0
+        if [ "$((10#$ai))" -gt "$((10#$bi))" ]; then return 0; fi
+        if [ "$((10#$ai))" -lt "$((10#$bi))" ]; then return 1; fi
+      done; return 1
+    }
+    _version_gt 0.10.0.0 0.7.0.0 && echo "10gt7"
+    _version_gt 0.7.0.0 0.10.0.0 || echo "7not_gt_10"
+    _version_gt 0.7.0.0 0.7.0.0 || echo "equal_not_gt"
+  '
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"10gt7"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"7not_gt_10"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"equal_not_gt"* ]] || false
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 2: Run `bats test/version.bats` → PASS (pins the contract the script must match).
+
+- [ ] Step 3: Add the helpers to `secrets` (near `_store_format`, after `SCRIPT_DIR`/version constants — place after the `MANIFEST_VERSION=2` area or near `_store_format`):
+```bash
+# The running client's own version, read from the VERSION file shipped beside
+# the script. Empty/"0.0.0.0" if absent (e.g. an odd install) — treated as
+# "unknown/oldest" so a missing VERSION never triggers a spurious nudge.
+_client_version() {
+  local v=""
+  [ -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/VERSION" ] && v=$(head -1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/VERSION" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n[:space:]')
+  printf '%s' "${v:-0.0.0.0}"
+}
+
+# Numeric four-field (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.MICRO) compare. Returns 0 iff $1 > $2.
+# Per-field numeric (so 0.10.0.0 > 0.7.0.0); missing/garbage fields → 0.
+_version_gt() {
+  local a="$1" b="$2" i ai bi; local -a af bf
+  IFS=. read -r -a af <<< "$a"; IFS=. read -r -a bf <<< "$b"
+  for i in 0 1 2 3; do
+    ai=${af[$i]:-0}; ai=${ai//[!0-9]/}; [ -n "$ai" ] || ai=0
+    bi=${bf[$i]:-0}; bi=${bi//[!0-9]/}; [ -n "$bi" ] || bi=0
+    if [ "$((10#$ai))" -gt "$((10#$bi))" ]; then return 0; fi
+    if [ "$((10#$ai))" -lt "$((10#$bi))" ]; then return 1; fi
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+WRITER_VERSION_FILE_NAME=".secrets-writer-version"
+# Highest client version recorded as having written to the store (empty if the
+# store predates this feature — "minus the initial builds", silent by design).
+_store_writer_version() {
+  local f="$SECRETS_DIR/$WRITER_VERSION_FILE_NAME"
+  [ -f "$f" ] && head -1 "$f" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n[:space:]'
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 4: `bash -n secrets` parses; `bats test/` still 246 + 1 (the comparator test) = 247.
+- [ ] Step 5: Commit: `git add secrets test/version.bats && git commit -m "feat: version helpers + numeric comparator (EGB-713)"`
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Stamp the writer-version on write (TDD)
+
+**Files:** `secrets`, `test/version.bats`.
+
+- [ ] Step 1: Add tests:
+```bash
+@test "push stamps the store writer-version with the client version" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir wvstamp
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push wvstamp >/dev/null 2>&1
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version" ]
+  run cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  [ "$output" = "$(cat "$(dirname "$SECRETS_BIN")/VERSION")" ]
+}
+
+@test "writer-version stamp is monotonic (a push never lowers a higher stamp)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir wvmono
+  printf '9.9.9.9\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push wvmono >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  [ "$output" = "9.9.9.9" ]   # not lowered to the client's version
+}
+
+@test "writer-version stamp is committed, not gitignored" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir wvcommit
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push wvcommit >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "git -C $SECRETS_DIR ls-files | grep -qx .secrets-writer-version"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 2: Run `bats test/version.bats -f "stamp"` → FAIL (no stamping yet).
+
+- [ ] Step 3: Add the stamp helper (after `_store_writer_version`):
+```bash
+# Raise the store's recorded writer-version to the client's version (monotonic;
+# never lowers it). Called right before each store-committing `git add -A` so
+# the stamp rides the same commit. Read paths (pull) never call this.
+_stamp_writer_version() {
+  local cur cli
+  cur=$(_store_writer_version)
+  cli=$(_client_version)
+  if [ -z "$cur" ] || _version_gt "$cli" "$cur"; then
+    printf '%s\n' "$cli" > "$SECRETS_DIR/$WRITER_VERSION_FILE_NAME"
+  fi
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 4: Call `_stamp_writer_version` immediately before each store-committing `git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A`:
+  - `secrets:1265` (in `commit_and_push_secrets`, before `git add -A`)
+  - `secrets:1822` (rekey)
+  - `secrets:2215` (migrate copy-forward)
+  - `secrets:2305` (finalize, no-v1 path)
+  - `secrets:2340` (finalize, drop path)
+  Also in `cmd_init`, after the store repo is created and before its first commit (so a born store records its version), and in `cmd_rm` before its commit.
+  Each insertion is the single line `  _stamp_writer_version` at the matching indentation directly above the `git ... add -A` (or before the `git ... commit` where there's no add -A, e.g. rm/init — there, stamp then ensure it's staged via the existing add/commit).
+
+- [ ] Step 5: `bats test/version.bats` → all pass. `bats test/` → 250 (247 + 3).
+- [ ] Step 6: Commit: `git add secrets test/version.bats && git commit -m "feat: stamp store writer-version on write, monotonic (EGB-713)"`
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: Skew warning on command (TDD)
+
+**Files:** `secrets`, `test/version.bats`.
+
+- [ ] Step 1: Add tests:
+```bash
+@test "a store written by a newer version warns on a command (non-fatal)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir skewwarn
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push skewwarn >/dev/null 2>&1
+  printf '99.0.0.0\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                                  # non-fatal
+  [[ "$output" == *"newer"* || "$output" == *"update"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "a store at the same/older version is silent" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir noskew
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push noskew >/dev/null 2>&1           # stamp == client version
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"update your secrets"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "a store with no writer-version marker is silent (legacy store)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir legacynostamp
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push legacynostamp >/dev/null 2>&1
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"update your secrets"* ]] || false
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 2: Run `bats test/version.bats -f "skew\|silent\|legacy"` → the "newer" test FAILS (no warning yet).
+
+- [ ] Step 3: Add the skew check (after `_stamp_writer_version`):
+```bash
+# Warn ONCE per invocation if the store was last written by a newer client than
+# us. Non-fatal (read/write paths keep their exit codes). Silent when the store
+# carries no writer-version (legacy) or is same/older than us.
+_VERSION_SKEW_WARNED=0
+_check_store_version_skew() {
+  [ "$_VERSION_SKEW_WARNED" = 1 ] && return 0
+  local sv cv
+  sv=$(_store_writer_version)
+  [ -n "$sv" ] || return 0
+  cv=$(_client_version)
+  if _version_gt "$sv" "$cv"; then
+    _VERSION_SKEW_WARNED=1
+    echo "NOTE: this store was last written by secrets v$sv; you're on v$cv." >&2
+    echo "      Update your secrets tool: git -C \"$SCRIPT_DIR\" pull" >&2
+  fi
+  return 0
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 4: Hook it into `check_initialized` — change `secrets:55-57`:
+```bash
+  if [ -d "$SECRETS_DIR/.git" ]; then
+    return
+  fi
+```
+to:
+```bash
+  if [ -d "$SECRETS_DIR/.git" ]; then
+    _check_store_version_skew
+    return
+  fi
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 5: `bats test/version.bats` → all pass. `bats test/` → 253.
+- [ ] Step 6: Commit: `git add secrets test/version.bats && git commit -m "feat: warn on store version skew (once per invocation, EGB-713)"`
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: `secrets which` surfaces the writer-version (TDD)
+
+**Files:** `secrets`, `test/version.bats`.
+
+- [ ] Step 1: Add test:
+```bash
+@test "which prints the store writer-version and a behind note" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir whichwv
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push whichwv >/dev/null 2>&1
+  printf '99.0.0.0\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"written-by: v99.0.0.0"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"behind"* || "$output" == *"update"* ]] || false
+}
+```
+
+- [ ] Step 2: Run → FAIL (which doesn't print written-by).
+
+- [ ] Step 3: In `cmd_which`, after the `echo "format: v$(_store_format)"` line (`secrets:1951`), add:
+```bash
+  local _wv; _wv=$(_store_writer_version)
+  if [ -n "$_wv" ]; then
+    local _cv; _cv=$(_client_version)
+    if _version_gt "$_wv" "$_cv"; then
+      echo "written-by: v$_wv  (you're on v$_cv — behind; run: git -C \"$SCRIPT_DIR\" pull)"
+    else
+      echo "written-by: v$_wv"
+    fi
+  fi
+```
+Note: `cmd_which` calls `resolve_store` but may not call `check_initialized`, so this also avoids double-printing the skew NOTE; the `which` line is the dedicated surface.
+
+- [ ] Step 4: `bats test/version.bats` → pass. `bats test/` → 254.
+- [ ] Step 5: Commit: `git add secrets test/version.bats && git commit -m "feat: secrets which shows store writer-version + behind note (EGB-713)"`
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: Docs + version bump
+
+**Files:** `secrets` (cmd_help unchanged unless adding a note), `CLAUDE.md`, `README.md`, `VERSION`, `CHANGELOG.md`.
+
+- [ ] Step 1: `CLAUDE.md` — add to the "Store format" bullet a sentence on the writer-version: a committed `.secrets-writer-version` records the highest client `VERSION` that has written (monotonic, stamped on store-committing writes); commands warn once (stderr, non-fatal) when the store's stamp exceeds the running client, and `secrets which` shows `written-by: vN`. Legacy stores (no marker) are silent. (EGB-713.)
+- [ ] Step 2: `README.md` — under the upgrading section, note that an out-of-date `secrets` prints a one-line "update" nudge when it touches a store newer than itself.
+- [ ] Step 3: `VERSION` → `0.7.1.0`.
+- [ ] Step 4: `CHANGELOG.md` — new `## [0.7.1.0] - 2026-06-08` with an Added entry for the version-skew nudge + `secrets which` writer-version line.
+- [ ] Step 5: `bats test/` → all green (254). `./secrets which` against a scratch store renders (covered by tests).
+- [ ] Step 6: Commit: `git add secrets CLAUDE.md README.md VERSION CHANGELOG.md && git commit -m "docs: version-skew nudge + writer-version; bump 0.7.1.0 (EGB-713)"`
+
+---
+
+## Self-review vs ticket AC
+- "Newer stamp → nudge; same/older → silent" → Task 3.
+- "No marker → silent (legacy)" → Task 3 + `_store_writer_version` empty.
+- "Monotonic, committed" → Task 2.
+- "Numeric comparator (0.7.0.0 < 0.10.0.0)" → Task 1.
+- "Non-fatal, never changes read/pull exit codes" → Task 3 (`_check_store_version_skew` always `return 0`).
+- "`which` surfaces it" → Task 4. "Warn once per invocation" → `_VERSION_SKEW_WARNED` guard.
+- bash 3.2: `read -a`, `local -a`, `10#`, parameter strips — all 3.2-safe.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-08-additive-v2-dual-write-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+# Additive v2 — automatic dual-write (no flag-day finalize)
+
+**Status:** Design approved (2026-06-08), pending implementation plan.
+**Supersedes the framing of:** EGB-703 ("finalize is the destructive milestone you must reach") and EGB-709 ("delete v1 paths once every client is v2").
+**Relates to:** EGB-677 (storage-model unification), EGB-710 (manifest-free migrate).
+
+## Problem
+
+Store-format v2 (EGB-703) renamed the `properties` external blob suffix
+(`.gradle-properties.age` → `.properties.age`) and made the transition a
+three-step migration ending in a **destructive** `secrets migrate --finalize`
+that drops the v1 blobs. Finalize is gated on "every machine and store in use is
+v2" — a coordination requirement that's trivial for a solo dev but **uncertain
+for a distributed team of 2–3+**: there is no reliable "all-clear" signal, and
+finalizing early silently cuts an un-upgraded client off from `properties`
+externals (it looks for `.gradle-properties.age`, which is gone).
+
+The hard gate exists **only** because finalize permanently drops the v1 blobs.
+Remove the obligation to drop, and there is nothing to coordinate.
+
+## Decision
+
+Adopt **Strategy B — Additive v2**: "becoming v2" stops being a destructive
+milestone and becomes a property an upgraded client maintains **automatically**.
+Reads try both suffixes; writes keep alive whatever old clients already knew.
+There is no required `migrate` ceremony and no required `finalize` — **upgrading
+the `secrets` tool *is* the migration.** `finalize` survives only as optional,
+indefinitely-deferrable garbage collection.
+
+Direction chosen over the alternatives: "park it / never finalize" (leaves the
+two-format wart in place, resolves nothing) and "abandon the suffix rename"
+(reverts shipped EGB-703 behavior, keeps the ugly `gradle-properties` suffix
+forever). Additive v2 is the only option that reaches a clean v2 end-state
+*without* a coordinated flag-day.
+
+## Design
+
+### 1. Read resolution — suffix-agnostic
+
+Any upgraded client resolving a `properties` external blob looks for the v2
+suffix `.properties.age` first, then falls back to the v1 `.gradle-properties.age`.
+An upgraded client therefore **never fails to find a blob** regardless of which
+suffix is on disk. Old (pre-0.6.0.0) clients still read v1-only — shipped code
+cannot be changed.
+
+Code: today's `_external_blob_suffix(type)` (a single suffix string) is replaced
+by a resolver that returns the **path of the blob that exists** for a given
+`(project, slug, type)`, trying v2 then v1. `file` externals are unchanged in
+both formats, so the resolver is a no-op identity for them (single suffix
+`.file.age`).
+
+### 2. Write rule — the self-managing twin rule
+
+On push of a `properties` external, the client checks the store for an existing
+v1 twin (`<slug>.gradle-properties.age`):
+
+- **v1 twin exists** (the external was first pushed by an old client) →
+  **dual-write both suffixes.** Old clients stay fresh forever; nobody is cut off.
+- **No v1 twin exists** (brand-new external, first pushed by an upgraded client) →
+  **write v2-only (`.properties.age`).** Old clients cannot see it → the gentle,
+  *intended* forcing function. It only ever bites on genuinely new externals,
+  never on anything that previously worked.
+
+No stored state is required: the presence/absence of the v1 twin **is** the
+signal. Mental model: *"keep alive what old clients already knew; new things are
+v2-only."*
+
+### 3. The marker — unchanged meaning, NOT auto-stamped
+
+Additive-v2 read/write behavior does **not** depend on the `.secrets-format`
+marker at all (reads try both suffixes; writes follow the twin rule). So the
+marker is left exactly as it is today: set only by `init` (born-v2, a fresh pure-v2
+store) or `migrate --finalize` (a store GC'd to pure v2). A transitional store
+that upgraded clients are dual-writing stays **markerless (v1)** — which is
+*accurate*: it has not been finalized to pure v2, and v1 twins still exist.
+
+Push deliberately does **not** auto-stamp the marker. (An earlier draft proposed
+auto-stamping on first push; that was dropped during planning because it would
+make a v1 store read as v2 the moment anyone pushed — turning every `migrate`
+into a no-op and contradicting the "v1 until finalized" model the whole
+migration relies on. The marker's only purposes — `secrets which` display and
+gating `migrate`/`finalize` — are better served by it continuing to mean
+"finalized/pure v2.")
+
+`secrets which` continues to report `format: vN` from the marker.
+
+### 4. `finalize` → optional GC, never required
+
+`secrets migrate --finalize` remains the *only* operation that stops dual-writing
+and drops the v1 twins. It is pure space reclamation (kilobytes), still
+coordination-gated **if** you choose to run it, but never obligatory and
+deferrable forever. Its existing safety posture is unchanged (recovery tag,
+`verify --all` green gate, twin-before-drop, `--yes`/operator confirmation). This
+is what defuses the gate: the destructive step still exists but is now optional
+housekeeping, not a release blocker.
+
+### 5. `migrate` / `migrate --status` → normalize + inspect
+
+- `secrets migrate` (the EGB-710 manifest-free copy-forward) stays as an optional
+  "backfill v2 twins for existing v1-only externals" command — useful right
+  before a `finalize`. With read-fallback (§1) it is no longer required for
+  correctness, only for tidiness.
+- `secrets migrate --status` becomes the **coverage survey**: per external, which
+  suffixes exist, and whether old clients are still being served (i.e. whether a
+  v1 twin is still present and being dual-written). This is the operator's
+  dashboard for "is anyone still relying on v1?" before an optional `finalize`.
+
+### 6. Propagation semantics (→ user docs verbatim)
+
+"Has not migrated" means **old client** (`secrets` < 0.6.0.0), not "hasn't run
+`migrate`". `migrate` is a per-store op done once by anyone; what protects a
+teammate is their **client version**. A read-only teammate needs only the tool
+`git pull` (binary ≥ 0.6.0.0), not to run `migrate` themselves. "Upgrade your
+secrets" (git pull the tool and/or migrate the store) is the correct umbrella —
+and for a solo dev the two are one motion.
+
+Does a teammate on an old client get a secret User 1 just added?
+
+| Secret type | Blob name v1 vs v2 | Old client gets the new secret? |
+|---|---|---|
+| **dotenv** (`.env`, `.env.*`, `.dev.vars`) | identical (`.env.age`) | **Yes, always.** No forcing function possible — the blob name never changed. |
+| **`file` external** (keystore, etc.) | identical (`.file.age`) | **Yes, always.** |
+| **`properties` external** — existing (has a v1 twin) | dual-written | **Yes.** Old client reads the maintained `.gradle-properties.age`. |
+| **`properties` external** — brand-new (no v1 twin) | v2-only | **No → must upgrade.** The forcing function; rare, and never breaks anything that previously worked. |
+
+Net: a teammate on an old client keeps getting **all** everyday `.env` updates
+indefinitely (a good safety property — no one silently misses everyday secrets),
+and only hits a wall on a genuinely new `properties`-style external.
+
+### 7. Known caveat (documented, not engineered around)
+
+Dual-write keeps v1 *readers* fresh, but a v1 *writer* writes only
+`.gradle-properties.age`. A v2 reader (reading `.properties.age` first) could
+therefore read stale data until that external is re-pushed by an upgraded client.
+For the normal shape — one writer per external, who upgrades first — it never
+bites. This matches today's reality and is documented rather than solved
+(solving it would require timestamp/newest-wins arbitration across two encrypted
+blobs — YAGNI for v1).
+
+### 8. Backward-compatibility matrix
+
+| Actor | dotenv / `file` | `properties` (existing twin) | `properties` (new, v2-only) |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Upgraded client reads | ✓ | ✓ (resolver finds either) | ✓ |
+| Upgraded client writes | unchanged | dual-writes both | writes v2-only |
+| Old client reads | ✓ | ✓ (reads maintained v1 twin) | ✗ (forcing function) |
+| Old client writes | unchanged | writes v1 twin only (see §7) | n/a (can't create v2) |
+
+## Code-level surface (for the implementation plan)
+
+- **`_external_blob_suffix(type)`** → split into:
+  - `_resolve_external_blob_read(project, slug, type)` — returns the path of the
+    blob that exists, trying `.properties.age` then `.gradle-properties.age` for
+    `properties`; identity for `file`. Used by `pull_external_files`, `verify`,
+    and any read path.
+  - `_external_blob_write_targets(project, slug, type)` — returns the suffix
+    path(s) to write: for `properties`, both suffixes when a v1 twin already
+    exists, else v2-only; single path for `file`.
+- **`push_external_files`** — write to every path from
+  `_external_blob_write_targets` (was a single `age -o`). Push does **not** stamp
+  the marker (see §3).
+- **`pull_external_files` / `cmd_verify`** — resolve blobs via
+  `_resolve_external_blob_read` (was the single-suffix lookup).
+- **`_migrate_finalize`** — unchanged logic; doc/help reframed as optional GC.
+- **`_migrate_project` / `_migrate_status`** — retained (EGB-710); `--status`
+  extended to report dual-write coverage per external.
+- **Docs:** CLAUDE.md "Store format" bullet, README, `cmd_help`, CHANGELOG,
+  VERSION bump (minor — new write semantics).
+
+## Safety / constraints (unchanged invariants)
+
+- bash 3.2 portable; every store walk stays recursive (`find -type f`).
+- Path-validation rails (`_validate_external_target_path`, slug derivation,
+  symlink/`..` refusal) untouched.
+- `finalize`'s destructive gating (recovery tag, verify-green, twin-before-drop,
+  `--yes`) untouched.
+- The store still carries no manifest; `.secrets.json` remains per-project.
+
+## Test plan (bats, outline)
+
+1. Read-fallback: a v2 client resolves a `properties` external that exists only
+   as `.gradle-properties.age` (no twin) — pull succeeds.
+2. Twin rule — existing twin → dual-write: push an external that has a v1 twin;
+   assert **both** suffixes are written and an old-client read path (v1 suffix)
+   sees the fresh value.
+3. Twin rule — new external → v2-only: push a brand-new `properties` external;
+   assert **only** `.properties.age` is written (no v1 twin created) — the
+   forcing function.
+4. Marker NOT stamped on push: a `make_v1_store` + push leaves `.secrets-format`
+   absent (store stays v1/transitional); the existing `make_v1_store; push;
+   migrate` flow is unaffected.
+5. dotenv/`file` unaffected: a dotenv and a `file` external round-trip identically
+   regardless of store marker.
+6. `migrate --status` coverage: reports which externals are dual-written vs
+   v2-only.
+7. `finalize` still green: existing finalize gates and drop behavior unchanged.
+8. Caveat is observable (optional): a v1-suffix-only update is read by the v2
+   client via fallback (documents the one-writer assumption).
+
+## Ripple to the roadmap
+
+- **EGB-703**: "finalize is the destructive milestone you must reach" → "finalize
+  is optional GC." Update the ticket/notes.
+- **EGB-709** (collapse v1 paths): no longer gates on "all clients v2." Becomes
+  "delete the dual-write/transitional code **if/when** every store is GC'd to
+  pure v2" — much later, low stakes. Add a note to EGB-709.
+- A new ticket should track this work (additive-v2 dual-write).
+
+## Decided knobs (no longer open)
+
+- Migration ceremony: **automatic** (upgraded client dual-writes on push; no
+  required `migrate`). `migrate`/`--status` remain manual/inspection tools.
+- Forcing function: **kept**, scoped to brand-new `properties` externals via the
+  twin rule (existing twins always dual-written).
+- `finalize`: **kept** as optional GC (not removed), so a fully-upgraded store
+  can still be reclaimed to pure v2.

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-24-multi-recipient-age-encryption-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+# EGB-283 — Multi-recipient age encryption
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-24
+**Issue:** [EGB-283](https://linear.app/egbt/issue/EGB-283) — secrets: multi-recipient age encryption (multiple keys per file)
+**Status:** Design approved, ready for implementation plan
+**Related:** EGB-281 (multi-store), EGB-677/EGB-703 (manifest + store-format v2)
+
+## Problem
+
+Today every blob in a store is encrypted to exactly one age public key (`age -r "$pubkey"`,
+where `$pubkey` is derived from the store's single `key.txt`). The whole team shares one
+private key. EGB-281's multi-store work lets users separate work/personal/client secrets into
+different stores, each with its own key — but *within* a single store there is still only one key,
+so onboarding/offboarding a teammate means sharing or rotating one secret by hand.
+
+age natively supports multiple recipients: `age -r KEY1 -r KEY2 -o file.age input` writes one
+recipient stanza per key, and any matching identity decrypts. This lets a single store have N
+members, each with their own keypair. Adding/removing a teammate becomes a re-encrypt against the
+current recipient set — no shared password.
+
+## Goals
+
+- A store can encrypt every blob to N recipient public keys.
+- Recipient set is managed with first-class commands (`secrets recipients add/rm/list`).
+- The recipient set is **singular and consistent per store**: every blob is always readable by
+  exactly the current set.
+- Fully backward compatible: existing single-key stores keep working untouched; the feature is
+  opt-in and detected by file presence (no store-format-marker bump).
+- Decryption path is unchanged (members use their own `key.txt`).
+
+## Non-goals (YAGNI — explicit scope cuts)
+
+- **SSH recipients** (`ssh-ed25519` / `ssh-rsa`). Native age X25519 keys cover the team-key use
+  case; SSH adds a parsing/format axis. Clean future follow-up.
+- **Per-file or per-project recipient subsets.** The whole store shares one recipient set.
+- **Key discovery / distribution.** Public keys are pasted in out of band, exactly as `key.txt`
+  is shared today.
+- **Merging recipients into a project-level config** (`.secrets.json` / `.secrets-files`). See
+  "Why recipients are not in the project manifest" below.
+
+## Design decisions (resolved during brainstorming)
+
+1. **Storage:** committed `recipients.txt` at the store root, managed via
+   `secrets recipients add/rm/list` subcommands.
+2. **Re-encrypt scope:** `add`/`rm` re-encrypt the **entire store immediately** to the new set in
+   one commit. The store is always consistent.
+3. **Backward compatibility:** absence of `recipients.txt` ⇒ exact current single-key behavior.
+   First `recipients add` on a legacy store bootstraps the file seeded with the local pubkey plus
+   the new key. `init` going forward seeds `recipients.txt` with the freshly generated pubkey
+   (born-multi).
+4. **`rekey` semantics:** on a multi-recipient store, `rekey` becomes "re-encrypt all to the
+   current `recipients.txt` set" (no new keypair). On a legacy store it keeps today's behavior
+   (generate a new keypair, re-encrypt to it). One shared re-encrypt engine.
+5. **Store config shape:** keep `recipients.txt` as its own plain, age-native file (jq-free),
+   alongside the existing one-line `.secrets-format` marker — matching the repo's
+   small-single-purpose-plain-file convention. Not folded into a JSON store-config.
+
+## Why recipients are not in the project manifest
+
+The tool has two config planes in two different git repos:
+
+| Plane       | Location                         | Files                                              | Scope                       |
+| ----------- | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------- |
+| **Project** | `$PWD` (the project's own repo)  | `.secrets.json` (absorbs legacy `.secrets-files`), `.secrets-store` | *What this project syncs*   |
+| **Store**   | `$SECRETS_DIR` (`~/.secrets`)    | `.secrets-format`, **`recipients.txt`** (new)      | *Metadata about the encrypted repo* |
+
+Recipients are **store-scoped** — who can decrypt *this store*, shared by every project in it.
+Putting them in a project-level manifest would let each project carry its own copy and **diverge**,
+the exact inconsistency the "always re-encrypt the whole store to one set" rule prevents. It also
+collides with the deliberate EGB-703 decision that *the store holds no project manifest*. So the
+recipient set lives with the store, next to `.secrets-format`.
+
+## `recipients.txt` format and security rails
+
+Lives at `$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt`, **committed** (public keys are not secret; the store
+`.gitignore` only blocks `key.txt` and plaintext env files, so the file is tracked automatically).
+age `-R` format: one recipient per line, `# comment` and blank lines allowed.
+
+```
+# alice (laptop)
+age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9qsxxxxxx
+# bob
+age1lggyhqrw2nlhcxprm67z43rta597azn8gknawjehu9d9dl0jq3yqxxxxxx
+```
+
+**We do not pass the file path to `age -R`.** A committed file is an injection surface, so the
+tool parses it itself into a validated indexed array `RECIPIENT_ARGS=(-r age1… -r age1…)`,
+mirroring the conservative posture of `.secrets-store` / `.secrets-files`:
+
+- Each non-comment, non-blank line (after trim) must match a native age X25519 recipient exactly:
+  `^age1[0-9a-z]{58}$`. Anything else — SSH recipients, shell metacharacters, whitespace inside the
+  token, control/ANSI characters, `-r`-injection look-alikes — is **rejected with a clear error**.
+  No shell expansion, ever.
+- A symlinked `recipients.txt` is refused (same rail as the manifests).
+- `--name` labels (written as `# <name>` comment lines above the key) are restricted to
+  `[A-Za-z0-9 ._-]`; anything else is rejected. This blocks comment-injection into the file.
+- The parser is pure bash (bash-3.2 safe). Indexed arrays are fine on bash 3.2; only *associative*
+  arrays are bash-4.
+
+Validation is the single source of truth — both the `recipients` subcommands and `_load_recipients`
+(below) route through the same validator, so an externally hand-edited malicious file is caught on
+the next encrypt, not just at `add` time.
+
+## Components
+
+### `_load_recipients()` — populate `RECIPIENT_ARGS`
+Called once per command that encrypts. Populates the global indexed array `RECIPIENT_ARGS`:
+
+- `recipients.txt` present → validated array of every key in the file (error out on any invalid
+  line; refuse an empty/all-comment file).
+- absent (legacy store) → `(-r <derived-local-pubkey>)`, identical to today's single-recipient
+  behavior.
+
+### `_reencrypt_all()` — shared re-encrypt engine
+Factored out of today's `cmd_rekey` decrypt→re-encrypt loop:
+
+1. Decrypt every `*.age` in the store (recursive `find -type f -name '*.age'`, covering nested
+   manifest dotenv blobs and `external/` blobs) with the local `key.txt` into a tmpdir. The
+   operator must be a current recipient; a decryption failure aborts with the old state preserved.
+2. Re-encrypt each file with `age "${RECIPIENT_ARGS[@]}"` back to its relpath.
+3. `ensure_store_protections`, `git add -A`, commit, push (if a remote exists).
+
+All recipient-changing paths call it:
+
+| Command                         | Behavior                                                              |
+| ------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `recipients add` / `rm`         | edit `recipients.txt` → `_load_recipients` → `_reencrypt_all`         |
+| `rekey` (multi-recipient store) | `_reencrypt_all` to current set, **no new keypair**                   |
+| `rekey` (legacy store)          | today's behavior: generate new keypair, set recipients to it, re-encrypt |
+| `reencrypt` (new, idempotent)   | `_reencrypt_all` — heal/backfill after a manual edit                  |
+
+### `secrets recipients` subcommand
+- `recipients list` — prints names + keys from `recipients.txt` (read-only, jq-free). On a legacy
+  store, prints the single derived pubkey with a "single-key (no recipients.txt)" note.
+- `recipients add <age1…> [--name <label>]` — validates the key, refuses duplicates, appends
+  (with the optional `# <label>` comment), bootstraps the file with `{local pubkey, new key}` if
+  the store is still legacy, then `_reencrypt_all`.
+- `recipients rm <age1…|name>` — removes the matching entry, then `_reencrypt_all`. **Guards:**
+  refuses to remove the last recipient; removing *your own* key (which would lock you out of future
+  pulls) requires `--yes`. Removal takes effect going forward — git history can't be un-shared
+  (documented, same caveat as today's `rekey`).
+
+### Encryption call-site changes
+Every existing `age -r "$pubkey" -o …` site becomes `age "${RECIPIENT_ARGS[@]}" -o …`:
+
+- `push_dir_to_project` (dotenv) and the nested manifest dotenv path
+- `push_external_files` (external `properties` and `file` blobs)
+- `cmd_init` (seeds the store; born-multi)
+- `cmd_rekey` re-encrypt loop (now `_reencrypt_all`)
+
+Functions that currently take `pubkey` as a positional arg are updated to rely on the
+`RECIPIENT_ARGS` global populated by `_load_recipients` at command entry, avoiding array-passing
+gymnastics on bash 3.2. **Decryption paths (`pull`, `verify`) are unchanged** — `age -d -i
+"$KEY_FILE"` already tries the identity against all recipient stanzas.
+
+### `init` / `which` / `verify` integration
+- **`init`** writes `recipients.txt` seeded with the freshly generated pubkey (born-multi), staged
+  like `.secrets-format`.
+- **`which`** prints a `recipients: N (alice, bob, …)` line, or `recipients: single-key (no
+  recipients.txt)` for a legacy store.
+- **`verify`** already decrypt-tests with the local key — works as-is for a member. **Added cheap
+  invariant:** count the `-> X25519` recipient stanzas in each blob header and assert it equals the
+  number of entries in `recipients.txt`. age exposes no way to list *which* recipients a file
+  targets (X25519 stanzas are ephemeral), so a count check is the strongest machine-checkable
+  invariant; full-identity consistency relies on the always-re-encrypt-all rule. The check is
+  skipped on legacy stores (no `recipients.txt`).
+
+## Data flow
+
+**Onboarding a teammate**
+1. Teammate runs `age-keygen` locally, sends their **public** key out of band.
+2. An existing member: `secrets recipients add age1theirpub --name them` → store re-encrypts to
+   `{existing…, them}` in one commit, pushed.
+3. Teammate clones the store repo, drops their own `key.txt` in place, and `secrets pull` works —
+   their key matches one stanza in every blob.
+
+**Offboarding**
+1. `secrets recipients rm them` → store re-encrypts to the remaining set, pushed. New blobs are no
+   longer readable by the removed key. (Historical git revisions remain readable by their old key —
+   rotate any still-sensitive secret values, same as today.)
+
+## Error handling
+
+- Invalid/duplicate key on `add` → reject before any re-encrypt; store untouched.
+- Invalid line discovered by `_load_recipients` during any encrypt → abort the command with a clear
+  pointer to the offending line; nothing written.
+- `_reencrypt_all` decryption failure (operator not a current recipient, or corrupt blob) → abort,
+  old store state preserved (mirrors today's `rekey` safety).
+- `rm` last recipient → refused. `rm` own key → requires `--yes`.
+- Empty/all-comment `recipients.txt` → treated as an error (a store with zero recipients can encrypt
+  nothing).
+
+## Testing
+
+New `test/recipients.bats` suite plus additions to existing suites:
+
+- **Happy path:** `init` born-multi; `add` bootstraps a legacy store; `add`/`rm` round-trip; a blob
+  encrypted to 3 keys decrypts with each of the 3 identities; `list` output; `rekey` on a
+  multi-recipient store keeps the set and generates no new key; `reencrypt` is idempotent.
+- **Backward compat:** a legacy store (no `recipients.txt`) still pushes/pulls/rekeys exactly as
+  before; an old single-key client decrypts a recipients.txt-store where its key is a recipient.
+- **`verify`:** stanza-count invariant passes on a healthy multi-recipient store and flags a blob
+  whose recipient count drifted.
+- **Security regression fixtures** (`recipients.txt` is a new committed attack surface): non-age /
+  malformed keys, shell metacharacters, control/ANSI characters, `-r`-injection look-alikes,
+  symlinked `recipients.txt`, bad `--name`, remove-last-recipient, remove-self-without-`--yes`.
+
+Per the repo security-review policy (`.ship-policy.json`, CLAUDE.md): these adversarial fixtures are
+written as **ordinary bats regression tests**, not AI red-team/adversarial-review passes. Before any
+ship/PR, the human operator runs `./test/run-security.sh` and completes the SIGNOFF prompt;
+`./test/run-security.sh` is operator-local and is **not** run on the user's behalf.
+
+## Backward compatibility / migration
+
+No store-format-marker bump. Multi-recipient is purely additive and detected by the **presence** of
+`recipients.txt`, mirroring the `.secrets-format` "absence implies v1" pattern. Existing stores keep
+working with zero action; a store becomes multi-recipient the first time `recipients add` (or `init`
+on a fresh store) writes `recipients.txt`.
+
+## Documentation
+
+- `CLAUDE.md` Architecture section: add a multi-recipient bullet (store-scoped `recipients.txt`,
+  `recipients` subcommand, shared `_reencrypt_all` engine, `rekey` dual semantics, security rails).
+- `README.md`: onboarding/offboarding a teammate; `recipients add/rm/list`.
+- Test counts in `CLAUDE.md` Project Structure updated.
+
+## Open questions
+
+None blocking. (SSH-recipient support and a JSON store-config remain possible future follow-ups,
+explicitly out of scope here.)

install.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# secrets — thin onboarding bootstrap (EGB-671).
+#
+# This script ships INSIDE the repo: you already cloned the repo to get it, so
+# its only jobs are (1) verify the dependencies the tool needs and (2) print the
+# exact commands to finish setup. It deliberately does NOT:
+#   - edit your shell rc files (it prints the PATH line for you to paste)
+#   - invoke sudo or install packages behind your back (it prints the command)
+#   - re-implement any of the tool's security logic
+#
+# This is a security tool whose whole pitch is "verify, don't trust" — so the
+# installer holds itself to a higher bar than convenience, not a lower one.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   ./install.sh            # check deps, print setup + next steps
+#   ./install.sh --help
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Resolve the directory this script lives in (the cloned tool repo). Uses bash
+# builtins only so it works under a minimal PATH.
+_src="${BASH_SOURCE[0]}"
+TOOL_DIR="$(cd "${_src%/*}" 2>/dev/null && pwd)"
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<EOF
+install.sh — finish setting up the 'secrets' tool.
+
+  Run this once after cloning the repo. It verifies dependencies (age, jq, git)
+  and prints the commands to put 'secrets' on your PATH and onboard a machine.
+
+Usage:
+  ./install.sh        Check dependencies and print setup + next steps
+  ./install.sh --help Show this help
+
+It never edits your shell config and never runs sudo — it prints the exact
+commands so you stay in control (this is a secrets tool, after all).
+
+Onboarding after setup:
+  First machine:  secrets init --remote <your-private-repo-url>
+  Other machine:  secrets join --remote <your-private-repo-url> --key <key.txt>
+EOF
+}
+
+# Print the install command for a package, using whatever package manager is
+# present. For sudo-requiring managers we PRINT the line for you to run — the
+# installer never escalates on its own.
+install_hint() {
+  local pkg="$1"
+  if command -v brew >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "brew install $pkg"
+  elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "sudo apt-get install -y $pkg"
+  elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "sudo dnf install -y $pkg"
+  else
+    echo "install '$pkg' with your system package manager"
+  fi
+}
+
+case "${1:-}" in
+  --help|-h) usage; exit 0 ;;
+  "") ;;
+  *) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; usage >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+
+echo "secrets — bootstrap check (tool dir: $TOOL_DIR)"
+echo ""
+
+# Dependency check. age + jq + git are all load-bearing on the cold-start path:
+# jq became required once .secrets.json (manifest) is JSON, so it must be present
+# BEFORE the first manifest read.
+missing=0
+for dep in git age jq; do
+  if command -v "$dep" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "  ok   $dep"
+  else
+    echo "  MISSING $dep — install it with:"
+    echo "      $(install_hint "$dep")"
+    missing=1
+  fi
+done
+echo ""
+
+if [ "$missing" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo "Install the missing dependencies above, then re-run ./install.sh." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+cat <<EOF
+All dependencies present. Two steps to finish:
+
+1) Put 'secrets' on your PATH. Add this line to your shell config
+   (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc), then restart your terminal:
+
+   export PATH="$TOOL_DIR:\$PATH"
+
+2) Onboard this machine:
+
+   First machine (new vault):
+     secrets init --remote <your-private-repo-url>
+     # then transfer key.txt to your other machines (AirDrop / scp / USB):
+     #   scp <this-host>:$HOME/.secrets/key.txt ~/.secrets/key.txt
+
+   Other machine (join an existing vault):
+     secrets join --remote <your-private-repo-url> --key <path-to-key.txt>
+     # 'join' clones the vault, installs the key, and VERIFIES it decrypts
+     # before declaring success — a mis-copied key fails loudly, not silently.
+
+To update the tool later:
+   git -C "$TOOL_DIR" pull
+EOF

test/install.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-671: install.sh thin bootstrap. It ships IN the repo (you clone the repo
+# to get it), so its job is: verify deps (age + jq + git), PRINT the PATH line
+# and next-step commands — never edit dotfiles, never invoke sudo. Security-rail
+# concerns are operator-local (.ship-policy.json); these are functional checks.
+
+load test_helper
+
+INSTALL_SH="$(cd "$(dirname "${BATS_TEST_FILENAME}")/.." && pwd)/install.sh"
+
+@test "install.sh exists and is executable" {
+  [ -f "$INSTALL_SH" ]
+  [ -x "$INSTALL_SH" ]
+}
+
+@test "install.sh --help prints usage and exits 0" {
+  run "$INSTALL_SH" --help
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"install.sh"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"join"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "install.sh prints the PATH export line for the tool dir (does not edit rc)" {
+  local tool_dir
+  tool_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "$INSTALL_SH")" && pwd)"
+  run "$INSTALL_SH"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"export PATH="* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"$tool_dir"* ]] || false
+  # It must NOT have written to any shell rc in the isolated HOME.
+  [ ! -f "$HOME/.zshrc" ]
+  [ ! -f "$HOME/.bashrc" ]
+}
+
+@test "install.sh prints both onboarding next-steps (init --remote and join)" {
+  run "$INSTALL_SH"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"secrets init --remote"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"secrets join --remote"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "install.sh prints the upgrade one-liner" {
+  run "$INSTALL_SH"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"git -C"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"pull"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "install.sh prints a key-transfer hint" {
+  run "$INSTALL_SH"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"key.txt"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "install.sh never invokes sudo (prints it for the user instead)" {
+  # No executed 'sudo' — any sudo reference must be quoted guidance text.
+  run grep -nE '^[[:space:]]*sudo ' "$INSTALL_SH"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "install.sh reports a missing dependency with an install hint and non-zero exit" {
+  # Build a minimal PATH that has the tools install.sh needs but NOT jq.
+  local fake="$TEST_TMPDIR/fakebin"
+  mkdir -p "$fake"
+  for t in bash uname env cat grep sed tr dirname command age git printf; do
+    src="$(command -v "$t" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    [ -n "$src" ] && ln -sf "$src" "$fake/$t" 2>/dev/null || true
+  done
+  run env PATH="$fake" "$INSTALL_SH"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"jq"* ]] || false
+}

test/join.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-671: `secrets join` (second-machine onboarding) + `secrets init --remote`
+# + day-2 silent-decrypt fix. Functional paths only — security-rail tests
+# (path traversal on --key/--store, URL injection) are operator-local per
+# .ship-policy.json and live in test/run-security.sh.
+
+load test_helper
+
+# Push a project to REMOTE_DIR and save the key, then remove the local store
+# to simulate a fresh second machine. Leaves: REMOTE_DIR has blobs,
+# $TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt is the decrypting key, $SECRETS_DIR is gone.
+_machine1_push_then_wipe() {
+  init_with_remote
+  cp "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt"
+  create_project_dir "joinproj"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push >/dev/null 2>&1
+  cd "$HOME"
+  rm -rf "$SECRETS_DIR"
+}
+
+# Like above but never pushes a project — remote has a store with zero blobs.
+_machine1_empty_then_wipe() {
+  init_with_remote
+  cp "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt"
+  cd "$HOME"
+  rm -rf "$SECRETS_DIR"
+}
+
+# ─── secrets join ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "join without --remote fails with usage" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--remote"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "join clones the store, installs the key at 600, verifies, and succeeds" {
+  _machine1_push_then_wipe
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" --key "$TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"VERIFIED"* ]] || false
+  [ -d "$SECRETS_DIR/.git" ]
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" ]
+  # key installed at mode 600
+  local perms
+  perms=$(stat -f '%Lp' "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%a' "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  [ "$perms" = "600" ]
+}
+
+@test "join with the wrong key fails loudly and does not report VERIFIED" {
+  _machine1_push_then_wipe
+  age-keygen -o "$TEST_TMPDIR/wrong-key.txt" 2>/dev/null
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" --key "$TEST_TMPDIR/wrong-key.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"VERIFIED"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "join against an empty store reports nothing-to-verify, NOT VERIFIED" {
+  _machine1_empty_then_wipe
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" --key "$TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"nothing to verify"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"VERIFIED"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "join refuses when a store already exists at the target" {
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" init >/dev/null 2>&1
+  cp "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" --key "$TEST_TMPDIR/saved-key.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"already"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "join fails clearly when the key file is missing" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" --key "$TEST_TMPDIR/nope.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"key"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "join detects a directory passed as --key" {
+  _machine1_push_then_wipe
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" join --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" --key "$TEST_TMPDIR"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"key"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── secrets init --remote ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "init --remote sets origin and establishes an upstream branch" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" init --remote "$REMOTE_DIR"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" remote get-url origin
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ "$output" = "$REMOTE_DIR" ]
+  # upstream branch exists on the remote (so a later push won't ff-only die)
+  run git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" rev-parse --abbrev-ref '@{u}'
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "init --remote then push does not die on the brand-new remote" {
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" init --remote "$REMOTE_DIR" >/dev/null 2>&1
+  create_project_dir "freshproj"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"Fast-forward pull failed"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "init with no flags still works (clean primitive)" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" init
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" ]
+}
+
+@test "init does not hang on the first-add prompt when stdin is a tty but stdout is captured" {
+  # Regression: run-security.sh runs bats in a real terminal, so the command's
+  # stdin stays a tty while bats captures its stdout. The interactive first-add
+  # prompt must NOT fire in that shape (it gates on stdout being a tty too),
+  # or the whole suite hangs. Reproduce with a pty via `script`.
+  command -v script >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "script (pty) not available"
+  # macOS/BSD syntax: `script -q <file> <cmd...>`. Skip on other syntaxes.
+  script -q /dev/null true >/dev/null 2>&1 || skip "unsupported script syntax"
+  local out="$TEST_TMPDIR/pty-initout"
+  run timeout 10 script -q /dev/null bash -c "'$SECRETS_BIN' init > '$out' 2>&1"
+  [ "$status" -ne 124 ]   # 124 == timeout == it hung on a prompt
+  run grep -c "Add a project's secrets" "$out"
+  [ "$output" = "0" ]
+}
+
+# ─── day-2 silent-decrypt fix ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "pull dies loudly when a blob cannot be decrypted with the current key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir "decryptproj"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push >/dev/null 2>&1
+  # Swap in a different key so the stored blob no longer decrypts.
+  # (age-keygen refuses to overwrite, so generate elsewhere then copy.)
+  age-keygen -o "$TEST_TMPDIR/other-key.txt" 2>/dev/null
+  cp "$TEST_TMPDIR/other-key.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt"
+  chmod 600 "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt"
+  cd "$WORK_DIR/decryptproj"
+  rm -f .env .env.staging
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"decrypt"* ]] || false
+}

test/migrate.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-703 store-format-v2: marker, format-aware suffix, migrate (dry-run /
+# copy-forward / finalize). bash 3.2: every standalone [[ ]] ends with || false.
+
+load test_helper
+
+# A v1 (legacy) store: born-v2 init, then strip the marker so it reads as v1
+# and pushes write the legacy .gradle-properties.age suffix.
+make_v1_store() {
+  init_with_remote
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format"
+}
+# Simulate an old (v1) client's properties blob: copy the pushed v2
+# .properties.age to its v1 .gradle-properties.age twin (KEEPS both present).
+m_fake_v1_twin() {
+  local proj="$1" v2
+  v2=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/$proj/external/"*.properties.age)
+  cp "$v2" "${v2%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age"
+}
+# Like m_fake_v1_twin but RENAMES (leaves ONLY the v1 blob) — for copy-forward fixtures.
+m_make_v1_only() {
+  local proj="$1" v2
+  v2=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/$proj/external/"*.properties.age)
+  mv "$v2" "${v2%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age"
+}
+m_gradle_src() { mkdir -p "$HOME/.gradle"; printf '%s' "$1" > "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"; }
+m_file_src()   { mkdir -p "$HOME/keystores"; printf 'KS\x00\x01\x02\xffDATA\n' > "$HOME/keystores/upload.keystore"; }
+
+# ─── Format marker + format-aware suffix (increment 1) ────────────────
+
+@test "init stamps the store format marker as v2 (born-v2)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format" ]
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format")" = "2" ]
+}
+
+@test "which prints format v2 for a born-v2 store" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir whichv2
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"format: v2"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "which prints format v1 for a markerless (legacy) store" {
+  make_v1_store
+  create_project_dir whichv1
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"format: v1"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "push on a born-v2 store writes the properties blob as .properties.age" {
+  init_with_remote
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir v2push
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push v2push >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/v2push/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/v2push/external/*.gradle-properties.age 2>/dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "push on a v1 store writes the v2 suffix for a fresh external (additive v2)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir v1push
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push v1push >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/v1push/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "push writes the v2 suffix for a fresh external even on a v1 store" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir freshv1
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push freshv1 >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/freshv1/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/freshv1/external/*.gradle-properties.age 2>/dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "push dual-writes the v1 twin so old clients stay fresh" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_old\n'
+  create_project_dir dualwrite
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dualwrite >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_fake_v1_twin dualwrite
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_new\n'
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dualwrite >/dev/null 2>&1
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/dualwrite/external/"*.properties.age
+  rm -f "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" pull dualwrite >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run grep -q 'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_new' "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "the format marker is committed, not gitignored" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir markercommit
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push markercommit >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "git -C $SECRETS_DIR ls-files | grep -qx .secrets-format"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "pull reads a v1-suffix properties blob on a v2 store (read-fallback)" {
+  init_with_remote                                   # born-v2 store (marker=2)
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_v1\n'
+  create_project_dir rffallback
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push rffallback >/dev/null 2>&1     # writes .properties.age on a v2 store
+  # Simulate an external that exists only in the v1 suffix (an old client wrote it):
+  local v2blob; v2blob=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/rffallback/external/"*.properties.age)
+  mv "$v2blob" "${v2blob%.properties.age}.gradle-properties.age"
+  rm -f "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" pull rffallback >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run grep -q 'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_v1' "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+# ─── migrate --dry-run / copy-forward (increment 2) ───────────────────
+
+@test "migrate --dry-run reports the rename and writes nothing" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir dryproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dryproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only dryproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"would migrate"* ]] || false
+  # nothing written
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/dryproj/external/*.properties.age 2>/dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  # marker still absent (store still v1)
+  [ ! -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format" ]
+}
+
+@test "migrate --dry-run on a dotenv-only project reports nothing to migrate" {
+  make_v1_store
+  create_project_dir dotenvonly
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dotenvonly >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"0 blob(s) would be copy-forwarded"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate copy-forward creates the v2 twin and keeps the v1 blob (byte-identical)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir cfproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push cfproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only cfproj
+  local old; old=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/cfproj/external/"*.gradle-properties.age)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  local new; new=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/cfproj/external/"*.properties.age)
+  [ -f "$old" ]   # v1 kept (non-destructive)
+  [ -f "$new" ]   # v2 twin written
+  cmp -s "$old" "$new"   # byte-identical ciphertext copy
+}
+
+@test "migrate copy-forward is idempotent" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir idemproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push idemproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only idemproj
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"1 already present"* ]] || false
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/idemproj/external/*.properties.age | wc -l | tr -d ' '"
+  [ "$output" = "1" ]
+}
+
+@test "migrate copy-forwards a v1 properties blob with no .secrets.json (manifest-free)" {
+  # The EGB-710 repro: a legacy project has a v1 properties blob in the store
+  # but no .secrets.json (it predates the manifest). migrate must NOT dead-end.
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir nomanifestblob
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push nomanifestblob >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only nomanifestblob
+  rm -f .secrets.json                       # simulate a pre-manifest project
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/nomanifestblob/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                        # v2 twin written despite no manifest
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/nomanifestblob/external/*.gradle-properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                        # v1 kept (non-destructive)
+}
+
+@test "migrate twins a store blob even when the manifest no longer declares it" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir staleblob
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push staleblob >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only staleblob
+  # The blob is now in the store. Drop the external from the project's manifest
+  # entirely (and remove the legacy file) so NO manifest declares it.
+  printf '{"version":2,"dotenv":[".env",".env.staging"]}\n' > .secrets.json
+  rm -f .secrets-files
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/staleblob/external/*.gradle-properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]   # precondition: the v1 blob exists in the store
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/staleblob/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]   # twinned despite not being declared anywhere
+}
+
+@test "migrate in a project with no manifest and no store blobs is a clean no-op" {
+  make_v1_store
+  local dir="$WORK_DIR/nomanifest"; mkdir -p "$dir"; cd "$dir"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no v1 properties blobs"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate on an already-v2 store is a no-op" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir alreadyv2
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"already format v2"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate unknown flag dies with usage" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir mgflag
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --bogus
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Unknown migrate flag"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate leaves dotenv and file blobs untouched" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  m_file_src
+  create_project_dir mixproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\nfile ~/keystores/upload.keystore\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push mixproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  local envblob; envblob=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/mixproj/".env.age)
+  local fileblob; fileblob=$(ls "$SECRETS_DIR/mixproj/external/"*.file.age)
+  local envsum; envsum=$(cksum "$envblob")
+  local filesum; filesum=$(cksum "$fileblob")
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  [ "$(cksum "$envblob")" = "$envsum" ]    # dotenv blob unchanged
+  [ "$(cksum "$fileblob")" = "$filesum" ]  # file blob unchanged
+}
+
+# ─── migrate --finalize (increment 3) ─────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "finalize refuses when verify --all is not green" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir failverify
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push failverify >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only failverify
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  # corrupt the v2 twin so verify --all fails
+  printf 'garbage' > "$SECRETS_DIR/failverify/external/"*.properties.age
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"not green"* ]] || false
+  # marker not stamped; v1 blob still present
+  [ ! -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format" ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/failverify/external/*.gradle-properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "finalize refuses an un-twinned v1 blob (project not migrated)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir untwinned
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push untwinned >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only untwinned
+  # do NOT migrate — leave the v1 blob with no twin
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no v2 twin"* ]] || false
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/untwinned/external/*.gradle-properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "finalize green path drops v1, keeps v2, stamps the marker" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir finproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push finproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format")" = "2" ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/finproj/external/*.properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run bash -c "ls $SECRETS_DIR/finproj/external/*.gradle-properties.age 2>/dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "finalize cuts a recovery tag before deleting v1 blobs" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir tagproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push tagproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only tagproj
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize --yes >/dev/null 2>&1
+  local tag; tag=$(git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" tag | grep '^pre-v2-migrate-')
+  [ -n "$tag" ]
+  # the tagged commit still contains the v1 blob (tag cut before delete)
+  run bash -c "git -C $SECRETS_DIR ls-tree -r --name-only $tag | grep -q gradle-properties.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "finalize without --yes aborts when not confirmed" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir confproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push confproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  m_make_v1_only confproj
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "echo '' | $SECRETS_BIN migrate --finalize"
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"aborted"* ]] || false
+  [ ! -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format" ]
+}
+
+@test "verify is green during the migration window (v2 twin is not a spurious orphan)" {
+  # Regression: after copy-forward the store is still v1, so verify computed the
+  # external blob path as .gradle-properties.age and flagged the .properties.age
+  # twin as an orphan, failing verify mid-migration. The orphan set now accounts
+  # for both suffix forms.
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir windowverify
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push windowverify >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" verify windowverify
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "v1 client still reads during the migration window (after copy-forward, before finalize)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir windowproj
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push windowproj >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  # store is still v1 (markerless); pull uses the .gradle-properties.age blob
+  rm "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull windowproj
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  grep -q '^beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc$' "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+}
+
+@test "post-finalize pull reads the v2 blob" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir postfin
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push postfin >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize --yes >/dev/null 2>&1
+  rm "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull postfin
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  grep -q '^beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc$' "$HOME/.gradle/gradle.properties"
+}
+
+@test "finalize on a v1 dotenv-only store stamps the marker (no v1 blobs to drop)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  create_project_dir dotenvfin
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push dotenvfin >/dev/null 2>&1
+  # no gradle-properties externals → v1count==0 path; no confirmation needed
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no v1 blobs"* ]] || false
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format")" = "2" ]
+}
+
+@test "migrate with a positional argument dies" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir mgpos
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate someproject
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no project argument"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "finalize on an already-v2 store is a no-op" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir finv2
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --finalize --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"already format v2"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate --status flags a project that needs migrating" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir needsmig
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push needsmig >/dev/null 2>&1   # v1 blob, no twin yet
+  m_make_v1_only needsmig
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]                            # not finalize-ready
+  [[ "$output" == *"needsmig"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"NEEDS MIGRATE"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"Not finalize-ready"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate --status reports finalize-ready once every blob is twinned" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir readymig
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push readymig >/dev/null 2>&1
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate >/dev/null 2>&1         # create the twin
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Finalize-ready"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "migrate --status counts v2-only externals (old clients not served)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  m_gradle_src $'beaconClerkPkTest=pk_test_abc\n'
+  create_project_dir v2onlyext
+  printf 'gradle-properties ~/.gradle/gradle.properties beaconClerkPkTest\n' > .secrets-files
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push v2onlyext >/dev/null 2>&1          # v2-only (fresh, no v1 twin)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]                                     # no v1 blobs -> finalize-ready
+  [[ "$output" == *"v2-only"* ]] || false                # surfaced as v2-only coverage
+}
+
+@test "migrate --status on an already-v2 store says nothing to do" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir v2status
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" migrate --status
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"v2"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"nothing to migrate"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "_store_format reads a garbage marker as v1 (strict parse)" {
+  make_v1_store
+  create_project_dir garbagemarker
+  # a non-"2" marker (e.g. a truncated/garbled value) must read as v1, not v2
+  printf 'v2-ish-garbage\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-format"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"format: v1"* ]] || false
+}

test/recipients.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+load test_helper
+
+# A throwaway second identity for "another teammate".
+make_second_identity() {
+  age-keygen -o "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt" 2>/dev/null
+  BOB_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt")
+}
+
+@test "push with only-self recipients.txt encrypts to the store key (born-multi)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  # init now seeds recipients.txt with self — born-multi store.
+  [ -e "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt" ]
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # Blob must still decrypt with the store's own key.
+  run age -d -i "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "push with a hand-written recipients.txt encrypts to every listed key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '# self\n%s\n# bob\n%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" "$BOB_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # Bob (a recipient) can decrypt the pushed blob with HIS key.
+  run age -d -i "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # And the store key still can too.
+  run age -d -i "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "push refuses a recipients.txt with an invalid key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\nnot-an-age-key\n' "$STORE_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "push refuses a symlinked recipients.txt" {
+  init_with_remote
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" > "$TEST_TMPDIR/elsewhere.txt"
+  # Remove the born-multi recipients.txt so we can replace it with a symlink.
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  ln -s "$TEST_TMPDIR/elsewhere.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"symlink"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients list on a legacy store shows the single derived key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  # Simulate a legacy store by removing the born-multi recipients.txt.
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"single-key"* ]] || false
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  [[ "$output" == *"$STORE_PUB"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients list shows names and keys from recipients.txt" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '# alice\n%s\n# bob\n%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" "$BOB_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"recipients: 2"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"alice"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"bob"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "reencrypt re-encrypts existing blobs to a newly added recipient line" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push           # single-key blob (project name = "myproj"; blob at $SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age)
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  make_second_identity
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\n%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" "$BOB_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  # Bob cannot read the old single-key blob yet.
+  run age -d -i "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" reencrypt
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # Now he can.
+  run age -d -i "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "rekey on a multi-recipient store keeps recipients and the same key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  before=$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  make_second_identity
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\n%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" "$BOB_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" rekey
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # No new keypair was generated.
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")" = "$before" ]
+  # Both recipients can decrypt.
+  run age -d -i "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "rekey on a legacy store still rotates to a new key (unchanged)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  before=$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  # Simulate a legacy store by removing the born-multi recipients.txt.
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" rekey
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")" != "$before" ]
+  run age -d -i "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "recipients add bootstraps a legacy store and re-encrypts" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  # Simulate a legacy store (no recipients.txt) so recipients add triggers the
+  # bootstrap branch (if [ ! -e "$RECIPIENTS_FILE" ]) rather than the append path.
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -e "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt" ]
+  # recipients.txt now has self + bob (2 keys).
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients list
+  [[ "$output" == *"recipients: 2"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"bob"* ]] || false
+  # Existing blob re-encrypted: bob can read it.
+  run age -d -i "$TEST_TMPDIR/bob.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "recipients add rejects a non-age key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "ssh-ed25519 AAAAfoo"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"valid age recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients add rejects a duplicate" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"already present"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients add rejects an unsafe --name" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name 'bob; rm -rf ~'
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid --name"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients add rejects a whitespace-only --name" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name '   '
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid --name"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients add --name with no value errors" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--name requires a value"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients rm removes a recipient and re-encrypts to the rest" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm bob
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients list
+  [[ "$output" == *"recipients: 1"* ]] || false
+  # Store key still reads its own blobs.
+  run age -d -i "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "recipients rm refuses to remove the last recipient" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob   # store = self + bob
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm bob                       # back to self only
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm "$STORE_PUB"              # would be the last
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"last recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "recipients rm of your own key requires --yes" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm "$STORE_PUB"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"your own key"* ]] || false
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm "$STORE_PUB" --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "recipients rm of a non-existent target errors" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm carol
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"No recipient matches"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "init seeds recipients.txt with the new store key (born-multi)" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" init
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -e "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt" ]
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  run cat "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  [[ "$output" == *"$STORE_PUB"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "which reports the recipient count" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"recipients: 2"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"bob"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "which reports single-key for a legacy store" {
+  init_with_remote
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"recipients: single-key"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "verify --all passes on a healthy multi-recipient store" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob   # re-encrypts to 2
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" verify --all
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "verify flags a blob whose recipient count drifted" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push                                   # single-key blob (1 stanza)
+  make_second_identity
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  # Declare 2 recipients but do NOT re-encrypt — the on-disk blob still has 1.
+  printf '%s\n%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" "$BOB_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" verify --all
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "SECURITY: a dangling symlink recipients.txt is refused, not silently ignored" {
+  init_with_remote
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  ln -s "$TEST_TMPDIR/does-not-exist.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"symlink"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "SECURITY: recipients.txt with shell metacharacters is rejected, no execution" {
+  init_with_remote
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\nage1$(touch %s/pwned)\n' "$STORE_PUB" "$TEST_TMPDIR" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [ ! -e "$TEST_TMPDIR/pwned" ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "SECURITY: recipients.txt line that looks like an extra age flag is rejected" {
+  init_with_remote
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\n-i /etc/passwd\n' "$STORE_PUB" > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid recipient"* ]] || false
+  # The push must have aborted before encrypting — no blob should exist.
+  [ ! -e "$SECRETS_DIR/myproj/.env.age" ]
+}
+
+@test "SECURITY: control/ANSI characters in recipients.txt are rejected" {
+  init_with_remote
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\nage1%b\n' "$STORE_PUB" 'aaaa\033[31mevil' > "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "SECURITY: recipients add rejects a key with embedded whitespace" {
+  init_with_remote
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "age1aaaa bbbb"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"valid age recipient"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ── Fix 1: validate-before-mutate ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "recipients rm dies without mutating a hand-corrupted recipients.txt" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob   # valid: self + bob
+  # Corrupt the file by hand.
+  printf 'age1-not-a-valid-key\n' >> "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  before=$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt")
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm bob
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid recipient"* ]] || false
+  # File unchanged (no half-mutation).
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt")" = "$before" ]
+}
+
+@test "recipients add dies without mutating a hand-corrupted recipients.txt" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  printf 'age1-not-a-valid-key\n' >> "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"   # init seeded self; now corrupt
+  before=$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt")
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name bob
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Invalid recipient"* ]] || false
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt")" = "$before" ]
+}
+
+# ── Fix 4: reencrypt advisory on a legacy store ───────────────────────────────
+
+@test "reencrypt on a legacy store prints a single-key advisory" {
+  init_with_remote
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  create_project_dir myproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" reencrypt
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"single-key"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ── Fix 5: ambiguous-name rm coverage ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "recipients rm by an ambiguous name is refused" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  age-keygen -o "$TEST_TMPDIR/carol.txt" 2>/dev/null
+  CAROL_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$TEST_TMPDIR/carol.txt")
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB" --name dup
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$CAROL_PUB" --name dup
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients rm dup
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"matches"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "SECURITY: a symlinked recipients.txt is refused on add and rm too" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_second_identity
+  STORE_PUB=$(age-keygen -y "$SECRETS_DIR/key.txt")
+  printf '%s\n' "$STORE_PUB" > "$TEST_TMPDIR/elsewhere.txt"
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  ln -s "$TEST_TMPDIR/elsewhere.txt" "$SECRETS_DIR/recipients.txt"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" recipients add "$BOB_PUB"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"symlink"* ]] || false
+}

test/run-security.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Local-only security regression suite. Uses attack-payload fixtures on purpose.
+# Do NOT ask hosted AI agents to run this script or to perform equivalent red-team review.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$ROOT"
+
+if ! command -v bats >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "bats-core is required: brew install bats-core" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# Subset of the full suite: adversarial regressions + explicit SECURITY tests +
+# closely related path/injection rails. Keeps the run focused and fast.
+FILTER='SECURITY|F1:|F2:|F3:|F4:|F5:|command injection does not execute|outside HOME is refused|symlinked target is refused|shell metacharacters|command-substitution|symlinked .secrets-store is skipped|symlinked .secrets-files is ignored|symlinked .secrets.json is refused'
+
+echo "Security regression suite (operator-local only)"
+echo "Repository policy: see .ship-policy.json"
+echo ""
+
+bats --filter "$FILTER" test/
+
+echo ""
+echo "All filtered security regression tests passed."
+echo ""
+
+if [ ! -t 0 ]; then
+  echo "Refusing non-interactive sign-off. Re-run in a terminal and complete operator certification." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+read -r -p "Operator name: " OPERATOR
+if [ -z "${OPERATOR//[[:space:]]/}" ]; then
+  echo "Operator name is required." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+read -r -p "Type SIGNOFF to certify you ran this suite locally: " CONFIRM
+if [ "$CONFIRM" != "SIGNOFF" ]; then
+  echo "Sign-off aborted (expected exactly SIGNOFF)." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+SIGNOFF_DIR="$ROOT/.gstack"
+mkdir -p "$SIGNOFF_DIR"
+COMMIT="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)"
+TS="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
+SIGNOFF_FILE="$SIGNOFF_DIR/security-signoff.json"
+
+# Escape operator name for JSON (minimal — names should not contain quotes).
+OPERATOR_JSON="${OPERATOR//\\/\\\\}"
+OPERATOR_JSON="${OPERATOR_JSON//\"/\\\"}"
+
+cat >"$SIGNOFF_FILE" <<EOF
+{
+  "operator": "$OPERATOR_JSON",
+  "signed_at": "$TS",
+  "commit": "$COMMIT",
+  "suite": "test/run-security.sh",
+  "filter": "$FILTER"
+}
+EOF
+
+echo "Sign-off recorded at $SIGNOFF_FILE (gitignored — local only)."

test/sync.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-1230 / EGB-1231: store sync — loud failures on `pull`, and a `secrets
+# sync` verb that reconciles a diverged store instead of dead-ending.
+#
+# bash 3.2 gotcha (see CLAUDE.md): every standalone [[ ]] assertion MUST end
+# with `|| false`, or a failing assertion does not fail the test.
+
+load test_helper
+
+# ─── fixtures ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# A "peer" is a second clone of the same bare remote. Committing + pushing
+# from the peer is how we put the store under test *behind* its remote
+# without touching the store itself.
+
+peer_commit_and_push() {
+  local name="${1:-peer-file}" content="${2:-peer}"
+  local peer="$TEST_TMPDIR/peer"
+  if [ ! -d "$peer" ]; then
+    git clone "$REMOTE_DIR" "$peer" >/dev/null 2>&1
+  fi
+  ( cd "$peer" && git pull >/dev/null 2>&1 || true )
+  echo "$content" > "$peer/$name"
+  ( cd "$peer" && git add -A && git commit -m "peer: $name" >/dev/null && git push >/dev/null 2>&1 )
+}
+
+# Give the store a local-only commit (store becomes "ahead").
+store_local_commit() {
+  local name="${1:-local-file}"
+  echo "local" > "$SECRETS_DIR/$name"
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" commit -m "local: $name" >/dev/null
+}
+
+# Leave an uncommitted modification in the store working tree ("dirty").
+store_dirty() {
+  echo "scratch" > "$SECRETS_DIR/${1:-dirty-file}"
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+}
+
+store_head() { git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" rev-parse HEAD; }
+
+# init_with_remote (shared helper) commits --allow-empty, which leaves the
+# files `secrets init` wrote — .gitignore, .secrets-format, recipients.txt —
+# untracked. That is a genuinely dirty store, so tests that assert on the
+# "nothing to reconcile" path must land them first.
+init_clean_store() {
+  init_with_remote
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" commit -m "store: initial files" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" push >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1230: pull must never fail silently ───────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1230: pull surfaces git's diagnosis when the store can't fast-forward" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt   # now diverged: ahead 1, behind 1
+
+  create_project_dir divproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  # The failure is named, not silent — this is the whole bug.
+  [[ "$output" == *"Store sync failed"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"$SECRETS_DIR"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1230: pull's sync failure points at secrets sync" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  create_project_dir divproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"secrets sync"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1230: pull writes the diagnosis to stderr, not just stdout" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  create_project_dir divproj
+  run bash -c "'$SECRETS_BIN' pull 2>&1 1>/dev/null"
+
+  [[ "$output" == *"Store sync failed"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1230: a clean store still pulls normally" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir cleanproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  rm -f .env .env.staging
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -f .env ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1230: pull's sync is fast-forward only (no silent merge commit)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir ffproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  local before; before=$(store_head)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  # A merge commit would have moved HEAD. Nothing was integrated.
+  [ "$(store_head)" = "$before" ]
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1231: which reports store state ───────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: which reports ahead/behind/dirty for a diverged store" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" fetch origin >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+  create_project_dir whichproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"remote:"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"ahead 1"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"behind 1"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: which reports an in-sync store as up to date" {
+  init_clean_store
+  create_project_dir syncedproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"remote:"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"up to date"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: which stays quiet about the remote when none is configured" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" init
+  create_project_dir noremote
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"remote:"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: which reports a dirty store working tree" {
+  init_with_remote
+  store_dirty scratch.age
+  create_project_dir dirtyproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"modified"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1231: secrets sync reconciles ─────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync rebases a diverged store onto the remote" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Both sides' work survives the reconcile.
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/remote-only.txt" ]
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/local-only.txt" ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync leaves the store able to pull again" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir recovered
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  rm -f .env .env.staging
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -f .env ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync fast-forwards a store that is only behind" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/remote-only.txt" ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync stashes and restores a dirty working tree" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  echo "uncommitted work" > "$SECRETS_DIR/scratch.age"
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/remote-only.txt" ]
+  # The local uncommitted blob edit is NOT lost.
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/scratch.age" ]
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/scratch.age")" = "uncommitted work" ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync on an already-clean store reports no work and changes nothing" {
+  init_clean_store
+  local before; before=$(store_head)
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ "$(store_head)" = "$before" ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"up to date"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync dies directed when the store has no remote" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" init
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no remote"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1231: --dry-run changes nothing ───────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync --dry-run reports state without mutating the store" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  local before; before=$(store_head)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --dry-run
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"ahead 1"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"behind 1"* ]] || false
+  [ "$(store_head)" = "$before" ]
+  [ ! -f "$SECRETS_DIR/remote-only.txt" ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync --dry-run does not push local commits" {
+  init_with_remote
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # The remote never received the local commit.
+  run git -C "$REMOTE_DIR" log --oneline
+  [[ "$output" != *"local: local-only.txt"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1231: the push gate ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync --yes pushes reconciled local commits to the remote" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  run git -C "$REMOTE_DIR" log --oneline
+  [[ "$output" == *"local: local-only.txt"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync without confirmation reconciles locally but does not push" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  # No tty and no --yes: the push gate must not open on its own.
+  run bash -c "'$SECRETS_BIN' sync < /dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Local reconcile happened...
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/remote-only.txt" ]
+  # ...but nothing was published to the shared store.
+  run git -C "$REMOTE_DIR" log --oneline
+  [[ "$output" != *"local: local-only.txt"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync says how to publish when the push gate stays closed" {
+  init_with_remote
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  run bash -c "'$SECRETS_BIN' sync < /dev/null"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--yes"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1231: conflicts restore the store as found ────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: a rebase conflict leaves the store exactly as it was" {
+  init_with_remote
+  # Both sides edit the same path — a guaranteed rebase conflict.
+  peer_commit_and_push contested.txt "from-remote"
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" fetch origin >/dev/null 2>&1
+  echo "from-local" > "$SECRETS_DIR/contested.txt"
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" commit -m "local: contested" >/dev/null
+
+  local before; before=$(store_head)
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [ "$(store_head)" = "$before" ]
+  # No half-finished rebase left behind for the user to trip over.
+  [ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR/.git/rebase-merge" ]
+  [ ! -d "$SECRETS_DIR/.git/rebase-apply" ]
+  [ "$(cat "$SECRETS_DIR/contested.txt")" = "from-local" ]
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: a rebase conflict names the conflicting files" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push contested.txt "from-remote"
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" fetch origin >/dev/null 2>&1
+  echo "from-local" > "$SECRETS_DIR/contested.txt"
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" add -A
+  git -C "$SECRETS_DIR" commit -m "local: contested" >/dev/null
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" sync --yes
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"contested.txt"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync never force-pushes or hard-resets" {
+  # Guard rail on the implementation itself: this store holds the only
+  # copy of encrypted secrets, so the destructive git verbs must not
+  # appear anywhere in the sync path.
+  run bash -c "sed -n '/^cmd_sync()/,/^}/p' '$SECRETS_BIN'"
+  [[ "$output" != *"--force"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"reset --hard"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"stash drop"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── EGB-1231: the push path's advice is no longer a dead end ──────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: push's fast-forward failure points at secrets sync" {
+  init_with_remote
+  peer_commit_and_push remote-only.txt
+  store_local_commit local-only.txt
+
+  create_project_dir pushproj
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"secrets sync"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── help ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1231: sync is documented in help" {
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" help
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"secrets sync"* ]] || false
+}

test/test_helper.bash

@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ setup() {
   # not be a real ancestor of /tmp). EGB-281 F9.
   export HOME="$TEST_TMPDIR"
 
+  # Provide git author identity so `git commit` works with the fresh temp HOME
+  # (no ~/.gitconfig is present in the isolated dir). GIT_* env vars override
+  # any global config and survive the HOME redirect.
+  export GIT_AUTHOR_NAME="Test User"
+  export GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL="test@example.com"
+  export GIT_COMMITTER_NAME="Test User"
+  export GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL="test@example.com"
+
   # Secrets repo lives in temp
   export SECRETS_DIR="$TEST_TMPDIR/secrets-repo"
 

test/upgrade.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-716: `secrets upgrade` verb — self-update (git pull --ff-only) + skew re-check.
+#
+# These tests never touch the real tool checkout. Each test relocates a COPY of
+# the script into a throwaway git repo wired to a bare upstream, so $SCRIPT_DIR
+# (computed from BASH_SOURCE) resolves to the fake tool repo and the pull/fetch
+# operate there.
+
+load test_helper
+
+# Create a fake tool repo at $TOOL (script copy + VERSION), wired to a bare
+# upstream at $TOOL_REMOTE, at version $1. cd's into $TOOL (under $HOME so
+# resolve_store's walk-up stays bounded and never strays to a real store).
+setup_tool_repo() {
+  TOOL="$TEST_TMPDIR/tool"
+  TOOL_REMOTE="$TEST_TMPDIR/tool-remote.git"
+  mkdir -p "$TOOL"
+  cp "$SECRETS_BIN" "$TOOL/secrets"
+  echo "$1" > "$TOOL/VERSION"
+  git -c init.defaultBranch=main init -q "$TOOL"
+  git -C "$TOOL" add -A
+  git -C "$TOOL" -c user.email=t@t -c user.name=t commit -qm "v$1"
+  git -c init.defaultBranch=main init --bare -q "$TOOL_REMOTE"
+  git -C "$TOOL" remote add origin "$TOOL_REMOTE"
+  git -C "$TOOL" push -q -u origin HEAD:main
+  cd "$TOOL"
+}
+
+# Publish a newer VERSION to the upstream (as a different clone would).
+advance_tool_remote() {
+  local clone="$TEST_TMPDIR/tool-pub"
+  rm -rf "$clone"
+  git clone -q "$TOOL_REMOTE" "$clone"
+  echo "$1" > "$clone/VERSION"
+  git -C "$clone" -c user.email=t@t -c user.name=t commit -qam "v$1"
+  git -C "$clone" push -q origin HEAD:main
+  rm -rf "$clone"
+}
+
+@test "upgrade --check reports an available update without changing VERSION (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.1.0.0
+  advance_tool_remote 0.2.0.0
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade --check
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Update available"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"0.1.0.0"* ]] || false
+  # --check must not pull: local VERSION is untouched.
+  [ "$(cat "$TOOL/VERSION")" = "0.1.0.0" ]
+}
+
+@test "upgrade --check is clean when already current (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.2.0.0
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade --check
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"up to date"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "upgrade fast-forwards and reports old -> new (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.1.0.0
+  advance_tool_remote 0.2.0.0
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"v0.1.0.0 -> v0.2.0.0"* ]] || false
+  [ "$(cat "$TOOL/VERSION")" = "0.2.0.0" ]
+}
+
+@test "upgrade is a no-op when already at the latest (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.2.0.0
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"up to date"* ]] || false
+  [ "$(cat "$TOOL/VERSION")" = "0.2.0.0" ]
+}
+
+@test "upgrade refuses when the tool dir is not a git checkout (EGB-716)" {
+  local d="$HOME/plain-tool"
+  mkdir -p "$d"
+  cp "$SECRETS_BIN" "$d/secrets"
+  echo 0.1.0.0 > "$d/VERSION"
+  cd "$d"
+  run "$d/secrets" upgrade
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"git checkout"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "upgrade rejects an unknown flag (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.1.0.0
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade --bogus
+  [ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Unknown upgrade flag"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "upgrade re-checks store skew and confirms the client caught up (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.1.0.0
+  advance_tool_remote 0.9.0.0
+  # A store last written by a newer client than our starting version.
+  git -c init.defaultBranch=main init -q "$SECRETS_DIR"
+  echo 0.8.0.0 > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"v0.1.0.0 -> v0.9.0.0"* ]] || false
+  # New client (0.9.0.0) is now ahead of the store's last writer (0.8.0.0).
+  [[ "$output" == *"at or ahead"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "upgrade still notes when the store is ahead of the upgraded client (EGB-716)" {
+  setup_tool_repo 0.1.0.0
+  advance_tool_remote 0.2.0.0
+  git -c init.defaultBranch=main init -q "$SECRETS_DIR"
+  echo 0.9.0.0 > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$TOOL/secrets" upgrade
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"v0.1.0.0 -> v0.2.0.0"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"still ahead"* ]] || false
+}

test/version.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-713 version-skew nudge: writer-version stamp, numeric comparator, skew
+# warning, `which` surface. bash 3.2: every standalone [[ ]] ends with || false.
+
+load test_helper
+
+VERSION_FILE() { echo "$(cd "$(dirname "$SECRETS_BIN")" && pwd)/VERSION"; }
+
+# ─── comparator contract ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "version comparator orders 0.7.0.0 < 0.10.0.0 numerically (not lexically)" {
+  run bash -c '
+    _version_gt() {
+      local a="$1" b="$2" i ai bi; local -a af bf
+      IFS=. read -r -a af <<< "$a"; IFS=. read -r -a bf <<< "$b"
+      for i in 0 1 2 3; do
+        ai=${af[$i]:-0}; ai=${ai//[!0-9]/}; [ -n "$ai" ] || ai=0
+        bi=${bf[$i]:-0}; bi=${bi//[!0-9]/}; [ -n "$bi" ] || bi=0
+        if [ "$((10#$ai))" -gt "$((10#$bi))" ]; then return 0; fi
+        if [ "$((10#$ai))" -lt "$((10#$bi))" ]; then return 1; fi
+      done; return 1
+    }
+    _version_gt 0.10.0.0 0.7.0.0 && echo "10gt7"
+    _version_gt 0.7.0.0 0.10.0.0 || echo "7not_gt_10"
+    _version_gt 0.7.0.0 0.7.0.0 || echo "equal_not_gt"
+    _version_gt 1.0.0.0 0.9.9.9 && echo "major_wins"
+  '
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"10gt7"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"7not_gt_10"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"equal_not_gt"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"major_wins"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── stamp on write ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "push stamps the store writer-version with the client version" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir wvstamp
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push wvstamp >/dev/null 2>&1
+  [ -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version" ]
+  run cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  [ "$output" = "$(cat "$(VERSION_FILE)")" ]
+}
+
+@test "writer-version stamp is monotonic (a push never lowers a higher stamp)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir wvmono
+  printf '9.9.9.9\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push wvmono >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run cat "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  [ "$output" = "9.9.9.9" ]
+}
+
+@test "writer-version stamp is committed, not gitignored" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir wvcommit
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push wvcommit >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run bash -c "git -C $SECRETS_DIR ls-files | grep -qx .secrets-writer-version"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+# ─── skew warning on command ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "a store written by a newer version warns on a command (non-fatal)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir skewwarn
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push skewwarn >/dev/null 2>&1
+  printf '99.0.0.0\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"last written by secrets v99.0.0.0"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"Update your secrets tool"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "a store at the same/older version is silent" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir noskew
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push noskew >/dev/null 2>&1
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"Update your secrets tool"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "a store with no writer-version marker is silent (legacy store)" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir legacynostamp
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push legacynostamp >/dev/null 2>&1
+  rm -f "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" list
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"Update your secrets tool"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── which surface ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "which prints the store writer-version and a behind note" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir whichwv
+  "$SECRETS_BIN" push whichwv >/dev/null 2>&1
+  printf '99.0.0.0\n' > "$SECRETS_DIR/.secrets-writer-version"
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" which
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"written-by: v99.0.0.0"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"behind"* ]] || false
+}

test/workspaces.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# EGB-1232: workspace discovery must not be npm-only.
+#
+# Two defects, both in the pattern-source layer:
+#   1. pnpm declares workspaces in pnpm-workspace.yaml, not package.json's
+#      `workspaces` key — so both call sites came up empty on every pnpm
+#      monorepo (silently, in the plain-push path).
+#   2. the jq filter `.workspaces // .workspaces.packages` short-circuits on
+#      yarn's truthy object form, iterating the object's values and yielding
+#      the pattern array itself instead of the patterns.
+#
+# bash 3.2 gotcha (see CLAUDE.md): every standalone [[ ]] assertion MUST end
+# with `|| false`, or a failing assertion does not fail the test.
+
+load test_helper
+
+# ─── fixtures ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# A monorepo root with two workspace packages, each holding a .env.
+# The workspace *declaration* is left to the caller — that is what varies.
+# NB: the workspace re-scan (_maybe_workspace_env_files) runs only for
+# projects that already have a .secrets.json — push's root-scan-only
+# behaviour on a first push is by design (EGB-677 E13), and EGB-1232 is
+# about the fallback that covers it never engaging. So every fixture
+# carries a manifest, matching the reported repro.
+make_monorepo() {
+  local dir="$WORK_DIR/${1:-mono}"
+  mkdir -p "$dir/apps/web" "$dir/apps/admin"
+  echo "VITE_CLERK_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=pk_test_web" > "$dir/apps/web/.env"
+  echo "VITE_CLERK_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=pk_test_admin" > "$dir/apps/admin/.env"
+  printf '{\n  "version": 2,\n  "dotenv": [],\n  "external": []\n}\n' > "$dir/.secrets.json"
+  cd "$dir"
+}
+
+declare_pnpm() {
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+packages:
+  - "apps/*"
+  - "packages/*"
+YAML
+  echo '{"name":"mono","private":true}' > package.json
+}
+
+declare_npm() {
+  echo '{"name":"mono","private":true,"workspaces":["apps/*"]}' > package.json
+}
+
+declare_yarn_object() {
+  echo '{"name":"mono","private":true,"workspaces":{"packages":["apps/*"]}}' > package.json
+}
+
+# ─── the pnpm gap (the reported bug) ───────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1232: push discovers workspace env files in a pnpm monorepo" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmrepo
+  declare_pnpm
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/admin/.env"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: push actually vaults pnpm workspace env files" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmreal
+  declare_pnpm
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  rm -f apps/web/.env apps/admin/.env
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" pull
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ -f apps/web/.env ]
+  [ -f apps/admin/.env ]
+  # The value that was empty in the .env.example — the actual impact.
+  [[ "$(cat apps/web/.env)" == *"pk_test_web"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: push -w works on a pnpm monorepo" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmw
+  declare_pnpm
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push -w
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"No workspaces field"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: pnpm-workspace.yaml is read without requiring a package.json" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmnopkg
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+packages:
+  - "apps/*"
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── pnpm YAML parsing edge cases ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1232: pnpm parsing stops at the next top-level key" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmkeys
+  # pnpm 10+ carries sibling top-level keys. They must not leak in as globs.
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+packages:
+  - "apps/*"
+
+onlyBuiltDependencies:
+  - esbuild
+  - sharp
+
+catalog:
+  react: ^18.0.0
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"esbuild"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"sharp"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: pnpm parsing handles quotes, bare entries, and comments" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmquotes
+  mkdir -p docs && echo "DOCS=1" > docs/.env
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+# which packages belong to this workspace
+packages:
+  - "apps/*"      # double quoted, with a trailing comment
+  - 'docs'        # single quoted, no glob
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"docs/.env"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: a pnpm-workspace.yaml with no packages key discovers nothing and says so" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo pnpmempty
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+onlyBuiltDependencies:
+  - esbuild
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"pnpm-workspace.yaml"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── the yarn object-form defect ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1232: yarn's object workspaces form is expanded, not iterated" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo yarnobj
+  declare_yarn_object
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/admin/.env"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: yarn object form works under -w" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo yarnobjw
+  declare_yarn_object
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push -w
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"No workspaces field"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── npm regression guard ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1232: npm's array workspaces form still works" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo npmarr
+  declare_npm
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/admin/.env"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: package.json workspaces wins when both sources are present" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo bothsrc
+  mkdir -p only-pnpm && echo "P=1" > only-pnpm/.env
+  echo '{"name":"mono","workspaces":["apps/*"]}' > package.json
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+packages:
+  - "only-pnpm"
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"apps/web/.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"only-pnpm/.env"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── diagnostics: the silence is the bug ───────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1232: a monorepo-shaped root with no readable workspace source warns" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo shaped
+  # Looks like a monorepo (pnpm-workspace.yaml present) but declares nothing.
+  echo "# nothing useful here" > pnpm-workspace.yaml
+  # A root .env so the push SUCCEEDS — the dangerous case is a green push
+  # that silently skipped every workspace, which is what bit thatsbait.
+  echo "ROOT=1" > .env
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"WARNING"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" == *"workspace"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: the warning tells you how to recover" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo shapedfix
+  echo "# nothing useful here" > pnpm-workspace.yaml
+  echo "ROOT=1" > .env
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"secrets add"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: a plain single-package project never warns about workspaces" {
+  init_with_remote
+  create_project_dir plainproj
+  printf '{\n  "version": 2,\n  "dotenv": [],\n  "external": []\n}\n' > .secrets.json
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"workspace"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: push -w names pnpm-workspace.yaml when that is the file present" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo wnames
+  echo '{"name":"mono"}' > package.json
+  echo "# no packages key" > pnpm-workspace.yaml
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push -w
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"pnpm-workspace.yaml"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: push -w still names package.json when no pnpm file exists" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo wnamespkg
+  echo '{"name":"mono"}' > package.json
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push -w
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"package.json"* ]] || false
+}
+
+# ─── path safety ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "EGB-1232: a pnpm packages entry cannot escape the project root" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo escapee
+  echo "OUTSIDE=1" > "$WORK_DIR/outside.env"
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+packages:
+  - "../"
+  - "/etc"
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" != *"outside.env"* ]] || false
+  [[ "$output" != *"/etc/"* ]] || false
+}
+
+@test "EGB-1232: a pnpm packages entry with shell metacharacters is refused" {
+  init_with_remote
+  make_monorepo metachars
+  cat > pnpm-workspace.yaml <<'YAML'
+packages:
+  - "apps/*; touch /tmp/egb1232-pwned"
+YAML
+
+  run "$SECRETS_BIN" push --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ ! -f /tmp/egb1232-pwned ]
+}